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ABSTRACT	  	  
	  
HOW	  COMMUNITY	  INSTITUTIONS	  IN	  TURKEY	  ENGAGE	  IN	  DISASTER	  RISK	  REDUCTION:	  
A	  CASE	  STUDY	  OF	  ISTANBUL	  AND	  ANTAKYA	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  how	  different	  community	  institutions	  –	  government,	  education,	  
healthcare,	  business,	  and	  grassroots	  organizations	  –	  in	  Turkey	  engage	  in	  disaster	  risk	  
reduction	  (DRR)	  strategies	  and	  how	  each	  institution	  fosters	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  The	  
framework	  used	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  adequate	  DRR	  engagement	  is	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  
for	  Action,	  which	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  resilience	  and	  preparedness	  created	  by	  the	  United	  
Nations	  International	  Strategy	  for	  Disaster	  Reduction	  (UNISDR).	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  research	  is	  
to	  understand	  the	  ways	  that	  DRR	  is	  integrated	  into	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  Turkey,	  using	  
the	  cities	  of	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya	  as	  the	  primary	  case	  study	  communities.	  The	  analyses	  of	  
twenty-­‐one	  interviews,	  as	  well	  as	  supplemental	  respondent	  surveys	  highlight	  primary	  
themes	  informing	  how	  the	  five	  community	  institutions	  address	  seismic	  risk	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  
current	  social	  organization	  of	  Turkey	  has	  key	  characteristics	  found	  in	  ‘fatalistic’	  societies,	  
or	  societies	  that	  are	  inherently	  reactive.	  However,	  the	  ways	  community	  institutions	  engage	  
in	  DRR	  proves	  that	  Turkey	  is	  determined	  to	  shift	  their	  behavior	  from	  reactive	  to	  proactive.	  
“A	  current	  state	  of	  unpreparedness”	  is	  how	  a	  respondent	  described	  the	  risk	  culture	  in	  
Turkey	  today.	  Still,	  an	  examination	  of	  all	  of	  the	  interviews	  verifies	  that,	  despite	  the	  barriers,	  
Turkey	  is	  slowly	  moving	  towards	  having	  a	  strong	  culture	  of	  resilience,	  and	  the	  social	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It	  is	  therefore	  trying	  to	  show	  how	  disasters	  can	  be	  perceived	  within	  the	  broader	  patterns	  of	  
society,	  and	  indeed	  how	  analyzing	  them	  in	  this	  way	  may	  provide	  a	  much	  more	  fruitful	  way	  of	  
building	  policies,	  that	  can	  help	  to	  reduce	  disasters	  and	  mitigate	  hazards,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  improving	  living	  standards	  and	  opportunities	  more	  generally.	  
-­‐Ben	  Wisner,	  Piers	  Blaikie,	  Terry	  Cannon,	  and	  Ian	  Davis	  -­‐	  At	  Risk:	  Natural	  Hazards,	  People’s	  
Vulnerability,	  and	  Disasters,	  2nd	  Edition,	  4	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CHAPTER	  1:	  DISASTER	  RISK	  REDUCTION	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  how	  different	  institutions—governments,	  schools,	  healthcare	  
institutions,	  businesses,	  and	  grassroots	  organizations—understand	  and	  engage	  in	  disaster	  
risk	  reduction	  (DRR)	  practices	  in	  Turkey.	  Through	  the	  analysis	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  
and	  survey	  data,	  this	  research	  specifically	  focuses	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  community	  
institutions	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  Turkey,	  to	  implement	  the	  United	  Nations	  International	  
Strategy	  for	  Disaster	  Reduction	  (UNISDR)	  framework	  of	  resilience	  and	  preparedness,	  
which	  is	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  (HFA).	  Survey	  data	  guides	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  barriers	  and	  resource	  needs	  Turkish	  institutions	  have	  when	  trying	  to	  implement	  DRR.	  
Primary	  themes	  found	  throughout	  qualitative	  interviews	  supplement	  the	  survey	  data	  by	  
highlighting	  the	  reasons	  these	  institutions	  function	  at	  a	  particular	  capacity.	  A	  culmination	  
of	  each	  institution’s	  ability	  to	  support	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  helps	  inform	  the	  general	  
structure	  of	  Turkey’s	  DRR	  efforts	  and	  how	  community	  institutions	  in	  Turkey	  foster	  a	  
culture	  of	  resilience.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  RESEARCH	  
	  
This	  thesis	  is	  one	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  study	  of	  DRR	  practices.	  I	  am	  a	  member	  of	  a	  team	  of	  
engineers	  and	  social	  scientists	  who	  visited	  11	  cities	  with	  high	  seismic	  risk	  in	  seven	  
countries	  to	  interview	  a	  variety	  of	  DRR	  professionals.	  The	  GeoHazards	  International-­‐
Colorado	  State	  University	  (GHI-­‐CSU)	  project,	  which	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  
Model	  Foundation	  (GEM),	  focused	  on	  DRR	  activities	  in	  Bhutan,	  India,	  Indonesia,	  New	  
Zealand,	  Peru,	  Turkey,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  target	  cities	  in	  the	  project	  included:	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Antakya,	  Bandung,	  Chincha,	  Christchurch,	  Delhi,	  Guwahati,	  Istanbul,	  Lima,	  Padang,	  San	  
Francisco,	  and	  Thimpu.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  the	  data	  gathered	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  
Turkey.	  	  
The	  project	  team	  began	  by	  first	  identifying	  first,	  vulnerable	  places	  that	  have	  high	  
seismic	  risk.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  team	  evaluated	  recency	  of	  earthquake	  (EQ)	  exposure,	  level	  of	  
experience	  in	  EQ	  mitigation,	  as	  well	  as	  overall	  risk	  for	  seismic	  activity.	  Next,	  we	  identified	  
locations	  with	  a	  range	  of	  vulnerable	  people	  due	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  factors	  including	  
national	  income,	  population,	  national	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  ratings	  on	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI),	  average	  educational	  attainment,	  gender	  
inequality	  indicators,	  and	  overall	  access	  to	  healthcare.	  Because	  we	  realized	  we	  could	  not	  
approach	  the	  entire	  population	  in	  these	  target	  cities,	  the	  team	  decided	  to	  conduct	  key	  
informant	  interviews	  with	  influential	  actors	  working	  in	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  in	  several	  
core	  community	  institutions.	  We	  only	  included	  community	  institutions	  that	  were	  actively	  
working	  on	  earthquake	  preparedness,	  mitigation,	  and/or	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  efforts	  so	  
we	  could	  learn	  about	  what	  actions	  these	  organizations	  were	  taking	  to	  reduce	  risk,	  what	  
barriers	  they	  face,	  and	  what	  they	  need	  to	  better	  carry	  out	  their	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  In	  
the	  end,	  we	  included	  individuals	  in	  the	  final	  sample	  who	  had	  the	  power	  to	  influence	  
decision-­‐making	  within	  the	  organization,	  district,	  city,	  or	  region	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  and	  B	  for	  
a	  more	  complete	  summary	  of	  the	  city	  and	  interviewee	  selection	  criteria).	  	  
Before	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  project	  began,	  members	  of	  the	  team	  participated	  in	  a	  
two-­‐day	  methods	  training	  session	  in	  Palo	  Alto,	  California.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  training	  session	  
was	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  in	  the	  work	  as	  well	  as	  to	  articulate	  and	  clarify	  the	  expectations	  
of	  each	  team	  member.	  During	  this	  workshop,	  we	  also	  reviewed	  several	  key	  research	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instruments,	  including	  a	  fieldwork	  guide,	  interview	  guide,	  survey,	  and	  demographic	  
questionnaire	  (see	  Appendix	  C,	  D,	  E	  and	  F).	  While	  I	  participated	  throughout	  each	  phase	  of	  
the	  GHI-­‐GEM	  project,	  my	  research	  and	  fieldwork	  were	  focused	  in	  Turkey.	  	  
	  
CASE	  STUDY	  AREA:	  TURKEY	  
	  
Location	  
Turkey	  is	  the	  37th	  largest	  nation	  in	  the	  world,	  covering	  783,562	  square	  kilometers.	  It	  
is	  located	  in	  the	  northeastern	  corner	  of	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea,	  with	  Greece	  and	  Bulgaria	  
bordering	  western	  Turkey	  and	  Syria,	  Iraq,	  Iran,	  Armenia,	  and	  Georgia	  border	  the	  east.	  
Turkey’s	  entire	  northern	  coastline	  is	  buttressed	  by	  the	  Black	  Sea	  while	  the	  Mediterranean	  
meets	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  southern	  and	  western	  coastline.	  All	  of	  the	  land	  west	  of	  the	  
Bosphorus	  River	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  on	  the	  continent	  of	  Europe	  and	  all	  of	  the	  land	  east	  of	  
the	  Bosphorus	  River	  is	  on	  the	  continent	  of	  Asia	  (see	  Figure	  1.1).	  Turkey	  has	  approximately	  
7,200	  kilometers	  of	  coastline	  and	  is	  slightly	  larger	  than	  the	  state	  of	  Texas.	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Figure	  1.1.	  Map	  of	  Turkey	  
	  
Government	  
	   Mustafa	  Kemal	  Ataturk	  founded	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  on	  October	  29,	  1923.	  Turkey	  
is	  a	  unitary	  state	  governed	  by	  the	  parliamentary	  democratic	  system.	  “The	  citizens	  exercise	  
their	  sovereignty	  directly	  by	  the	  elections,	  and	  indirectly	  by	  means	  of	  the	  authoritative	  
organizations…	  legislative,	  executive,	  and	  judiciary”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2).	  The	  legislative	  
branch	  is	  the	  Turkish	  Grand	  National	  Assembly,	  composed	  of	  550	  members	  of	  parliament	  
elected	  directly	  by	  the	  citizens	  every	  five	  years.	  The	  executive	  branch	  is	  made	  up	  of	  the	  
President	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  The	  Turkish	  Grand	  National	  
Assembly	  elects	  the	  President	  every	  seven	  years	  and	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  appoints	  
the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  Judicial	  power	  is	  used	  by	  means	  of	  the	  independent	  courts.	  	  
	   The	  country	  is	  divided	  up	  into	  81	  units,	  provinces,	  where	  appointed	  governors	  serve	  
the	  institutions	  functions	  of	  the	  government.	  Each	  province	  is	  divided	  into	  districts,	  and	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now	  there	  are	  over	  850	  districts	  in	  Turkey.	  Provinces,	  districts,	  and	  any	  settlement	  over	  
2,000	  people	  elect	  a	  mayor	  every	  five	  years.	  “While	  appointed	  governors	  are	  the	  
representatives	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  elected	  mayors	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  providing	  public	  services,	  
such	  as	  drinking	  water,	  waste	  management,	  transportation,	  etc.,	  to	  the	  citizens	  within	  the	  
district”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  3).	  
	  
Economy	  
Turkey	  has	  the	  17th	  largest	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  globally	  ($1.053	  trillion,	  
in	  US,	  2011	  dollars)	  but	  only	  the	  86th	  largest	  GDP	  per	  capita	  world-­‐wide	  ($14,600,	  in	  US,	  
2011	  dollars).	  Still,	  the	  economy	  in	  Turkey	  has	  grown	  rapidly	  as	  there	  is	  an	  influx	  of	  new	  
residents	  migrating	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas	  for	  industrial	  and	  service	  sector	  job	  
opportunities.	  Still,	  approximately	  25%	  of	  Turkey’s	  employed	  workers	  work	  in	  agriculture.	  
The	  aggressive	  privatization	  programs	  that	  started	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s	  in	  order	  to	  integrate	  
the	  Turkish	  economy	  with	  the	  global	  markets	  and	  to	  accelerate	  Turkey’s	  accession	  into	  the	  
European	  Union	  (EU)	  significantly	  decreased	  state	  involvement	  in	  basic	  industry,	  banking,	  
transport	  and	  communication	  (Ertuna	  1998;	  Kizil	  2006).	  During	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  
implementation,	  political,	  legal,	  and	  labor	  constraints	  limited	  the	  success	  of	  the	  transition	  
from	  public	  to	  private	  enterprises	  (Ertuna	  1998).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990’s,	  private	  
enterprises	  were	  the	  primary	  creator	  of	  jobs	  and	  national	  income	  (Kizil	  2006).	  This	  shift	  
from	  state	  economic	  enterprises	  (S.E.E)	  fueling	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  to	  successful	  
privatization	  practices	  led	  to	  an	  emerging	  cadre	  of	  middle-­‐class	  entrepreneurs	  that	  added	  
dynamism	  to	  the	  economy,	  expanding	  production	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  textiles	  and	  
clothing	  sectors	  (CIA	  2012).	  This	  shift	  has	  also	  created	  a	  more	  significant	  standard-­‐of-­‐living	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gap	  between	  the	  middle-­‐class	  and	  the	  poor.	  The	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  estimated	  that	  16.9%	  
of	  Turkish	  citizens	  were	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  in	  2010.	  In	  2011,	  10.3%	  of	  the	  
Turkish	  population	  was	  unemployed,	  making	  it	  the	  112th	  highest	  unemployment	  rate	  
worldwide.	  
In	  2001,	  following	  a	  national	  financial	  crisis,	  Turkey	  adopted	  economic	  reforms	  as	  
part	  of	  an	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  program.	  “The	  reforms	  strengthened	  the	  
countries	  economic	  fundamentals	  and	  ushered	  in	  an	  era	  of	  strong	  growth	  –	  averaging	  more	  
than	  6%	  annually”	  (CIA	  2012)	  until	  the	  global	  financial	  meltdown	  in	  2008.	  Although	  
Turkey	  experienced	  a	  marked	  economic	  slowdown	  due	  to	  the	  heightened	  risk	  perception	  
and	  adverse	  effects	  of	  the	  global	  crisis	  on	  banks’	  funding	  facilities,	  Turkey’s	  recovery	  from	  
the	  2008	  global	  financial	  crisis	  was	  relatively	  rapid	  when	  compared	  to	  many	  other	  nations	  
due	  to	  their	  well-­‐regulated	  financial	  markets	  and	  banking	  system	  (Yörükoğlu).	  
Turkey	  has	  been	  striving	  for	  decades	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EU.	  However,	  
because	  of	  their	  dependence	  on	  volatile,	  short-­‐term	  investments	  to	  supplement	  their	  large	  
trade	  deficit,	  their	  economy	  is	  seen	  as	  “vulnerable	  to	  destabilizing	  shifts	  in	  investor	  
confidence”	  (CIA	  2012).	  Despite	  their	  dependence	  on	  short-­‐term	  investments,	  they	  are	  not	  
as	  dependent	  on	  exports	  as	  many	  other	  emerging	  markets.	  	  
The	  service	  sector	  accounts	  for	  63.9%	  of	  Turkey’s	  annual	  GDP	  and	  industry	  
accounts	  for	  26.9%.	  	  Even	  though	  it	  employs	  25%	  of	  the	  Turkish	  workforce,	  the	  agriculture	  
industry	  accounts	  for	  only	  9.2%	  of	  Turkey’s	  annual	  GDP.	  Turkey’s	  main	  agricultural	  
products	  include	  tobacco,	  cotton,	  grain,	  olives,	  sugar	  beets,	  citrus,	  hazelnuts,	  and	  livestock.	  
The	  most	  prevalent	  industries	  in	  Turkey	  are	  textiles,	  food	  processing,	  automotive,	  
electronics,	  mining,	  steel,	  petroleum,	  construction,	  lumber,	  and	  paper.	  The	  UN	  estimates	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that	  the	  industrial	  production	  rate	  of	  the	  nation	  was	  8.5%	  in	  2011.	  Bakir	  and	  Boduroglu	  
(2004)	  claim	  that	  most	  of	  the	  industrial	  activity	  in	  Turkey	  occurs	  in	  one	  single	  area,	  the	  
Marmara	  region,	  which	  is	  considered	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  region	  in	  Turkey	  for	  volatile	  
seismic	  activity.	  Three-­‐quarters	  (75%)	  of	  Turkey’s	  profitable	  industries	  are	  located	  on	  the	  
Northern	  and	  Eastern	  Anatolian	  Faults	  (see	  Figure	  1.2	  and	  1.3).	  	  When	  Figures	  1.2	  -­‐	  1.5	  are	  
compared,	  they	  visually	  represent	  the	  areas	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  seismic	  activity,	  which	  
approximately	  mirror	  the	  same	  areas	  that	  are	  most	  densely	  populated	  as	  well	  as	  the	  same	  
areas	  that	  produce	  that	  highest	  per	  capita	  income	  for	  Turkey.	  
	  
Figure	  1.2	  GDP	  per	  Person	  in	  Turkey,	  by	  Region	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Source:	  http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/countries/tr/soertopic_view?topic=country%20introduction	  
Figure	  1.3	  Distribution	  of	  Economic	  Activities	  in	  Turkey	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Figure	  1.5	  Earthquakes	  Magnitude	  >	  4.0	  in	  Turkey,	  1900-­2011	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Population	   	  
Turkey’s	  population	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  79,749,	  461	  as	  of	  July	  2012,	  according	  to	  the	  
UN	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  live	  in	  the	  provinces	  of	  Istanbul,	  Kocaeli,	  and	  Sakarya	  in	  the	  
Marmara	  Region	  (Brinkhoff	  2012)	  (see	  Figure	  1.4).	  Turkey	  is	  the	  17th	  most	  populated	  
nation	  in	  the	  world.	  By	  2050,	  Turkey’s	  population	  is	  estimated	  to	  grow	  to	  100,000,000,	  
which	  would	  make	  it	  the	  largest	  nation	  in	  Europe	  by	  30,000,000.	  	  
The	  two	  primary	  ethnicities	  are	  Turkish	  (70-­‐75%)	  and	  Kurdish	  (18%),	  with	  
approximately	  12%	  of	  other	  minorities	  within	  its	  borders.	  The	  primary	  religion	  practiced	  is	  
Islam,	  with	  99.8%	  of	  all	  Turkish	  citizens	  being	  Sunni	  Muslims.	  The	  other	  0.2%	  are	  reported	  
to	  be	  Christians	  or	  Jews.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Turkish	  population	  is	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  15	  -­‐
64	  years	  old	  (~67.1%).	  The	  youth	  of	  the	  nation	  make	  up	  its	  second	  largest	  age	  group,	  as	  
26.6%	  of	  the	  population	  is	  between	  the	  ages	  0-­‐14.	  The	  elderly,	  age	  65	  years	  and	  older,	  
make	  up	  approximately	  6.3%	  of	  the	  Turkish	  population.	  Approximately	  87%	  of	  the	  
population	  is	  literate	  and	  the	  average	  Turk	  attends	  school	  for	  12	  years.	  	  
	  
Seismic	  Risk	  
Turkey’s	  risk	  for	  seismic	  activity	  is	  extremely	  high:	  92%	  of	  the	  nation’s	  land	  is	  prone	  
to	  EQ	  activity	  (Ural	  2008),	  making	  earthquakes	  the	  most	  prevalent	  and	  dangerous	  hazard	  
in	  Turkey.	  According	  to	  the	  national	  databases,	  from	  1900-­‐2011,	  more	  than	  10,000	  events	  
with	  a	  magnitude	  larger	  than	  4	  have	  occurred	  (humans	  cannot	  feel	  seismic	  activity	  below	  
magnitude	  4.)	  The	  number	  of	  events	  that	  have	  resulted	  in	  disaster	  during	  the	  same	  period	  
is	  significantly	  smaller,	  but	  the	  numbers	  are	  still	  in	  the	  hundreds	  (see	  Figure	  1.5).	  These	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events	  are	  due	  to	  the	  Northern	  Anatolian	  Fault,	  the	  Eastern	  Anatolian	  Fault,	  and	  the	  
Hellenic	  Trench	  or	  Arc,	  which	  digresses	  into	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  	  
The	  Northern	  Anatolian	  fault	  is	  a	  1,200-­‐kilometer	  long	  right-­‐lateral	  strike-­‐slip	  fault	  
and	  spans	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  Turkey	  from	  east	  to	  west.	  At	  the	  western	  end	  of	  the	  North	  
Anatolian	  fault	  is	  the	  Marmara	  region,	  where	  the	  fault	  branches	  into	  a	  series	  of	  sub	  parallel	  
fault	  systems.	  This	  series	  of	  faults	  is	  also	  the	  eastern	  most	  part	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Arc,	  or	  the	  
Hellenic	  Trench	  (Gulkan	  et	  al.	  2002).	  There	  is	  also	  the	  Eastern	  Anatolian	  fault,	  which	  runs	  
north	  to	  south	  (see	  Figure	  1.6).	  Bakir	  and	  Boduroglu	  (2004a)	  note	  that	  43%	  of	  the	  entire	  
Turkish	  population,	  or	  approximately	  34	  million	  people,	  live	  in	  potentially	  catastrophic	  
disaster	  regions	  (see	  Figure	  1.4).	  	  
In	  the	  last	  decade,	  five	  earthquakes	  significantly	  affected	  urban	  areas	  in	  Turkey.	  A	  
projected	  20,000	  people	  have	  died	  as	  a	  result,	  primarily	  through	  the	  collapse	  of	  residential	  
buildings.	  Viewed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  deaths	  and	  injuries,	  earthquakes	  account	  for	  
approximately	  97%	  of	  the	  losses	  in	  Turkey	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Approximately	  70,000	  
buildings	  have	  been	  irreparably	  damaged	  and	  20,000	  destroyed.	  The	  estimated	  cost	  of	  the	  
damage	  represented	  solely	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  buildings	  is	  between	  5	  and	  7	  billion	  USD	  
(Center	  2005).	  Measured	  in	  terms	  of	  direct	  economic	  losses,	  natural	  disasters	  have	  
accounted	  for	  1%	  loss	  on	  average	  GNP,	  of	  which	  earthquakes	  account	  for	  0.8%	  (Ergunay	  et	  
al.	  2012).	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I	  focused	  on	  two	  cities	  in	  Turkey	  as	  the	  primary	  case	  study	  areas	  for	  this	  thesis:	  
Istanbul	  and	  Antakya.	  These	  cities	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  the	  following	  criteria:	  1)	  city	  size	  
–	  one	  large	  (Istanbul)	  and	  one	  medium-­‐sized	  city	  (Antakya)	  were	  selected	  drawing	  on	  
World	  Bank	  population	  estimates;	  2)	  the	  level	  of	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  how	  recently	  a	  large	  
earthquake	  has	  affected	  them	  –	  Istanbul	  was	  last	  severely	  affected	  by	  a	  quake	  in	  1999	  and	  
Antakya	  in	  1998;	  and	  3)	  the	  city	  chosen	  to	  do	  field	  work	  in	  had	  to	  have	  a	  safe,	  stable,	  and	  
semi-­‐	  to	  fully	  democratic	  government	  structure.	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Istanbul	  
Istanbul,	  located	  in	  the	  northwestern	  corner	  of	  Turkey,	  is	  the	  21st	  largest	  city	  in	  the	  
world	  and	  the	  biggest	  metropolis	  in	  Turkey	  (Dursun	  2010)	  (See	  Figure	  1.7).	  It	  is	  also	  
considered	  the	  third	  largest	  metropolitan	  area	  in	  Europe	  as	  it	  spans	  a	  total	  area	  of	  5,343	  
square	  kilometers.	  In	  December	  2010,	  the	  population	  of	  Istanbul	  was	  estimated	  at	  13	  
million.	  On	  average,	  the	  rate	  of	  population	  growth	  is	  approximately	  3.45%,	  primarily	  due	  to	  
the	  influx	  of	  people	  from	  the	  surrounding	  rural	  areas	  (Municipality	  2008)	  (See	  Figure	  1.8).	  
Istanbul	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  cultural,	  economic,	  and	  financial	  center	  of	  Turkey.	  It	  lies	  directly	  
on	  the	  Bosphorus	  Strait,	  which	  connects	  the	  Sea	  of	  Marmara	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  and	  is	  the	  
only	  metropolis	  in	  the	  world	  that	  resides	  on	  two	  different	  continents	  (Europe	  and	  Asia)	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Figure	  1.8	  Population	  Density	  of	  Istanbul	  in	  2007	  
	  
	  
Istanbul	  is	  situated	  atop	  the	  North	  Anatolian	  Fault,	  which	  has	  been	  responsible	  for	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  deadly	  earthquakes	  in	  Turkish	  history.	  There	  is	  a	  record	  of	  an	  earthquake	  
in	  1509,	  which	  also	  caused	  a	  tsunami,	  killing	  10,000	  people	  and	  destroying	  over	  100	  
historically	  significant	  buildings	  and	  religious	  centers	  (Erdik	  2008).	  In	  1999,	  the	  most	  
recent	  deadly	  earthquake	  killed	  approximately	  17,000	  people	  in	  the	  Marmara	  Region.	  This	  
event,	  and	  the	  losses	  it	  generated,	  made	  the	  citizens	  of	  Istanbul	  more	  aware	  of	  their	  
vulnerability,	  as	  thousands	  of	  structures	  recently	  built	  to	  accommodate	  the	  city’s	  rapidly	  
increasing	  population	  collapsed.	  These	  structures	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  withstand	  an	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earthquake	  because	  they	  were	  not	  constructed	  according	  to	  earthquake-­‐safe	  building	  
regulations	  (Revkin	  2010).	  Looking	  towards	  the	  future,	  geologists	  and	  seismologists	  have	  
predicted	  that	  there	  is	  a	  60%	  chance	  that	  a	  7.6	  magnitude	  earthquake	  will	  occur	  in	  the	  
Marmara	  region	  before	  2030	  (Traynor	  2006).	  To	  maintain	  the	  safety	  of	  Istanbul’s	  ever-­‐
increasing	  urban	  population	  density,	  earthquake-­‐safe	  building	  regulations	  for	  the	  Marmara	  
region	  have	  been	  improved	  upon	  and	  are	  now	  regularly	  enforced.	  Many	  of	  the	  government	  
owned	  buildings	  have	  been	  retrofitted	  (schools,	  hospitals,	  government	  buildings),	  but	  the	  
residential	  building	  stock	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  still	  considered	  a	  hazard.	  
The	  religion	  most	  practiced	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  Islam,	  with	  over	  2,900	  active	  mosques	  
within	  the	  city	  (CIA	  2011).	  The	  majority	  of	  Istanbul	  residents	  are	  Sunni	  Muslims	  while	  the	  
next	  most	  populated	  religious	  community	  is	  the	  Alevi.	  Religious	  minorities	  include	  Greek	  
Orthodox	  Christians,	  Armenian	  Christians,	  Syriac	  Oriental	  Orthodox	  Christians,	  Catholic	  
Levantines,	  and	  Sephardic	  Jews	  (CIA	  2011).	  Many	  districts	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  ethnically	  
exclusive	  as	  there	  are	  sizable	  populations	  of	  Greeks,	  Levantines,	  Jews,	  and	  Armenians	  that	  
reside	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  Istanbul.	  
Istanbul	  has	  always	  been	  and	  remains	  the	  center	  of	  Turkey’s	  economic	  prosperity	  
mostly	  because	  of	  its	  ideal	  location	  between	  international	  land	  and	  sea	  trade	  routes.	  
Istanbul	  employs	  20%	  of	  all	  of	  Turkey’s	  industrial	  laborers	  and	  is	  the	  home	  to	  38%	  of	  
Turkey’s	  industrial	  workspace	  (Dursun	  2010).	  Istanbul	  and	  its	  surrounding	  provinces	  
produce	  cotton,	  fruit,	  olive	  oil,	  silk,	  and	  tobacco.	  Food	  processing,	  textile	  production,	  oil	  
products,	  rubber,	  metal	  ware,	  leather,	  pharmaceuticals,	  electronics,	  glass,	  machinery,	  
automotive,	  transport	  vehicles,	  paper	  products,	  and	  alcoholic	  drinks	  are	  among	  the	  city’s	  
major	  industrial	  products	  (Trade	  1923-­‐2006).	  Istanbul	  generates	  55%	  of	  Turkey’s	  trade	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revenue	  as	  well	  as	  40%	  of	  all	  Turkish	  taxes.	  The	  cities’	  work	  force	  also	  produces	  27.5%	  of	  
Turkey’s	  national	  product	  (CIA	  2011).	  
	   Istanbul	  has	  over	  35	  public	  and	  private	  universities,	  many	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  15th	  
and	  17th	  centuries.	  The	  city	  has	  many	  public	  and	  private	  hospitals,	  clinics,	  and	  laboratories	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  medical	  research	  centers.	  Many	  of	  these	  facilities	  have	  the	  latest	  in	  
technologically	  advanced	  medical	  equipment,	  which	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  recent	  upsurge	  
in	  ‘medical	  tourism’	  (Connel	  2010).	  Istanbul	  has	  a	  vast	  and	  efficient	  public	  transportation	  
system	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  transportation	  options	  available	  to	  the	  everyday	  citizen	  including	  
ferries,	  sea	  buses,	  roads,	  highways,	  railways,	  trams,	  funiculars,	  light	  rail,	  bus	  rapid	  transit,	  
and	  an	  underground	  metro	  system	  (which	  is	  continually	  undergoing	  updates	  and	  
extensions).	  
To	  date,	  Istanbul’s	  most	  destructive	  earthquake	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  economic	  and	  
physical	  losses	  occurred	  on	  August	  17,	  1999.	  The	  epicenter	  of	  this	  quake	  was	  
approximately	  65	  miles	  (106	  km)	  east	  of	  Istanbul	  (see	  Figure	  1.7).	  This	  event	  is	  typically	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  Kocaeli	  or	  Izmit	  Earthquake	  and	  was	  measured	  as	  a	  7.6	  magnitude	  on	  the	  
10-­‐point	  Richter	  scale.	  Approximately	  17,000	  people	  died	  throughout	  the	  Marmara	  Region.	  
Within	  the	  provinces	  in	  the	  Marmara	  Region,	  including	  Istanbul,	  Kocaeli,	  and	  Sakarya,	  the	  
United	  States	  Geological	  Survey	  (USGS)	  estimated	  fiscal	  losses	  to	  be	  between	  3	  and	  6.5	  
billion.	  Approximately	  120,000	  houses	  were	  damaged	  beyond	  repair	  and	  between	  27,000	  
and	  35,000	  buildings	  needed	  to	  be	  demolished	  because	  of	  irreparable	  damage	  (Ansal	  
1999).	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  the	  earthquake	  was	  so	  devastating	  was	  because	  of	  the	  poor	  
quality	  of	  the	  building	  stock	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  residents	  dependent	  on	  illegally	  built,	  
squatter	  structures.	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Structures	  built	  before	  1999	  were	  primarily	  constructed	  out	  of	  unreinforced	  
masonry,	  unreinforced	  concrete,	  and	  reinforced	  concrete	  frames	  with	  masonry	  infills	  and	  
designed	  only	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  the	  building	  inhabitants.	  Even	  today,	  the	  
Earthquake	  Engineering	  Research	  Institute	  (EERI)	  estimates	  that	  80%	  of	  Turkey’s	  urban	  
households	  live	  in	  mid-­‐rise	  apartment	  blocks	  constructed	  of	  reinforced	  concrete	  with	  
masonry	  infill	  and	  the	  masonry-­‐blocks	  are	  rarely	  connected	  structurally	  to	  the	  reinforced	  
concrete	  frame.	  These	  types	  of	  built	  structures	  do	  not	  perform	  well	  in	  seismic	  events	  
because	  there	  is	  “insufficient	  lateral	  resistance	  in	  the	  framing	  system”	  (Gulkan	  et	  al.	  2002)	  
and	  weak	  first	  floors,	  which	  is	  another	  prevalent	  structural	  design	  issue	  that	  leads	  to	  
increased	  losses	  in	  earthquakes.	  Additionally,	  insufficient	  construction	  materials	  and	  the	  
prevalent	  use	  of	  unreinforced	  concrete	  are	  unable	  to	  withstand	  the	  lateral	  loads	  caused	  by	  
ground	  shaking.	  	  
The	  Pacific	  Disaster	  Center	  (PDC)	  reports	  the	  rate	  of	  urban	  growth	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  
resulting	  in	  incompatible	  land-­‐use	  and	  a	  “planning	  system	  that	  incentivizes	  the	  
development	  of	  informal	  and	  poor	  settlements	  in	  the	  city”	  (Initiative	  2005,	  15).	  This	  poorly	  
built,	  aging	  infrastructure	  is	  the	  product	  of	  years	  spent	  using	  inappropriate	  materials	  and	  
construction	  technologies	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  of	  building	  codes	  and	  
standards.	  Without	  these	  fundamental	  precautions	  even	  the	  most	  minimal	  seismic	  
protections	  to	  basic	  housing	  are	  absent	  and	  will	  result	  in	  catastrophic	  losses	  when	  
earthquakes	  do	  occur.	  	  
The	  physical	  infrastructure	  and	  social	  structure	  of	  Istanbul	  have	  changed	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  large	  migration	  of	  rural	  citizens	  looking	  for	  employment.	  This	  rapid	  population	  
growth	  led	  to	  an	  increased	  need	  for	  housing.	  This	  migration	  has	  transformed	  the	  city	  of	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Istanbul	  into	  a	  bustling	  industrial	  city	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  inhabitants	  living	  in	  “semi-­‐
squatter,	  multi-­‐story	  buildings”(Dursun	  2010,	  2).	  Without	  permission	  or	  regard	  for	  federal	  
building	  codes,	  poor	  migrants	  build	  built	  shoddy	  structures	  on	  land	  that	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  
them.	  Besides	  the	  perceived	  benefit	  of	  avoiding	  the	  cost	  of	  engineers	  and	  contractors,	  
Green	  (2006)	  reports	  that	  new	  residents	  prefer	  unauthorized	  construction	  and	  self-­‐built	  
structures	  because	  they	  actually	  decreased	  the	  resident’s	  perception	  of	  their	  vulnerability	  
to	  any	  sort	  of	  geological	  risk.	  However,	  in	  actuality,	  unauthorized	  construction	  increased	  
the	  physical	  vulnerability	  of	  structures.	  Structural	  specifications	  are	  often	  inadequate,	  
materials	  used	  are	  insufficient,	  cost-­‐saving	  cheaper	  materials	  are	  made	  weaker,	  and	  often	  
construction	  is	  never	  fully	  finished.	  The	  result	  is	  structurally	  insufficient	  buildings	  that	  do	  
not	  meet	  code	  and	  that	  increase	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  already	  overpopulated	  area.	  
Rapid	  industrialization	  brought	  thousands	  of	  the	  rural	  poor	  into	  the	  metropolis	  and	  
a	  social	  gap	  between	  ‘natives’	  and	  migrants	  was	  created.	  As	  of	  2010,	  housing	  has	  been	  one	  
of	  the	  biggest	  indicators	  of	  status	  in	  Istanbul	  (Dursun	  2010).	  ‘Native’	  residents	  tend	  to	  live	  
in	  more	  suburban	  areas	  or	  in	  tunnel	  form	  buildings,	  which	  are	  compatible	  with	  seismic	  
building	  codes	  and	  therefore	  safer	  for	  the	  residents.	  Istanbul’s	  “wealthy	  elite	  (about	  25%)	  
lives	  in	  newly	  built	  suburbs	  and	  enjoys	  the	  sophistication	  of	  Istanbul’s	  society”	  (Initiative	  
2005,	  2).	  Migrant	  residents	  reside	  in	  structures	  they	  built	  illegally	  and	  by	  themselves,	  
without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  an	  engineer,	  contractor,	  or	  seismologist	  about	  the	  appropriate	  
considerations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  made	  in	  order	  to	  make	  their	  structure	  as	  safe	  as	  possible.	  
These	  structures	  rarely	  comply	  with	  seismic	  building	  codes	  and	  are	  therefore	  more	  
dangerous	  structures	  to	  live	  in	  than	  newer	  buildings	  that	  are	  built	  according	  to	  code.	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Following	  the	  disastrous	  Kocaeli	  earthquake	  in	  1999,	  the	  Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  
Municipality	  (IMM)	  made	  drastic	  changes	  to	  the	  overall	  structure	  of	  their	  Risk	  Mitigation	  
and	  Emergency	  Preparedness	  division	  in	  order	  to	  make	  Istanbul	  a	  disaster	  resistant	  city.	  
The	  IMM	  initiated	  the	  Istanbul	  Seismic	  Risk	  Mitigation	  and	  Emergency	  Preparedness	  
Project	  (ISMEP)	  to	  improve	  Istanbul’s	  preparedness	  for	  a	  potential	  earthquake	  through	  a)	  
enhancing	  institutional	  and	  technical	  capacity	  for	  disaster	  management	  and	  emergency	  
response,	  b)	  strengthening	  critical	  public	  facilities	  for	  earthquake	  resistance,	  and	  c)	  
supporting	  measures	  for	  better	  enforcement	  of	  building	  codes	  and	  land	  use	  plans	  (Cilingir	  
2010).	  
The	  majority	  of	  current	  earthquake	  regulations,	  legislation,	  awareness	  projects,	  as	  
well	  as	  structural	  and	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  took	  place	  in	  the	  months	  following	  the	  
Kocaeli	  Earthquake	  of	  1999.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  seismic	  performance	  of	  the	  building	  stock	  in	  
Istanbul	  substantially	  improved	  after	  2000	  due	  to	  improved	  construction	  materials,	  
building	  techniques,	  and	  enforcement	  regulations	  that	  in	  turn	  were	  possible	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
increases	  awareness	  of	  risk	  as	  well	  as	  DRR	  practices.	  Minimal	  code	  compliance	  buildings	  
were	  built	  before	  1980,	  moderate	  code	  compliance	  buildings	  were	  built	  between	  1980	  and	  
2000,	  and	  maximum	  code	  compliance	  buildings	  were	  built	  after	  2000.	  The	  primary	  
deficiencies	  found	  in	  minimal	  and	  moderate	  code	  compliance	  buildings	  are	  weak	  material	  
strength	  and	  lack	  of	  seismic	  design	  considerations	  (Cilingir	  2010).	  Despite	  recent	  
developments	  born	  out	  of	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  Kocaeli	  earthquake,	  the	  majority	  of	  
buildings	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  still	  masonry	  construction.	  Masonry	  construction	  is	  cheap	  even	  
though	  it	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  create	  structurally	  sound	  buildings.	  Steel,	  reinforced	  concrete	  
framing,	  and	  reinforced	  concrete	  framing	  with	  shear	  walls	  are	  also	  used	  (Cilingir	  2010).	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As	  part	  of	  The	  Study	  on	  Disaster	  Prevention	  /	  Mitigation	  Basic	  Plan	  in	  Istanbul,	  
Republic	  of	  Turkey,	  funded	  by	  the	  Japan	  International	  Cooperation	  Agency	  (JICA),	  the	  IMM	  
conducted	  a	  variety	  of	  seismic	  scenarios	  using	  current	  data	  on	  social	  vulnerability	  
indicators	  and	  disaster	  risk	  management	  models.	  The	  most	  likely	  scenario	  and	  the	  worst-­‐
case	  scenario	  were	  of	  most	  interest	  to	  the	  Municipality,	  so	  they	  decided	  to	  share	  these	  
noteworthy	  areas	  of	  focus	  that	  would	  be	  seminal	  to	  decision-­‐makers,	  investment	  
opportunities	  and	  DRR;	  rates	  of	  death	  and	  damage	  to	  buildings	  (Erdik	  2008).	  	  	  
These	  visual	  representations	  help	  to	  raise	  risk	  awareness	  through	  publicizing	  
what	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  impacts	  of	  the	  disaster.	  They	  are	  also	  used	  for	  policy	  and	  
decision-­‐making	  purposes.	  Figure	  1.9	  provides	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  most	  likely	  
scenario	  of	  deaths	  by	  borough.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  deaths	  in	  the	  most	  likely	  scenario	  would	  
occur	  in	  the	  western	  most	  part	  of	  the	  metropolis.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  population	  
density	  of	  areas	  within	  the	  city	  (Figure	  1.7)	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  of	  estimated	  deaths	  
that	  would	  occur.	  For	  example,	  800	  deaths	  estimated	  in	  a	  borough	  with	  a	  population	  of	  
80,000	  would	  result	  in	  1.0%	  of	  their	  population	  dead.	  However,	  should	  800	  deaths	  be	  
estimated	  in	  a	  borough	  with	  a	  population	  of	  10,000,	  the	  percentage	  of	  lives	  lost	  would	  be	  
greater	  at	  8.0%.	  This	  will	  give	  us	  a	  relative	  proportion	  of	  number	  of	  deaths	  per	  borough,	  
providing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  a	  seismic	  event	  would	  have	  on	  the	  city.	  
In	  the	  most	  likely	  scenario,	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  the	  highest	  in	  
the	  densely	  populated	  southern	  area	  directly	  off	  of	  the	  Bosphorus	  Straight	  on	  the	  European	  
side	  (see	  red	  area	  in	  Figure	  1.7).	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  locations	  that	  are	  equally	  dense	  
in	  population	  if	  not	  more	  so,	  and	  the	  estimated	  number	  of	  deaths	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  
in	  the	  red	  area.	  The	  number	  of	  deaths	  per	  borough	  increases	  in	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	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but	  the	  distribution	  of	  lives	  lost	  is	  relatively	  proportionate	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  lives	  lost	  in	  
the	  most	  likely	  scenario.	  However,	  the	  population	  density	  of	  the	  areas	  estimated	  to	  have	  
the	  most	  deaths	  in	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  is	  not	  near	  the	  red	  area.	  These	  areas	  are	  located	  
in	  the	  western	  part	  of	  the	  city	  and	  are	  sparsely	  populated	  (see	  Figure	  1.10).	  
The	  study	  also	  looked	  at	  the	  estimated	  number	  of	  severely	  damaged	  buildings	  in	  
the	  most	  likely	  scenario	  (Figure	  1.11)	  and	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  (Figure	  1.12).	  Both	  
reflect	  losses	  to	  be	  highest	  in	  the	  sparsely	  populated	  areas	  that	  were	  estimated	  to	  also	  have	  
the	  most	  deaths	  in	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  the	  western	  most	  parts	  of	  the	  city.	  Also,	  the	  
number	  of	  estimated	  buildings	  to	  be	  severely	  damaged	  was	  greater	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  city	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  southeastern	  portion	  of	  the	  city.	  These	  are	  also	  areas	  that	  are	  sparsely	  
populated	  compared	  to	  other	  areas	  in	  Istanbul.	  In	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  representing	  the	  
amount	  of	  severely	  damaged	  buildings,	  the	  increase	  is	  noticeable	  from	  the	  amount	  of	  
damaged	  estimated	  in	  the	  most	  likely	  scenario,	  but	  still	  slight	  (compare	  Figure	  1.11	  and	  
1.12).	  This	  slight	  change	  in	  damage	  could	  have	  considerable	  effects	  on	  the	  types	  of	  actions	  
decision-­‐makers	  take	  when	  considering	  methods	  of	  DRR	  as	  well	  as	  where	  to	  focus	  DRR	  in	  
Istanbul.	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Figure	  1.9	  Most	  Likely	  Scenario	  –	  Number	  of	  Deaths	  by	  Borough
Marmara	  Sea	  
Major	  Highways	  
Number	  of	  Estimated	  Deaths	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Figure	  1.10	  Worst-­Case	  Scenario	  –	  Number	  of	  Deaths	  by	  Borough	  
	  
Number	  of	  Estimated	  Deaths	  
Marmara	  Sea	  
Major	  Highways	  
Number	  of	  Estimated	  Deaths	  
	  
	  
	   25	  
Figure	  1.11	  Most	  Likely	  Scenario	  –	  Number	  of	  Severely	  Damaged	  Buildings	  by	  
Neighborhood	  
	  
Number	  of	  Severely	  Damaged	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Figure	  1.12	  Worst-­Case	  Scenario	  –	  Number	  of	  Buildings	  Severely	  Damaged	  by	  District	  
	   	  
Population	  size,	  demographics,	  geography,	  cultural	  significance,	  construction	  
practices	  and	  standards,	  and	  the	  dependency	  the	  rest	  of	  Turkey	  has	  on	  Istanbul	  makes	  it	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  places	  to	  study	  as	  well	  as	  implement	  DRR.	  As	  seen	  by	  the	  most	  
likely	  earthquake	  scenario	  and	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  measured	  by	  the	  IMM,	  both	  
physical	  and	  economic	  losses	  will	  be	  substantial	  and	  devastating	  if	  critical	  structures	  and	  
sectors	  for	  intervention	  are	  not	  identified	  and	  DRR	  is	  not	  implemented.	  	  
	  
Number	  of	  Buildings	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Antakya	  
The	  historical	  city	  of	  Antioch,	  modern	  day	  Antakya,	  is	  the	  provincial	  capital	  of	  the	  
province	  of	  Hatay.	  Antakya	  has	  a	  population	  of	  approximately	  215,000	  people.	  Antakya	  is	  
located	  in	  the	  southeastern	  corner	  of	  Turkey	  and	  borders	  Syria	  (see	  Figure	  1.12).	  Due	  to	  its	  
relative	  proximity	  to	  Syria,	  Antakya	  is	  more	  cosmopolitan	  than	  most	  other	  cities	  in	  Turkey,	  
though	  when	  compared	  to	  Istanbul,	  Antakya	  seems	  severely	  rural.	  The	  two	  primary	  
languages	  spoken	  in	  Antakya	  are	  Turkish	  and	  Arabic.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  
Antakya	  are	  Sunni	  Muslims	  but	  a	  substantial	  population	  identify	  as	  Alevis	  and	  Arab	  Nusayri	  
Muslims.	  Antakya	  is	  considered	  a	  pilgrimage	  point	  for	  Christians	  and	  therefore	  is	  home	  to	  
several	  small	  communities	  of	  Christians.	  
	   Mustafa	  Kemal	  is	  the	  only	  University	  in	  Antakya	  and	  has	  around	  25,000	  students.	  
Antakya	  is	  known	  for	  its	  local	  products	  and	  traditions.	  The	  prominent	  local	  craft	  is	  soap	  
scented	  with	  bay	  tree	  oil	  and	  the	  local	  sweet	  treat,	  kunefe,	  is	  hot	  white	  cheese	  doused	  in	  
sweet	  syrup.	  Surrounding	  Antakya,	  the	  Nur	  Mountains	  to	  the	  north	  and	  Mount	  Keldag	  to	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Figure	  1.13	  Map	  of	  Turkey	  –	  Antakya	  	  
	  
The	  most	  recent	  and	  significant	  earthquake	  event	  that	  made	  the	  citizens	  of	  Hatay	  
province	  aware	  of	  their	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  changed	  the	  way	  community	  institutions	  
interact	  with	  DRR	  happened	  on	  June	  27,	  1998.	  An	  estimated	  15,000	  people	  in	  the	  province	  
of	  Hatay	  were	  injured	  and	  140	  were	  killed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  magnitude	  6.2	  event.	  
Approximately	  1,000	  buildings	  were	  damaged	  beyond	  repair	  or	  collapsed	  during	  the	  EQ.	  
Critical	  facilities	  in	  the	  Hatay	  province,	  three	  hospitals	  and	  six	  schools,	  were	  damaged	  
beyond	  use	  (EERI	  1998a).	  According	  to	  the	  Earthquake	  Engineering	  Research	  Institute	  
(1998b),	  “…	  many	  of	  the	  structural	  failures	  happened	  because	  ‘they	  use	  cinder	  block-­‐filled	  
joist	  floors...	  The	  resulting	  flat	  beams	  have	  little	  rotation/	  energy	  absorption	  capacity.	  
Added	  factors	  such	  as	  poor	  details,	  poor	  concrete	  quality,	  and	  the	  ever-­‐present	  ground	  
story	  shops	  compound	  the	  issue.’”	  Similar	  to	  Istanbul,	  weak	  materials	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  
consideration	  for	  seismic	  construction	  and	  design	  were	  the	  two	  primary	  causes	  of	  building	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damage	  and	  collapse.	  According	  to	  the	  detailed	  analysis	  provided	  by	  the	  Earthquake	  
Engineering	  Research	  Institute	  (EERI)	  the	  causes	  of	  damage	  was	  attributed	  to	  one	  or	  a	  
combination	  of	  the	  following	  (EERI	  1998b):	  
• Soft	  first	  story	  (now	  an	  internationally	  known	  defect	  in	  design)	  
• Inadequate	  detailing	  and	  reinforcements	  of	  column-­‐beam	  connections	  
• Design	  of	  strong	  beam/weak	  columns	  rather	  than	  strong-­‐column	  weak	  beams	  
• Creation	  of	  short-­‐columns	  due	  to	  infill	  walls	  or	  offset	  designs	  
• Unreinforced	  concrete	  and/or	  brick	  masonry	  piers	  or	  coupling	  beams	  
• Age	  of	  deteriorated	  buildings	  with	  little	  lateral	  load	  resistance	  
• Questionable	  quality	  of	  materials	  used	  (concrete,	  steel,	  mortar,	  brick,	  cinder	  block,	  
river	  washed	  stone-­‐masonry)	  
• Site	  effects,	  double	  resonance	  and	  soil-­‐structure	  interaction	  of	  the	  five	  to	  ten-­‐story	  
buildings	  on	  alluvial	  with	  single	  story	  basements	  and	  no	  piles.	  	  
EERI	  also	  reported	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  building	  designs	  and	  structures	  failed	  primarily	  
because	  of	  the	  location,	  characteristics,	  and	  the	  peak	  acceleration	  of	  ground	  motions	  of	  the	  
June	  27th	  event.	  	  
Unlike	  Istanbul,	  the	  Antakya	  Municipality	  does	  not	  have	  their	  own	  municipal	  laws	  
dictating	  DRR	  participation	  and	  responsibility.	  However,	  they	  regulate	  their	  DRR	  and	  
emergency	  response	  systems	  according	  to	  the	  national	  standards	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  Turkish	  
government.	  Turkey’s	  seismic	  code	  became	  a	  legalized	  provision	  in	  1944	  and	  annual	  
updates	  are	  made	  to	  the	  code;	  however,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  those	  codes	  on	  the	  physical	  
infrastructure	  have	  proven	  lax	  if	  not	  entirely	  absent	  (Gulkan	  2002).	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OVERVIEW	  OF	  THESIS	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  review	  the	  literature	  regarding	  DRR	  policies,	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  
earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  policies	  (EQRR)	  in	  Turkey.	  Next,	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  literature	  
documented	  the	  role	  and	  signficance	  of	  five	  community	  institutions	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  
strategies	  and	  influence	  in	  DRR.	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  describe	  the	  methodological	  approaches	  I	  
used	  	  in	  order	  to	  gather	  and	  analyze	  data	  that	  would	  supplement	  my	  knowledge	  of	  DRR	  in	  
Turkey.	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  which	  offer	  case	  studies	  of	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  respectively,	  	  
include	  analyses	  of	  the	  five	  community	  institution’s	  role	  in	  DRR	  and	  any	  supplemental	  data	  
collected	  in	  the	  target	  cities.	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  analyze	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	  data	  and	  
explain	  how	  the	  barriers	  and	  resources	  needs	  reported	  in	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	  help	  to	  
understand	  how	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR.	  Finally,	  in	  my	  conclusion,	  I	  
summarize	  how	  the	  five	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR,	  identify	  the	  primary	  
barriers	  and	  resource	  needs	  that	  affect	  DRR	  participation,	  and	  present	  how	  this	  thesis	  may	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CHAPTER	  2:	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
	  
This	  chapter	  reviews	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  United	  Nations	  International	  
Strategy	  for	  Disaster	  Reduction	  (UNISDR),	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  (HFA),	  and	  
how	  community	  institutions	  (are	  recommended	  to)	  engage	  in	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  (DRR)	  
practices.	  In	  the	  subsequent	  pages,	  I	  explore	  what	  DRR	  means	  using	  the	  UN	  framework.	  
Specifically,	  I	  focus	  on	  five	  key	  community	  institutions:	  1)	  government,	  2)	  business,	  3)	  
education,	  4)	  healthcare,	  and	  5)	  grassroots	  organizations.	  I	  then	  examine	  how	  these	  five	  
community	  institutions	  in	  Turkey	  engage	  in	  DRR	  practices,	  with	  a	  special	  emphasis	  on	  
reducing	  earthquake	  risk.	  	  
	  
UNITED	  NATIONS	  INTERNATIONAL	  STRATEGY	  FOR	  DISASTER	  REDUCTION	  
	  
	  The	  United	  Nations	  International	  Strategy	  for	  Disaster	  Reduction	  (UNISDR)	  is	  a	  
global	  strategy	  “to	  engage	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors	  in	  a	  coordinated	  effort	  to	  reduce	  the	  risks	  
of	  disasters	  and	  to	  build	  ‘a	  culture	  of	  prevention’	  in	  society	  as	  part	  of	  sustainable	  
development”	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  1).	  The	  UNISDR	  designs	  and	  uses	  cooperative	  mechanisms	  
(most	  recently,	  the	  biennial	  Global	  Platform	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction),	  through	  which	  
governments,	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  
technical	  institutions	  and	  networks,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  and	  civil	  society	  
organizations	  interact,	  share	  information,	  and	  collaborate	  on	  risk	  reduction	  initiatives.	  
Primarily,	  UNISDR	  coordinates	  the	  partnerships	  and	  leads	  a	  global	  DRR	  movement	  focused	  
on	  meeting	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  of	  Action	  (UNISDR	  2011b).	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What	  is	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  (DRR)?	  
The	  UN	  (2011)	  defines	  DRR	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  reducing	  disaster	  risks	  through	  
systematic	  efforts	  to	  analyze	  and	  manage	  the	  causal	  factors	  of	  disasters.	  There	  are	  many	  
opinions	  with	  regards	  to	  what	  the	  causal	  factors	  of	  disasters	  are.	  The	  UN	  determines	  the	  
causal	  factors,	  or	  “root	  causes,”	  of	  disasters	  as	  the	  exposure	  to	  hazards,	  level	  of	  
vulnerability	  of	  people	  and	  property,	  management	  of	  land	  and	  the	  environment,	  and	  level	  
of	  preparedness	  for	  adverse	  events.	  I	  will	  use	  the	  model	  created	  by	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  
Model	  Foundation	  and	  explain	  the	  causal	  factors	  of	  disasters	  using	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  hazard,	  
the	  exposure	  to	  the	  hazard,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  vulnerability	  or	  lack	  of	  capacity	  to	  cope.	  
	  






	   33	  
Hazard,	  Exposure,	  and	  Vulnerability	  
The	  three	  primary	  causal	  factors	  (hazard,	  exposure,	  vulnerability)	  are	  all	  
measurements	  of	  variables	  that	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  a	  community’s	  risk.	  Vulnerability	  is	  
defined	  as	  the	  pre-­‐event	  characteristics	  or	  qualities	  of	  a	  system	  (social,	  economic,	  
environmental,	  etc)	  that	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  harm.	  Adger	  (2006)	  explains	  that	  
vulnerability	  is	  a	  function	  of	  exposure	  (who	  or	  what	  is	  at	  risk)	  and	  sensitivity	  (the	  degree	  
to	  which	  people	  and	  places	  can	  be	  harmed).	  Wisner	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  explains	  that	  vulnerability	  
is	  “…	  generated	  by	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  processes	  that	  influence	  how	  hazards	  
affect	  people	  in	  varying	  ways	  and	  with	  differing	  intensities.”	  The	  level	  of	  vulnerability	  
generally	  refers	  to	  the	  capacity	  (or	  lack	  of	  capacity)	  of	  an	  individual,	  community,	  or	  society	  
to	  cope	  with	  a	  hazardous	  event.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  vulnerability	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  probability	  
of	  loss	  given	  a	  level	  of	  ground	  shaking	  for	  physical	  vulnerability	  and	  through	  indicators	  that	  
envelop	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  factors	  known	  to	  be	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  disaster	  vulnerability.	  
There	  are	  a	  multitude	  of	  indices	  and	  combination	  of	  variables	  used	  worldwide	  to	  measure	  
vulnerability,	  although	  a	  ‘best	  practice’	  index	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  determined.	  While	  considering	  
the	  inherent	  weaknesses	  within	  systems	  that	  make	  them	  at	  risk,	  it	  is	  also	  essential	  to	  
consider	  the	  modes	  of	  resilience.	  	  
As	  resilience	  has	  a	  variety	  of	  meanings	  to	  different	  fields	  of	  study,	  I	  will	  use	  Klein’s	  
(2003)	  definition,	  which	  has	  been	  supplemented	  by	  Burton	  (2011).	  Resilience	  is	  “the	  ability	  
of	  a	  system,	  community,	  or	  society	  exposed	  to	  hazards	  to	  resist,	  absorb,	  accommodate	  to	  
and	  recover	  from	  the	  efforts	  of	  hazard	  in	  a	  timely	  and	  efficient	  manner,	  including	  through	  
the	  preservation	  and	  restoration	  of	  its	  essential	  basic	  structures	  and	  functions.”	  Where	  
vulnerability	  broadly	  refers	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  loss,	  resilience	  can	  broadly	  be	  defined	  as	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the	  probability	  of	  resistance	  to	  loss.	  The	  rhetoric	  and	  standards	  used	  to	  develop	  and	  
measure	  resilience	  remain	  a	  challenge	  to	  quantify.	  “This	  is	  partially	  because	  there	  are	  few	  
explicit	  sets	  of	  procedures	  within	  the	  existing	  literature	  that	  suggest	  how	  resilience	  should	  
be	  quantified,	  how	  to	  compare	  communities	  with	  one	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  resilience,	  
or	  how	  to	  determine	  whether	  communities	  are	  becoming	  more	  resilient	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  
imminent	  threat”	  (Burton	  2011	  –	  quoting	  Bruneau	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Although	  no	  global	  index	  is	  
available,	  there	  is	  a	  consensus	  among	  the	  disaster	  research	  community	  that	  resilience	  is	  a	  
multi-­‐faceted	  concept.	  Both	  vulnerability	  indicators	  and	  resilience	  indicators	  are	  
considered	  when	  determining	  risk	  in	  a	  community.	  
A	  natural	  hazard	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  natural	  process	  or	  phenomenon	  that	  “may	  cause	  
loss	  of	  life,	  injury	  or	  other	  health	  impacts,	  property	  damage,	  loss	  of	  livelihoods	  and	  
services,	  social	  and	  economic	  disruption,	  or	  environmental	  damage”	  (Burton	  2011,	  3).	  
Different	  communities	  are	  susceptible	  to	  different	  kinds	  of	  natural	  hazards,	  and	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  recognize	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  natural	  hazard	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  assess	  and	  
analyze	  risk.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  ‘hazard’	  refers	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  levels	  of	  ground	  shaking	  
resulting	  from	  earthquakes	  within	  a	  given	  time	  span.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  exposure	  to	  a	  hazard	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  hazard	  to	  
intersect	  with	  human	  settlements	  and	  society.	  Exposure	  is	  essentially	  defined	  as	  the	  
elements	  in	  hazard	  zones	  such	  as	  people,	  property,	  and	  systems	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  
potential	  damage	  and	  loss.	  Exposure	  is	  one	  factor	  in	  exploring	  the	  level	  of	  vulnerability,	  as	  
one	  can	  be	  exposed	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  hazards,	  but	  have	  different	  capacities	  to	  deal	  and	  
therefore	  different	  levels	  of	  susceptibility.	  Measures	  of	  exposure	  can	  include	  the	  number	  of	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people	  or	  types	  of	  resources	  and	  assets	  within	  a	  community.	  These	  types	  of	  variables	  have	  
become	  associated	  with	  particular	  levels	  of	  vulnerability	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  quantify	  risks.	  
Possible	  Components	  of	  Risk	  Analysis	  
The	  variables	  that	  decision-­‐makers	  consider	  in	  risk	  and	  impact	  analysis	  for	  disasters	  
are	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  numerous.	  They	  are	  also	  highly	  contingent	  on	  local	  social,	  economic,	  
political,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  contexts,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  generalized	  across	  time	  
and	  space.	  I	  will	  only	  discuss	  a	  few	  possible	  components	  of	  analyzing	  risks	  that	  are	  most	  
relevant	  to	  a	  seismic	  hazard	  event.	  
Population	  growth	  is	  a	  component	  of	  analyzing	  risk	  because,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
Turkey,	  it	  is	  associated	  with	  overcrowded	  areas,	  cheap	  mass-­‐produced	  housing,	  and	  unsafe	  
living	  conditions	  for	  migrants	  and	  locals	  alike.	  Population	  growth	  also	  increases	  the	  
number	  of	  landless	  families,	  the	  rural-­‐urban	  migration	  rates,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  
people	  looking	  for	  employment	  and	  living	  space.	  Urbanization	  of	  already	  overcrowded	  
cities	  leaves	  migrants	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  occupy	  unsafe	  land,	  construct	  cheap,	  illegal,	  and	  
unsafe	  homes,	  and	  work	  in	  dangerous	  environments.	  	  
The	  dynamism	  and	  the	  inequalities	  inherent	  in	  global	  economic	  processes	  also	  
influence	  the	  level	  of	  vulnerability.	  Dependent	  relationships	  between	  the	  first	  world	  and	  
third	  world	  which	  push	  the	  poor	  lower	  and	  raise	  the	  rich	  up	  further	  widens	  the	  varying	  
capacities	  of	  communities	  to	  cope	  with	  a	  disaster	  event.	  While	  poverty	  and	  vulnerability	  
have	  not	  been	  quantitatively	  linked,	  there	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  increased	  poverty	  leads	  to	  
a	  decreased	  coping	  capacity	  and	  therefore	  increases	  vulnerability	  (Wisner	  2006).	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Decision-­‐Making	  
The	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  causal	  factors	  of	  disasters	  is	  unique	  to	  each	  community.	  
Hazards	  that	  occur	  in	  different	  geological	  locations	  with	  different	  cultural	  traditions,	  
standards	  of	  living,	  and	  social	  expectations	  makes	  ‘best	  practices’	  or	  universal	  rules	  
obsolete	  and	  makes	  DRR	  fundamentally	  contingent.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  communities’	  best	  interest	  
to	  design	  their	  own	  DRR	  structure	  based	  on	  their	  particular	  causal	  factors,	  their	  culture,	  
and	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  different	  livelihood	  strategies	  are	  taken	  into	  
account	  because	  understanding	  or	  at	  least	  recognizing	  ways	  that	  different	  types	  of	  
communities	  live	  will	  help	  us	  understand	  how	  other	  types	  of	  communities	  and	  cultures	  
cope	  with	  hazards	  (Wisner	  2006).	  Similarly,	  the	  way	  different	  communities	  view	  and	  
analyze	  risks	  as	  well	  as	  what	  causes	  a	  disaster	  and	  their	  impacts	  can	  affect	  the	  modes	  and	  
types	  of	  decision-­‐making	  drastically.	  
Petal	  (2007)	  explains	  that	  causes	  of	  disasters	  can	  be	  perceived	  within	  broader	  
patterns	  of	  society	  and	  can	  be	  assessed	  at	  three	  overlapping	  levels	  of	  social	  organization:	  1)	  
the	  micro	  level,	  or	  individuals	  and	  households,	  2)	  the	  meso	  level,	  which	  comprises	  schools,	  
businesses,	  local	  governments,	  faith-­‐organizations,	  etc,	  and	  3)	  the	  macro	  level,	  consisting	  of	  
regional,	  national,	  and	  international	  policy	  making	  entities.	  Table	  2.1	  outlines	  the	  different	  
levels	  of	  social	  organization	  and	  some	  of	  their	  specific	  targets	  when	  implementing	  DRR.	  In	  
this	  research,	  I	  focused	  specifically	  on	  the	  meso	  level	  of	  social	  organization	  in	  Turkey.	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Table	  2.1:	  Possible	  Risk	  Reduction	  Program	  Targets	  
	  
Micro	  Level	   Meso	  Level	   Macro	  Level	  
Children	   Elementary	  and	  
secondary	  schools	  
Policy	  makers:	  advocacy	  to	  
move	  toward	  a	  “culture	  of	  
disaster	  prevention”	  
Elderly	   Colleges	  and	  
universities	  
Policy	  makers:	  change	  
building	  code	  standards	  
Women;	  pregnant	  women	   Hospitals	   Policy	  makers:	  change	  land-­‐
use	  planning	  regulations	  
Adults	  with	  disabilities;	  children	  
with	  disabilities	  
Elder	  care	  facilities	   Policy	  makers:	  make	  
preparedness	  guidelines	  
more	  socially	  inclusive	  
Low-­‐income	  individuals	  
	  
Businesses	   Policy	  makers:	  include	  the	  
public	  in	  mitigation	  
planning	  decisions	  
Drug-­‐addicted	  individuals	   Government	   	  




Incarcerated	  populations	   Prisons	  and	  jails	   	  
War	  veterans	   Non-­‐profits	   	  
Renters	   Media	   	  
Homeowners	   	   	  
Small	  business	  owners	   	   	  
	  
Non-­‐profit	  volunteers	  and	  staff	   	   	  
	  
Faith-­‐based	  leaders;	  faith-­‐based	  
congregations	  
	   	  
School	  administrators;	  teachers	   	   	  
	  
Government	  workers	   	   	  
	  
Healthcare	  staff:	  doctors,	  nurses,	  
home	  health	  aides,	  EM	  medical	  
technicians,	  ambulance	  drivers	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Petal	  (2007)	  also	  explains	  that	  there	  are	  three	  primary	  actions	  considered	  when	  
conducting	  DRR.	  These	  are	  risk	  assessment	  and	  planning,	  physical	  protection,	  and	  
response	  capacity	  development	  (Table	  2.1).	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  think	  of	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  
social	  organization	  and	  the	  different	  actions	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  create	  and	  enforce	  
DRR.	  Understanding	  these	  fundamental	  characteristics	  of	  community	  institutions	  will	  help	  
shape	  an	  understanding	  of	  their	  level	  of	  engagement	  and	  capacity	  in	  DRR.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure	  2.2.	  Petal’s	  DRR	  Levels	  and	  Actions	  
	  
Risk	  Assessment	  and	  Planning	  
Physical	  Protection	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The	  following	  are	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  fundamental	  characteristics	  of	  meso	  
community	  institutions	  can	  shape	  their	  modes	  of	  engagement	  in	  DRR	  (across	  risk	  
assessment	  and	  planning,	  physical	  protection,	  and	  response	  capacity	  and	  development).	  
Government	  can	  implement	  legislation	  and	  policies	  dictating	  how	  far	  to	  build	  off	  of	  the	  
shore	  of	  a	  hurricane	  swept	  beach;	  Schools	  can	  educate	  students	  about	  how	  they	  can	  protect	  
themselves	  at	  school	  and	  at	  home;	  The	  private	  sector	  can	  advocate	  for	  DRR	  and	  therefore	  
strengthen	  the	  resilience	  of	  their	  businesses;	  Healthcare	  facilities	  can	  be	  prepared	  for	  a	  
high	  magnitude	  event,	  both	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  their	  services	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  
accommodations	  they	  provide;	  Grassroots	  organizations	  can	  reach	  out	  to	  those	  who	  are	  
unable	  to	  increase	  their	  coping	  capacity	  and	  provide	  them	  a	  safer	  location	  to	  live,	  a	  safer	  
building	  in	  which	  to	  live,	  and	  mandate	  certain	  maintenance	  take	  place	  in	  order	  for	  the	  
tenant	  to	  remain	  safe.	  There	  are	  a	  plethora	  of	  options	  that	  community	  institutions	  can	  take,	  
at	  various	  levels,	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  idea	  of	  reducing	  risk.	  By	  understanding	  the	  
causal	  factors	  of	  disasters,	  a	  general	  level	  of	  risk	  can	  be	  assessed,	  which	  can	  inform	  
community	  institution’s	  decision-­‐making	  and	  actions.	  	  
	  
HYOGO	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  ACTION	  
	  
A	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  reduce	  disaster	  risks	  is	  established	  in	  the	  UN-­‐
endorsed	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  (HFA).	  Adopted	  in	  2005,	  the	  HFA	  was	  developed	  to	  
substantially	  reduce	  the	  losses	  to	  social,	  economic,	  and	  environmental	  assets	  of	  
communities	  and	  countries	  from	  disasters	  (UNISDR	  2009,	  11).	  The	  HFA	  is	  the	  international	  
blueprint	  for	  DRR	  and	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  162	  UN	  member	  states,	  including	  Turkey.	  Its	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overarching	  goal	  is	  “to	  build	  the	  resilience	  of	  nations	  and	  communities	  to	  disasters,	  [and]	  
achieving	  substantive	  reduction	  of	  disaster	  losses	  by	  2015”	  (Nkala	  et	  al.	  2011,	  69).	  	  
The	  HFA	  outlines	  five	  priorities	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  acted	  upon	  in	  order	  for	  
vulnerable	  communities	  to	  build	  and	  maintain	  resilience	  (Appendix	  G:	  Summary	  of	  HFA).	  
The	  first	  priority	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  HFA	  is	  that	  DRR	  be	  a	  national	  and	  local	  priority	  and	  
community	  institutions	  recognize	  their	  role	  and	  importance	  in	  the	  application	  of	  DRR.	  
There	  are	  four	  key	  indicators	  that	  reveal	  whether	  this	  priority	  is	  being	  implemented	  
(Childs	  2009).	  First,	  national	  legal	  frameworks	  need	  to	  exist	  with	  DRR	  as	  a	  decentralized	  
responsibility.	  Second,	  adequate	  resources	  must	  be	  available	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  apply	  
DRR.	  The	  third	  indicator	  is	  whether	  the	  local	  government	  is	  able	  to	  gain	  community	  
support	  and	  participation,	  and	  accepts	  the	  decentralization	  of	  authority	  with	  regards	  to	  
DRR	  decisions.	  The	  final	  indicator	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  coordination	  among	  different	  
stakeholders	  from	  multi-­‐levels	  of	  community	  institutions.	  During	  this	  analysis	  of	  the	  HFA	  
throughout	  Europe,	  the	  UNISDR	  found	  that	  significant	  challenges	  with	  priority	  one	  
included	  updating	  legal	  frameworks,	  coordinating	  across	  different	  levels	  of	  existing	  
organizational	  structures,	  financial	  limitations,	  and	  disparity	  between	  the	  demand	  for	  and	  
availability	  of	  DRR	  services	  and	  resources	  (Childs	  2009).	  
The	  second	  priority	  dictates	  that	  communities	  must	  identify,	  assess,	  and	  monitor	  
disaster	  risks	  and	  enhance	  early	  warning	  mechanisms.	  There	  are	  three	  core	  indicators	  that	  
determine	  the	  efficacy	  of	  oversight	  and	  early	  warning	  systems	  (Childs	  2009).	  One,	  current	  
hazard	  and	  vulnerability	  data	  is	  available	  and	  is	  used	  to	  inform	  policy	  and	  provide	  risk	  
assessments	  for	  key	  community	  institutions.	  Another	  indicator	  of	  priority	  two	  is	  the	  
presence	  of	  technical	  systems	  that	  are	  available	  to	  different	  stakeholders	  across	  multi-­‐
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levels	  of	  community	  institutions.	  Third,	  the	  presence	  of	  early	  warning	  systems	  for	  all	  major	  
hazards	  in	  the	  area	  and	  all	  risk	  assessments	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  regional	  risks.	  The	  
nations	  participating	  in	  the	  HFA	  in	  2009-­‐2011	  were	  unable	  to	  dedicate	  financial	  resources	  
to	  address	  all	  of	  the	  indicators	  of	  priority	  two	  of	  the	  HFA.	  However,	  national	  and	  local	  
governments	  were	  able	  to	  integrate	  a	  regional	  approach	  in	  their	  risk	  assessments.	  
The	  third	  priority	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  HFA	  calls	  for	  the	  use	  of	  knowledge,	  innovation,	  
and	  education	  to	  build	  a	  culture	  of	  safety	  and	  resilience	  throughout	  community	  
institutions.	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  were	  identified	  using	  four	  primary	  indicators	  
(Childs	  2009).	  One,	  the	  amount	  of	  disaster	  information	  and	  risk	  assessments	  available	  to	  all	  
is	  measured	  to	  assess	  strength	  of	  DRR	  capacity.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  consideration	  made	  for	  
whether	  there	  is	  open	  dialogue	  and	  information	  sharing	  between	  institutions.	  Two,	  
thorough	  coverage	  of	  DRR,	  response	  and	  recovery	  strategies	  are	  used	  (to	  a	  measureable	  
unreported	  extent)	  in	  school	  curricula,	  education	  materials,	  and	  training.	  Three,	  cost-­‐
benefit	  analysis	  and	  multi-­‐risk	  assessments	  are	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  help	  indicate	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  community	  is	  embracing	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  The	  fourth	  indicator	  is	  
measured	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  nationwide	  public	  awareness	  campaigns	  to	  encourage	  a	  
culture	  of	  DRR.	  The	  UNISDR	  reports	  that	  all	  four	  indicators	  were	  achieved	  in	  the	  nations	  
participating	  in	  the	  HFA	  between	  2009	  and	  2011.	  
The	  overall	  reduction	  of	  risk	  is	  the	  fourth	  priority	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  HFA.	  There	  are	  
five	  fundamental	  indicators	  of	  progress	  (Childs	  2009).	  First,	  DRR	  must	  be	  a	  key	  
consideration	  when	  creating	  land	  use,	  natural	  resource	  management,	  and	  climate	  change	  
adaptation	  policies.	  Second,	  vulnerable	  populations	  most	  at	  risk	  are	  identified	  and	  policies	  
targeting	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  are	  implemented.	  The	  third	  indicator	  is	  that	  policies	  that	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reduce	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  developed.	  Fourth,	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  
mechanisms	  must	  be	  incorporated	  into	  human	  settlement	  planning	  as	  well	  as	  response	  and	  
recovery	  processes.	  Fifth,	  the	  impacts	  of	  potential	  risks	  of	  major	  development	  projects	  and	  
infrastructure	  are	  assessed	  and	  taken	  into	  planning	  consideration.	  Progress	  has	  been	  
limited	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  these	  indicators	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  financial	  resources	  is	  
reported	  as	  the	  primary	  barrier.	  
The	  fifth	  priority	  is	  for	  communities	  to	  strengthen	  disaster	  preparedness	  efforts	  and	  
response	  strategies.	  There	  are	  four	  key	  indicators	  of	  growth	  and	  progress	  in	  community’s	  
preparedness	  and	  response	  strategies	  (Childs	  2009).	  One,	  strong	  policy	  frameworks	  and	  
technical	  and	  institutional	  capacities	  for	  DRR	  must	  exist.	  Two,	  all	  administrative	  levels	  have	  
disaster	  preparedness	  plans	  as	  well	  as	  contingency	  plans.	  Three,	  financial	  resources	  need	  
to	  be	  set	  aside	  and	  contingency	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  are	  functional	  to	  support	  
effective	  response	  and	  recovery.	  The	  final	  indicator	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  fifth	  priority	  of	  
the	  HFA	  is	  that	  information	  sharing	  strategies	  and	  networks	  of	  support	  are	  in	  place.	  
Financial	  resources	  were	  scarce	  in	  order	  for	  many	  of	  the	  institutions	  within	  the	  
participating	  nations	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  HFA	  indicators	  (Childs	  2009).	  
The	  goals	  of	  the	  UNISDR	  and	  the	  HFA	  are	  considered	  appropriate	  foundations	  on	  
which	  to	  understand	  institutional	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  Turkey	  because	  
Turkey	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  locations	  in	  which	  the	  HFA	  is	  widely	  accepted	  by	  DRR	  
institutions	  (Childs	  2009).	  Turkey	  began	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  by	  
creating	  a	  ‘Disaster	  and	  Emergency	  Management	  Presidency’	  under	  the	  Prime	  Ministry.	  
This	  Presidency	  collaborates	  with	  other	  existing	  government	  departments,	  non-­‐
governmental	  organizations	  (NGO),	  universities,	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  establish	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and	  continually	  strengthen	  a	  national	  platform	  for	  DRR	  (Madji	  et	  al.	  2011).	  These	  
stakeholders	  concentrate	  primarily	  on	  reducing	  seismic	  risk	  in	  order	  to	  lower	  losses	  and	  to	  
minimize	  costly	  actions	  during	  response	  and	  recovery.	  The	  UNISDR	  reports	  that	  Turkey	  
implemented	  the	  HFA	  through	  a	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  across	  almost	  all	  levels	  of	  




In	  order	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  engage	  all	  relevant	  parties	  
and	  various	  institutions	  in	  DRR	  activities	  (UNISDR	  2011).	  Yet,	  there	  is	  no	  standardized	  
process	  from	  which	  to	  develop	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  Much	  like	  other	  cultural	  factors,	  such	  
as	  language,	  religion,	  and	  celebratory	  traditions,	  the	  development	  of	  resilience	  within	  a	  
culture	  is	  contingent	  upon	  the	  specific	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  context	  of	  the	  culture.	  It	  is	  also	  
important	  to	  note	  there	  is	  no	  holistically	  accepted	  methodology	  for	  assessing	  the	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities	  of	  community	  institutions	  involved	  in	  DRR	  practices	  (Twigg	  2004).	  
However,	  I	  will	  use	  a	  framework	  that	  has	  been	  recognized	  worldwide	  as	  a	  sufficient	  
standard	  with	  which	  to	  begin	  the	  DRR	  process.	  The	  UNISDR’s	  framework,	  the	  HFA	  provides	  
an	  adequate	  platform	  upon	  which	  DRR	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  can	  be	  conceptualized,	  
developed,	  and	  integrated	  into	  communities	  through	  various	  community	  institutions.	  
The	  UN	  enables	  interactions,	  learning,	  and	  cooperation	  through	  an	  interactive	  
internet-­‐based	  platform	  and	  open	  discourse	  among	  stakeholders.	  The	  stakeholders	  operate	  
at	  all	  levels	  of	  social	  discourse	  (household,	  international,	  private,	  public)	  and	  affect	  
livelihood	  and	  wellbeing	  by	  influencing	  access	  to	  assets	  as	  well	  as	  resources	  (Twigg	  2004).	  
Stakeholders	  can	  include	  governments	  and	  local	  authorities,	  organizations	  invested	  in	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national	  or	  regional	  wellbeing,	  the	  private	  sector,	  science	  and	  technically	  based	  
institutions,	  NGO’s,	  civil	  society,	  and	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  (UNISDR	  2011b).	  In	  
this	  thesis,	  I	  explore	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  five	  different	  community	  institutions	  
that	  engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  earthquake	  risk	  in	  Turkey.	  Specifically,	  I	  focus	  on	  
government,	  business,	  education,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  organizations.	  	  
The	  UNISDR	  has	  many	  priorities	  and	  engages	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  tactics	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  
actors	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  successfulness	  of	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  
worldwide.	  Ensuring	  safe	  communities	  and	  increasing	  coping	  capacity	  requires	  
coordinated	  efforts	  by	  multiple	  actors	  through	  partnerships	  and	  networks	  across	  
community	  hierarchies	  and	  knowledge	  centers	  in	  order	  to	  combine	  resources	  and	  
expertise	  (UNISDR	  2011a).	  Scholars	  agree	  that	  in	  order	  to	  organize	  and	  implement	  DRR	  
measures	  effectively	  within	  a	  community,	  organizations	  must	  “seek	  to	  ‘institutionalize’	  risk	  
reduction	  by	  incorporating	  it	  throughout	  their	  thinking,	  structures,	  cultures,	  and	  
operations”	  (Twigg	  2004,	  30).	  First,	  these	  organizations	  must	  understand	  and	  engage	  in	  
risk	  reduction	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  before	  they	  are	  able	  to	  incorporate	  it	  throughout	  their	  
rhetoric.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  how	  different	  community	  institutions	  
understand	  and	  engage	  in	  risk	  reduction	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  communities	  foster	  a	  
culture	  of	  resilience.	  Below,	  I	  summarize	  the	  five	  key	  community	  institutions	  and	  highlight	  
how	  they	  implement	  DRR	  effectively	  within	  communities.	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Government	  
Good	  governance	  is	  an	  important	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  DRR	  
efforts.	  The	  development	  and	  promotion	  of	  sound	  disaster	  related	  policies,	  legislation,	  and	  
regulatory	  frameworks	  are	  crucial	  for	  creating	  and	  enabling	  an	  efficient	  atmosphere	  for	  
DRR	  efforts	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  Governments	  are	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  the	  
duties	  of	  community	  stakeholders	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  a	  disaster.	  Yet,	  DRR	  practices	  
are	  often	  undermined	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  investment	  in	  proper	  legislation.	  A	  lack	  in	  proper	  
legislation	  worldwide	  also	  impairs	  the	  capacity	  of	  DRR	  professionals	  to	  enforce	  DRR	  
strategies	  (UNISDR	  2004,	  18).	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  legislation	  further	  depends	  upon	  the	  
capacity	  of	  local	  or	  national	  administrations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  acceptance	  and	  recognition	  of	  
rules	  and	  standards	  by	  civil	  society.	  The	  level	  of	  integration	  and	  enforcement	  of	  DRR	  
policies	  at	  the	  local	  level	  can	  indicate	  legislative	  deficiencies	  and	  strengths	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  
18).	  	  
Legislation	  provides	  an	  official	  justification	  for	  DRR	  and	  allocates	  major	  
responsibilities	  and	  resources	  in	  legal	  form.	  Legislation	  should	  be	  comprehensive	  and	  
adopt	  a	  multi-­‐hazard	  approach	  involving	  multiple	  levels	  of	  the	  government	  and	  
stakeholders	  (Mangroves	  For	  the	  Future	  2008).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  law	  has	  sufficient	  
capacity	  for	  creation	  as	  well	  as	  implementation,	  “it	  is	  important	  that	  a	  vision	  for	  the	  
implementations	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  new	  laws	  is	  developed	  alongside	  the	  process	  of	  
enactment	  of	  the	  law	  itself”	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  20).	  
While	  effective	  legislation	  is	  imperative	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  there	  are	  
particular	  duties	  that	  are	  executed	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  that	  ensure	  the	  most	  
effective	  DRR	  engagement	  and	  implementation.	  I	  will	  first	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  the	  national	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government	  in	  DRR.	  Then	  I	  will	  concentrate	  on	  how	  regional	  and	  local	  governments	  engage	  
in	  DRR	  as	  well	  as	  what	  types	  of	  interests	  they	  hold	  when	  creating,	  implementing,	  and	  
enforcing	  DRR	  legislation.	  
National	  Government	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  good	  governance	  –	  “participation,	  rule	  of	  law,	  transparency,	  
responsiveness,	  consensus	  orientation,	  equity,	  effectiveness,	  efficiency,	  accountability,	  and	  
strategic	  vision”	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  20)	  –	  are	  as	  applicable	  to	  DRR	  as	  they	  are	  to	  any	  other	  
effective,	  state	  controlled	  affair.	  Support	  from	  central	  government	  leaders	  and	  adequate	  
funding	  is	  imperative	  to	  create	  and	  implement	  effective	  legislation.	  However,	  faith	  in	  the	  
ability	  of	  the	  legislation	  to	  bring	  about	  positive	  change	  and	  the	  continued	  support,	  and	  
therefore	  continued	  existence,	  of	  DRR	  legislation	  is	  contingent	  upon	  groups	  in	  addition	  to	  
government;	  groups	  invested	  in	  the	  local	  community	  who	  have	  the	  power	  to	  influence,	  
such	  as	  women’s	  organizations	  and	  academia	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  20).	  
Transition	  from	  Command-­and-­Control	  Framework	  to	  a	  Developmental	  Framework	  
Historically,	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  been	  considered	  the	  “healer”	  (Balamir	  
2001a,	  1).	  The	  national	  government	  only	  intervenes	  in	  social	  organization	  after	  a	  disaster,	  
in	  order	  to	  heal	  a	  wound	  that	  has	  already	  been	  inflicted.	  Resources,	  legislation,	  and	  
community	  groups	  are	  only	  established	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  directly	  to	  a	  disaster	  or	  to	  
assist	  and	  supplement	  in	  long-­‐term	  recovery.	  Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  (1990-­‐2010),	  
there	  has	  been	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  from	  “state	  as	  healer”	  to	  “state	  as	  protector”	  (Balamir	  
2001a,	  1).	  The	  protective	  national	  government	  acts	  before	  the	  disaster	  occurs,	  preventing	  
and	  shielding	  its	  population	  from	  the	  potential	  disaster.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  governmental	  
resources,	  public	  legislation,	  and	  community	  efforts	  are	  focused	  on	  structural	  and	  non-­‐
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structural	  mitigation	  as	  well	  as	  basic	  preparedness	  skills,	  tools,	  and	  knowledge.	  The	  idea	  is	  
that	  by	  increasing	  the	  community’s	  capacity	  to	  become	  resilient	  to	  disasters	  through	  
mitigation	  efforts,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  resources	  needed	  for	  response	  
and	  recovery.	  	  
The	  UN	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  national	  governments	  to	  shift	  from	  
‘response	  activities’	  to	  ‘disaster	  risk	  reduction.’	  This	  involves	  a	  complete	  reconsideration	  of	  
the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  DRR	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  general	  population	  thinks	  
about	  risks.	  The	  top-­‐down	  centralized	  government	  structure	  has	  historically	  proven	  to	  be	  
too	  rigid	  for	  DRR	  implementation,	  enforcement,	  and	  effectiveness.	  The	  top-­‐down	  approach	  
to	  DRR	  management	  has	  also	  proven	  ineffective	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  local	  levels,	  where	  the	  
laws	  take	  shape	  and	  directly	  affect	  the	  community.	  In	  the	  shift	  from	  government	  as	  healer	  
to	  government	  as	  protector,	  this	  structure	  must	  become	  more	  flexible,	  adaptive,	  inclusive,	  
and	  consider	  the	  local	  level	  as	  a	  primary	  participant	  in	  decision-­‐making	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  
20).	  However,	  the	  UNISDR	  is	  aware	  that	  many	  national	  institutions	  still	  retain	  authority	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  characteristics	  of	  an	  emergency	  management	  institution.	  A	  centralized	  power	  
structure	  and	  failing	  to	  include	  the	  local	  government	  is	  a	  primary	  barricade	  for	  any	  
possible	  shift	  in	  the	  cultural	  values	  of	  risk.	  
Strengthening	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  service	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  not	  enough	  has	  been	  done	  to	  enhance	  the	  will	  and	  capacities	  
of	  community	  institutions	  to	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  implement	  the	  provisions	  of	  new	  laws	  
and	  policies.	  The	  federal	  government	  can	  create	  many	  legislative	  mandates	  that	  can	  be	  
carried	  out	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  However,	  without	  the	  input	  of	  local	  community	  institutions	  
and	  local	  leaders,	  effective	  laws	  and	  policies	  that	  can	  be	  implemented	  and	  enforced	  locally	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are	  easily	  misguided	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  community’s	  capacity	  to	  cooperate	  
with	  laws	  and	  policies.	  Therefore,	  national	  governments	  support	  and	  foster	  multi-­‐level	  
decision-­‐making	  networks,	  which	  the	  literature	  suggests	  will	  help	  implement	  laws	  and	  
policies	  so	  they	  have	  a	  practical	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theoretical	  purpose	  (UNISDR	  2007).	  Members	  
of	  civil	  society	  must	  also	  be	  active	  participants	  in	  order	  for	  the	  federal	  government’s	  DRR	  
responsibilities	  to	  ultimately	  be	  effective.	  Information	  sharing	  and	  decision-­‐making	  that	  
crosses	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  community	  must	  be	  used	  more	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  DRR	  laws	  (UNISDR	  
2008).	  	  
Additionally,	  it	  is	  widely	  recognized	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  professional	  DRR	  
expertise	  and	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  publically	  shared	  often	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  
community	  members.	  Without	  DRR	  expertise	  that	  is	  comprehensible	  and	  accessible,	  civil	  
society	  can	  fail	  to	  understand	  information,	  ignore	  the	  DRR	  practices	  because	  they	  are	  
unintelligible,	  and	  ultimately	  stifle	  DRR	  implementation	  at	  the	  base/local	  level	  of	  society.	  
DRR	  practices	  are	  unable	  to	  function	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  manner,	  across	  all	  community	  
institutions.	  	  
Many	  nations	  draw	  from	  outdated	  information	  and	  past	  experience	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  hazards	  and	  global	  environmental	  risk	  (Berkes	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Therefore,	  
policy	  and	  decision	  making	  is	  too	  often	  based	  on	  historical	  precedent	  and	  ‘folk	  wisdom’	  
rather	  than	  present-­‐day	  evidence	  of	  vulnerabilities	  and	  risk	  (Berkes	  et	  al.	  2000).	  In	  this	  
context,	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  national	  governments	  to	  update	  DRR	  strategies,	  
mechanisms,	  and	  practices	  so	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  modern	  technology,	  knowledge,	  and	  
social	  conventions.	  Government	  is	  also	  charged	  with	  creating	  a	  comprehensive	  but	  
understandable	  and	  usable	  analyses	  of	  the	  data	  that	  is	  wrought	  from	  modern	  technology	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and	  knowledge.	  This	  will	  help	  the	  public	  integrate	  their	  particular	  risk	  into	  their	  culture	  of	  
preparedness	  and	  everyday	  habits	  as	  well	  as	  assist	  in	  informed	  decision-­‐making	  for	  
mitigation.	  	  
Preexisting	  structures	  and	  skills	  at	  the	  national	  level	  should	  help	  in	  the	  development	  
of,	  but	  not	  dominate,	  legislation	  and	  institutional	  frameworks.	  As	  the	  UN	  is	  keen	  on	  DRR	  
laws	  that	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  effective	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  setting	  up	  copies	  of	  the	  national	  
structure	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  local	  level	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  resources	  and	  can	  often	  impede	  
effective	  DRR	  at	  the	  local	  level	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  21).	  
Regional	  Government	  
National	  government	  must	  often	  consider	  that	  their	  policies	  could	  be	  relevant	  for	  
one	  region	  of	  a	  country,	  but	  contradictory	  to	  another.	  The	  UN	  as	  well	  as	  the	  HFA	  recognizes	  
that	  national	  legislation	  has	  regional	  implications.	  This	  reinforces	  the	  importance	  of	  
cultivating	  partnerships	  as	  regional	  hazards	  can	  cross	  multiple	  national	  boundaries.	  
“Regional	  dialogue	  and	  international	  cooperation	  can	  inform	  the	  process	  of	  formulation	  of	  
national	  legislation	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  also	  contributes	  towards	  reducing	  disaster	  risk	  at	  the	  
regional	  level”	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  21).	  This	  also	  ensures	  that	  national	  boundaries	  do	  not	  
impede	  DRR	  laws	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  It	  is	  important	  for	  regional	  communities	  to	  be	  involved	  
in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  because	  they	  often	  have	  a	  more	  refined	  view	  of	  their	  
regional	  needs	  than	  multiple	  national	  governments.	  Their	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  more	  
specific	  and	  tend	  to	  supplement	  the	  national	  governments	  rules.	  
Continued	  dialogue	  between	  regional	  governments	  and	  their	  federal	  and	  local	  
counterparts	  must	  establish	  a	  normalized	  rhetoric	  of	  risk	  and	  DRR.	  As	  the	  federal	  
government	  establishes	  what	  risks	  are	  present,	  the	  regional	  government	  works	  with	  local	  
	  
	   50	  
government	  authorities	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  how	  these	  risks	  are	  to	  be	  approached	  
according	  to	  their	  community’s	  specific	  characteristics	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  will	  execute	  the	  
federal	  government’s	  mandates.	  The	  regional	  government	  acts	  as	  both	  a	  decision-­‐maker,	  
acknowledging	  multiple	  approaches	  to	  DRR	  as	  well	  as	  a	  liaison	  between	  different	  regions	  
and	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  governments.	  
Local	  Government	  
Local	  governmental	  involvement	  in	  DRR	  decision-­‐making	  is	  imperative.	  The	  local	  
government	  directly	  uses	  national	  and	  regional	  laws	  to	  direct	  their	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  actions.	  
Informed	  decision-­‐making	  across	  multi-­‐levels	  of	  government	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  
laws	  and	  policies	  can	  be	  implemented	  as	  well	  as	  enforced	  throughout	  different	  sectors	  of	  
the	  community	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  In	  the	  UNISDR’s	  analysis	  of	  local	  governments	  and	  the	  
lessons	  learned	  (2010),	  there	  are	  four	  major	  guidelines	  for	  local	  governments	  when	  
implementing	  DRR.	  	  
1)	  The	  local	  government	  must	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  coordinating	  and	  sustaining	  a	  
multi-­‐level,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  platform	  to	  promote	  DRR	  in	  the	  community/region	  or	  for	  a	  
specific	  hazard.	  The	  strong	  leadership	  of	  the	  local	  government	  is	  imperative	  to	  ensure	  the	  
political	  momentum	  and	  support	  among	  stakeholders	  and	  civil	  society.	  A	  pre-­‐determined	  
local	  level	  coordinating	  structure	  that	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  community’s	  long-­‐term	  
wellbeing	  is	  useful	  when	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  participatory	  and	  multi-­‐level/stakeholder	  
dialogue.	  This	  coordinating	  structure	  also	  establishes	  a	  foundation	  for	  organized	  
information	  sharing,	  transparency,	  and	  development	  of	  ideas	  from	  and	  to	  different	  levels	  
(Nkala	  et	  al.	  2011,	  55).	  	  
2)	  The	  local	  government	  is	  responsible	  for	  engaging	  the	  local	  population	  with	  DRR	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activities,	  linking	  their	  concerns	  with	  government	  priorities	  through	  active	  dialogue	  as	  well	  
as	  providing	  community	  education	  and	  training.	  It	  is	  also	  critical	  to	  integrate	  DRR	  
considerations	  into	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  culture.	  	  
3)	  The	  local	  government	  should	  strengthen	  their	  institutional	  capacities	  and	  
implement	  practical	  DRR	  mechanisms.	  The	  UN	  considers	  local	  governments	  responsible	  for	  
the	  long-­‐term	  development	  and	  viability	  of	  the	  community/region,	  despite	  their	  risk,	  
access	  to	  resources,	  etc.	  This	  suggests	  that	  local	  governments	  should	  institutionalize	  DRR	  
in	  their	  everyday	  operations.	  	  
4)	  The	  local	  government	  is	  smaller	  in	  scale	  and	  therefore	  more	  flexible	  to	  change	  
and	  innovate.	  It	  is	  more	  aptly	  positioned	  than	  a	  national	  government,	  given	  adequate	  
resources,	  to	  develop	  and	  experiment	  with	  new	  tools	  and	  techniques,	  applying	  them	  to	  
settings	  particular	  to	  their	  community	  and	  specific	  regional	  priorities.	  	  
“The	  local	  government	  is	  responsible	  for	  steering	  a	  long-­‐term	  process	  to	  solve	  
problems	  that	  threaten	  the	  local	  economy,	  community	  and	  environment”	  (Nkala	  et	  al.,	  
2010,	  55).	  Local	  vulnerability	  assessments	  serve	  to	  help	  local	  governments	  develop	  their	  
approach	  to	  DRR.	  According	  to	  the	  UNISDR,	  local	  land	  management	  and	  regulation	  of	  urban	  
development	  should	  be	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  local	  government.	  This	  includes	  enabling	  access	  to	  
safe	  housing	  for	  the	  entire	  population,	  regulating	  urban	  development,	  properly	  citing	  and	  
managing	  land,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  safe	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  withstand	  
potential	  risks.	  	  
The	  necessity	  for	  a	  central	  role	  of	  local	  governance	  in	  DRR	  is	  globally	  acknowledged.	  
The	  primary	  protector	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  community	  is	  their	  local	  governments.	  However,	  
the	  UNISDR	  argues	  that	  there	  remains	  a	  gap	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  reality	  that	  is	  expanding	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and	  that	  existing	  financial	  and	  technical	  resources	  do	  not	  match	  local	  governments	  
responsibilities	  (GAR	  2011a;	  UNISDR	  2011b).	  
All	  three	  major	  levels	  of	  government	  (federal,	  regional,	  and	  local)	  are	  important	  
actors	  in	  DRR.	  The	  UN	  emphasizes,	  however,	  that	  the	  most	  effective	  DRR	  implementation	  
and	  engagement	  results	  from	  a	  strong	  local	  government	  role.	  The	  local	  government	  relies	  
on	  and	  uses	  the	  federal	  and	  regional	  governments,	  as	  they	  are	  also	  crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  
DRR.	  Due	  to	  the	  spatial	  nature	  of	  hazards	  as	  well	  as	  the	  contingent	  characteristics	  of	  
communities	  at	  risk,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  local	  government	  provides	  leadership	  and	  
fosters	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  by	  the	  normalization	  of	  DRR	  practices.	  
	  
Business	  
The	  UNISDR	  and	  HFA	  dictate	  the	  responsibility	  of	  community	  protection	  to	  national,	  
regional,	  and	  local	  governments.	  The	  UNISDR	  recognizes,	  though,	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  
plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  managing	  disaster	  risks	  and	  building	  resilience.	  The	  private	  sector	  
shares	  both	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  risks	  and	  a	  responsibility	  to	  act	  in	  reducing	  them.	  In	  
most	  countries,	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  the	  primary	  generator	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product	  
(GDP),	  employs	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  is	  the	  dominant	  vehicle	  for	  innovation	  
and	  investment.	  It	  also	  has	  the	  economic	  and	  human	  resources	  and	  organizational	  
capabilities	  to	  provide	  solutions	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  62).	  	  
To	  determine	  the	  efficacy	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships,	  the	  UNISDR	  has	  measured	  
the	  success	  of	  businesses	  that	  have	  developed	  partnerships	  mandated	  by	  the	  Private	  Sector	  
Advisory	  Group,	  which	  creates	  robust	  and	  advantageous	  partnerships	  worldwide.	  These	  
mandated	  partnerships	  coordinate	  action	  and	  decision-­‐making	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  a	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community’s	  private	  sector	  structure.	  Partnership	  efficacy	  is	  measured	  by	  comparing	  the	  
capacity	  of	  businesses	  and	  their	  success	  within	  the	  community	  with	  their	  level	  of	  
cooperation	  and	  interaction	  with	  public-­‐private	  DRR	  partnerships.	  Business	  capacity	  is	  
also	  compared	  against	  the	  community’s	  overall	  engagement	  and	  compliance	  with	  
international	  DRR	  priorities	  as	  well	  as	  their	  capacity	  to	  manage	  risks.	  The	  UNISDR	  explains	  
that	  communities	  that	  actively	  promote	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  
create	  policies	  related	  directly	  to	  addressing	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  ‘non-­‐resilient	  activity,’	  like	  
mismanagement	  of	  land	  or	  a	  disregard	  for	  building	  regulations.	  	  
Although,	  overcoming	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  is	  the	  first	  task	  within	  a	  partnership,	  especially	  
a	  multi-­‐level	  partnership,	  the	  most	  frequent	  mediator	  of	  trust	  and	  understanding	  is	  the	  
shared	  common	  goal	  that	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  have.	  The	  shared	  goal	  between	  
the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  is	  enhancing	  DRR	  within	  the	  community	  and	  strengthening	  a	  
culture	  of	  resilience.	  Businesses	  that	  advocate	  for	  DRR	  will	  profit	  from	  the	  success	  DRR	  
activities	  and	  resources	  while	  the	  public	  will	  benefit	  through	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  
their	  risk	  and	  a	  strengthen	  capacity	  to	  cope.	  Partnerships	  create	  professional	  networks	  that	  
strengthen	  the	  bonds	  between	  community	  institutions	  and	  promote	  working	  with	  other	  
stakeholders	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  When	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  have	  parallel	  goals,	  
there	  are	  returns	  on	  investments.	  The	  UNISDR	  suggests	  that	  the	  barrier	  between	  the	  public	  
and	  private	  sector	  can	  be	  weakened	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  can	  be	  fostered	  through	  
public-­‐private	  partnerships	  united	  to	  reduce	  risk	  and	  increase	  coping	  capacity.	  	  
The	  private	  sector	  must	  also	  demonstrate	  the	  ability	  to	  “encourage,	  develop,	  and	  use	  
financial	  risk-­‐sharing	  mechanisms	  to	  ensure	  the	  resilience	  of	  facilities	  and	  communities	  to	  
hazards	  and	  allocate	  adequate	  resources”	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  64).	  When	  the	  private	  sector	  has	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created	  a	  network	  of	  institutions	  that	  have	  investments	  within	  the	  community,	  they	  
leverage	  private	  sector	  expertise	  and	  strengths	  to	  enhance	  resilience.	  Together,	  this	  fosters	  
a	  mutual	  exchange	  and	  distribution	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  throughout	  
multiple	  sectors	  of	  a	  community	  economy.	  This	  creates	  transparency	  within	  the	  private	  
sector,	  which	  allows	  the	  public	  (and	  other	  businesses)	  to	  see	  opportunities	  where	  
resilience	  building	  and	  DRR	  is	  a	  reliable	  economic	  strategy,	  with	  positive	  returns	  and	  
competitive	  advantages.	  By	  sharing	  how	  much	  the	  community	  would	  benefit	  in	  the	  long	  
run	  by	  implementing	  DRR,	  businesses	  become	  a	  stronger	  asset	  to	  the	  community.	  This	  
further	  institutionalizes	  DRR	  in	  the	  thinking	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  community,	  improving	  
resilience	  overall.	  
In	  2011,	  the	  UNISDR	  called	  for	  businesses	  to	  enhance	  their	  collaboration	  with	  other	  
businesses	  and	  to	  share	  their	  expertise	  and	  data	  with	  civil	  society.	  This	  is	  important	  
because	  civil	  society	  often	  has	  limited	  access	  to	  programs,	  knowledge,	  and	  resources,	  
which	  hinders	  the	  progress	  of	  instilling	  resilience	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  culture.	  This	  
also	  helps	  DRR	  to	  become	  institutionalized	  within	  the	  common	  thinking	  of	  a	  community.	  
For	  example,	  compensatory	  insurance	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  businesses	  involved	  directly	  in	  
enhancing	  the	  resilience	  of	  all	  levels	  of	  at-­‐risk	  communities.	  Its	  networks	  and	  partnerships	  
are	  more	  limited	  than	  other	  economic	  endeavors	  because	  it	  is	  an	  unfamiliar	  business	  
worldwide	  and	  therefore	  has	  restricted	  access	  to	  other	  economic	  enterprises	  (UNISDR	  
2011b).	  Increased	  interaction	  and	  fostering	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  would	  not	  only	  
maximize	  the	  awareness	  of	  compensatory	  earthquake	  insurance	  within	  the	  community,	  but	  
also	  would	  grow	  their	  business	  model	  and	  increase	  profits.	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Education	  
The	  education	  sector	  of	  a	  community,	  according	  to	  the	  UNISDR	  and	  the	  first	  session	  
of	  the	  Global	  Platform	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction,	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  “development	  and	  
sharing	  of	  content	  and	  strategies	  for	  teaching	  DRR	  to	  children,	  in	  and	  out	  of	  school”	  
(UNISDR	  2007,	  28).	  Schools—including	  administrators,	  teachers,	  and	  students—should	  act	  
as	  centers	  for	  community-­‐based	  DRR	  initiatives	  and	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  
education	  of	  the	  greater	  community.	  Educational	  institutions	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  
design	  and	  implementation	  of	  earthquake	  resistant	  school	  building	  construction,	  
retrofitting	  for	  post-­‐earthquake	  reconstruction	  programs,	  and	  disaster	  management	  plans	  
in	  schools.	  Curriculum	  within	  individual	  schools	  is	  to	  integrate	  DRR	  into	  planning	  and	  
regular	  school	  functions.	  Updated	  educational	  material	  for	  school	  children	  and	  civil	  society	  
is	  more	  accessible	  to	  the	  public	  than	  technical	  government	  documents	  and	  reports	  and	  
DRR	  training	  can	  more	  easily	  be	  provided	  through	  school	  curriculum.	  This	  helps	  build	  a	  
culture	  of	  community	  resilience	  since	  children	  often	  take	  home	  information	  and	  then	  
inform	  their	  parents	  and	  communities.	  Knowledge	  that	  youth	  bring	  home	  and	  take	  into	  
their	  community	  may	  be	  the	  only	  exposure	  to	  disaster	  preparedness	  strategies	  for	  their	  
parents	  and/or	  community.	  
	  Post-­‐secondary	  programs,	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  collegiate	  departments,	  have	  also	  
been	  created	  in	  all	  different	  types	  of	  communities	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  research	  and	  
development	  capacity	  for	  the	  DRR	  community	  (UNISDR	  2007).	  The	  UN	  also	  recognizes	  
schools	  and	  the	  education	  sector	  as	  the	  primary	  provider	  of	  expertise	  with	  specific	  DRR	  
training	  for	  engineers,	  local	  government	  officials,	  schoolteachers,	  and	  the	  extended	  
community	  population.	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The	  education	  sector	  acts	  as	  an	  innovator	  in	  DRR	  partnerships,	  capacity	  building,	  
and	  knowledge	  sharing.	  Worldwide,	  steps	  are	  being	  taken	  to	  integrate	  DRR	  education	  into	  
standard	  thinking	  practices	  and	  increasing	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  involvement	  in	  
efforts	  in	  building	  community	  resilience	  (Mangroves	  for	  the	  Future	  2008).	  International	  
conferences	  and	  regional	  gatherings	  of	  experts	  in	  education	  and	  risk	  management	  have	  
provided	  advocates	  with	  important	  opportunities	  for	  collaboration	  (UNISDR	  2007).	  
Governments	  (national,	  regional,	  and	  local)	  are	  also	  regularly	  encouraged	  to	  mainstream	  
DRR	  into	  education	  at	  all	  levels	  (UNISDR	  2007).	  
The	  UN	  reports	  that	  progress	  towards	  a	  culture	  of	  resiliency	  and	  promotion	  of	  DRR	  
is	  modest	  within	  the	  education	  sector.	  DRR	  education	  is	  often	  a	  one-­‐way	  process	  with	  
outside	  experts	  talking	  and	  teaching.	  This	  approach	  is	  ineffective	  and	  should	  build	  on	  
lessons	  learned	  from	  previous	  community	  experiences,	  present	  community	  skills,	  as	  well	  
as	  information	  networks	  and	  multi-­‐level	  dialogues	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  	  
	  
Healthcare	  
Healthcare	  is	  an	  essential	  service	  for	  everyone,	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  During	  
disasters,	  the	  main	  responsibility	  of	  the	  healthcare	  sector—which	  can	  include	  public	  and	  
private	  hospitals,	  nursing	  homes,	  and	  healthcare	  facilities,	  as	  well	  as	  lifeline	  facilities	  such	  
as	  water	  treatment	  centers	  and	  grocery	  stores—is	  to	  save	  lives,	  provide	  urgent	  medical	  
care,	  and	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  communicable	  diseases	  and	  other	  health	  risks.	  The	  operation	  of	  
a	  healthcare	  facility	  during	  a	  disaster	  is	  imperative	  if	  these	  services	  are	  to	  be	  provided.	  The	  
HFA	  states	  that	  one	  of	  their	  key	  goals	  in	  to	  make	  “hospitals	  safe	  from	  disasters	  by	  ensuring	  
that	  all	  new	  hospitals	  are	  built	  with	  a	  level	  of	  resilience	  that	  strengthens	  their	  capacity	  to	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remain	  functional	  in	  emergency	  and	  disaster	  situations	  and	  implement	  mitigation	  
measures	  to	  reinforce	  existing	  health	  facilities"	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  32).	  
The	  UNISDR	  and	  many	  of	  the	  institutions	  considered	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  HFA	  assert	  
that	  healthcare	  must	  have	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  disaster	  reduction	  planning	  and	  actual	  
implementation	  at	  the	  local,	  national,	  and	  international	  levels	  for	  many	  reasons,	  including	  
the	  protection	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  delivery	  of	  emergency	  medical	  services	  whenever	  and	  
wherever	  needed	  (UNISDR	  2011a).	  
The	  community-­‐based	  health	  workforce	  is	  made	  up	  of	  healthcare	  professionals	  at	  
the	  local/community	  level	  “who	  contribute	  to	  better	  health	  outcomes	  by	  promoting	  health	  
and	  providing	  primary	  healthcare	  (PHC)”	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  69).	  These	  workers	  usually	  live	  
in	  the	  community	  they	  work	  in.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  consideration	  because	  healthcare	  
worker’s	  understanding	  of	  community,	  cultural,	  and	  linguistic	  details	  are	  locally	  unique.	  
The	  community-­‐based	  health	  workforce	  is	  important	  in	  the	  management	  of	  all	  phases	  of	  a	  
hazard.	  “Their	  skills	  need	  to	  be	  recognized,	  revitalized	  and	  strengthened	  to	  manage	  
emergencies	  in	  hazard-­‐prone	  communities”	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  70).	  
Although	  healthcare	  is	  a	  primary	  and	  active	  institution	  in	  DRR,	  it	  is	  often	  not	  
considered	  as	  a	  key	  stakeholder	  during	  planning	  nor	  is	  it	  accounted	  for	  during	  decision-­‐
making.	  Despite	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  healthcare	  workforce	  in	  emergencies,	  this	  sector	  is	  
rarely	  recognized	  as	  a	  key	  stakeholder	  or	  included	  in	  local	  and	  national	  DRR	  plans,	  
strategies,	  or	  practices	  (UNISDR	  2011a).	  When	  healthcare	  workers	  are	  not	  recognized	  in	  
risk	  reduction	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms,	  their	  expertise	  and	  skills	  are	  neglected.	  
Additionally,	  the	  absence	  of	  essential	  career	  experiential	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  issues	  of	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gender	  inequality,	  homelessness,	  and	  the	  special	  needs	  population	  are,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  
forgotten	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  70).	  
Strong,	  as	  opposed	  to	  substandard	  and	  underfunded,	  healthcare	  systems	  have	  a	  
greater	  capacity	  to	  absorb	  the	  impact	  of	  emergency	  situations.	  The	  UNISDR	  (2011a)	  
recognizes	  a	  plethora	  of	  critical	  healthcare	  roles	  and	  services	  that	  are	  key	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  
DRR.	  Mitigating	  against	  key	  health	  related	  vulnerabilities,	  such	  as	  common	  illnesses,	  and	  
increasing	  access	  to	  PHC	  for	  all	  creates	  a	  healthy	  population	  that	  can	  withstand	  disaster	  
events	  better	  than	  a	  population	  in	  poor	  health.	  PHC	  can	  refer	  to	  education	  of	  basic	  family	  
practices	  such	  as	  washing	  hands	  or	  access	  to	  basic	  antibiotics.	  “The	  health	  sector	  can	  also	  
provide	  valuable	  input	  to	  national	  risk	  assessments	  through	  information	  on	  community	  
health	  hazards	  such	  as	  epidemics	  or	  pandemics	  and	  vulnerabilities	  and	  capacities	  of	  the	  
health	  system	  at	  all	  levels”	  (UNISDR	  2011a,	  71).	  	  
Another	  critical	  healthcare	  service	  involves	  contributing	  to	  or	  cooperating	  with	  
preparedness	  plans	  such	  as	  risk	  assessments,	  risk	  awareness	  training	  and	  education,	  and	  
advocating	  for	  emergency	  preparedness	  actions	  within	  individual	  households.	  Working	  
with	  other	  institutions	  to	  provide	  PHC	  can	  reduce	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  loss	  in	  a	  community.	  	  
	  
Grassroots	  Organizations	  
Decreased	  government	  funding	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  need	  for	  grassroots	  
organizations	  to	  take	  on	  many	  of	  the	  formerly	  government	  run	  DRR	  programs.	  Although	  
governments	  are	  critically	  important	  to	  the	  DRR	  process	  and	  fostering	  a	  culture	  of	  
resilience,	  with	  little	  funding	  and	  many	  social	  issues	  to	  deal	  with,	  governments	  may	  not	  
have	  the	  resources	  or	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  implementing	  DRR	  (UNISDR	  2007,	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Nkala	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Through	  this	  need	  as	  well	  as	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  fostering	  
a	  culture	  of	  resilience,	  grassroots	  organizations	  have	  made	  substantial	  progress	  in	  DRR	  
activities	  worldwide	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  Nkala	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  roles	  of	  communal	  grassroots	  organizations	  is	  to	  connect	  
the	  community	  with	  local	  governments	  and	  other	  key	  stakeholders	  to	  create	  partnerships	  
in	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  HFA.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  can	  be	  NGOs,	  faith	  based	  groups,	  
women’s	  rights	  groups,	  or	  local	  food	  cooperatives,	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  One	  of	  their	  key	  
resources	  is	  the	  social	  relationships	  they	  foster	  within	  and	  between	  local	  communities.	  
Networks	  are	  also	  formed	  in	  and	  between	  grassroots	  organizations	  and,	  at	  times,	  they	  are	  
possibly	  the	  most	  important	  voice	  to	  listen	  to	  when	  making	  decisions	  because	  of	  their	  own	  
knowledge	  about	  their	  own	  community.	  This	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  uses	  the	  voices,	  skills,	  
and	  resources	  of	  the	  local	  community	  to	  advocate	  for	  provisions	  that	  are	  locally	  acceptable	  
and	  feasible.	  With	  grassroots	  organizations	  being	  the	  links	  in	  the	  networks	  of	  local	  
communities,	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  efficiently	  informs	  and	  educates	  regional	  and	  national	  
decisions	  (Glover	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  
The	  development	  of	  local	  networks	  and	  building	  political	  and	  technical	  platforms	  
using	  existing	  structures	  in	  a	  local	  community	  is	  a	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  grassroots	  
organizations.	  Although,	  adequate	  legal	  and	  institutional	  frameworks	  are	  also	  recognized	  
as	  an	  enabling	  factor	  of	  efficient	  and	  successful	  local	  DRR	  initiatives,	  the	  advocacy	  of	  
grassroots	  organizations	  usually	  drives	  legislative	  and	  institutional	  considerations.	  
Additionally,	  grassroots	  organizations	  target	  high-­‐risk	  vulnerable	  populations	  and	  strive	  to	  
change	  their	  access	  to	  resources,	  educational	  level,	  capacity	  to	  cope,	  and	  so	  forth.	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Grassroots	  organizations	  provide	  the	  community	  with	  a	  network	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  safety	  net	  
for	  their	  population.	  This	  fosters	  a	  healthier	  community	  with	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  living.	  
Community	  experiences	  worldwide	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  community-­‐based	  grassroots	  
organizations	  are	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  promotion	  and	  enforcement	  of	  DRR.	  Their	  efforts	  
improve	  development	  outcomes	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  local	  community	  and	  increase	  the	  capacities	  
of	  high-­‐risk	  communities	  to	  cope	  with	  disasters	  independent	  of	  the	  regional	  or	  national	  
bureaucracies	  (UNISDR	  2007,	  25).	  While	  grassroots	  organizations	  are	  not	  necessarily	  
subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  national	  government,	  as	  the	  local	  government	  might	  be,	  there	  is	  
an	  important	  connection	  to	  be	  made	  between	  grassroots	  initiatives	  and	  national	  policies.	  
There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  replicate	  these	  grassroots	  best	  practices	  in	  highly	  vulnerable	  urban	  
settings	  where	  grassroots	  participation	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  less	  flexible	  and	  grassroots	  
organizations	  have	  found	  preparedness	  rhetoric	  within	  urban	  communities	  difficult	  to	  
scale	  up	  (UNISDR	  2007).	  These	  communities	  are	  highly	  vulnerable	  and	  have	  a	  need	  to	  
foster	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  resilience.	  
	  
DRR	  IN	  TURKEY	  
	  
How	  risk	  is	  viewed	  in	  Turkey	  influences	  how	  the	  government	  structures	  legislation;	  
how	  businesses	  model	  contingency	  plans;	  how	  schools	  structure	  curriculum;	  how	  hospitals	  
prepare	  for	  an	  emergency	  event;	  how	  grassroots	  use	  their	  resources	  and	  interact	  within	  
the	  community;	  and	  how	  resilience	  and	  risk	  awareness	  is	  standardized	  into	  the	  cultural	  
rhetoric	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  local	  communities.	  Turkey	  approaches	  risk	  as	  a	  ‘fatalistic’	  society	  
would,	  responding	  to	  crises	  as	  they	  occur	  in	  lieu	  of	  preventing	  them	  altogether	  (Balamir	  
2001,	  2002;	  Unlu	  et	  al.	  2010).	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In	  the	  following	  sections,	  I	  examine	  Turkey’s	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  policies	  
(EQRR)	  and	  legal	  framework	  to	  demonstrate	  Turkey’s	  historical	  tendency	  to	  rely	  on	  
‘fatalistic’	  methods	  when	  dealing	  with	  disaster	  risk	  management.	  Recently,	  however,	  there	  
have	  been	  incremental	  efforts	  to	  restructure	  Turkey’s	  DRR	  policies	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  
‘self-­‐reliant/risk’	  society.	  The	  transition	  from	  a	  ‘fatalistic’	  approach	  of	  social	  organization	  to	  
a	  ‘self-­‐reliant/risk’	  approach	  demonstrates	  Turkey’s	  desire	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  
and	  be	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  DRR.	  
	  
Shift	  from	  a	  ‘Fatalistic’	  Society	  to	  a	  ‘Risk/Self-­Reliant’	  Society	  
Balamir	  (2001,	  1)	  explains	  that	  the	  ‘fatalist’	  idea	  of	  social	  organization	  and	  the	  ‘risk’	  
idea	  “are	  two	  separate	  forms	  of	  social	  existence,	  and	  beyond	  differences	  in	  modes	  of	  
administration,	  they	  stand	  as	  distinct	  attitudes	  towards	  social	  organization	  and	  life	  in	  
total.”	  (Figure	  2.3)	  Instead	  of	  reducing	  risk	  and	  increasing	  coping	  mechanisms	  before	  
earthquakes	  happen,	  Turkey’s	  DRR	  policies	  have	  been	  more	  reactionary	  (Unlu	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
In	  lieu	  of	  planning	  for	  fatalities,	  Turkey’s	  policies	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  wait	  until	  there	  are	  
fatalities	  to	  act.	  Therefore,	  many	  scholars	  claim	  that	  Turkey’s	  ‘fatalistic’	  approach	  to	  
societal	  governance	  creates	  EQRR	  policies	  that	  are	  inherently	  inefficient,	  not	  cost-­‐effective,	  
and	  dangerous	  (Bakir	  2004b;	  Balamir	  2001;	  Erdik	  and	  Durukal	  2007;	  Okay	  2005;	  Unlu	  et	  
al.,	  2010;	  Ural	  2001).	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Turkish	  
government	  and	  characteristics	  of	  Turkish	  community	  life,	  culture,	  and	  civil	  society	  as	  the	  
foundation	  of	  Turkish	  social	  organization.	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Figure	  2.3	  Attributes	  of	  the	  Two	  Extreme	  Models	  of	  Strategy	  in	  Disaster	  Policy	  
	  
There	  are	  four	  primary	  characteristics	  of	  a	  fatalist	  society	  (Figure	  2.3).	  First,	  this	  
society	  exercises	  the	  strategy	  of	  saving,	  that	  which	  was	  not	  damaged,	  or	  loss.	  Second,	  there	  
are	  often	  frustrations	  among	  organizational	  partnerships	  and	  third,	  this	  type	  of	  society	  has	  
a	  discourse	  that	  focuses	  on	  repairing	  damages	  and	  recovering	  losses.	  Finally,	  a	  fatalist	  
society	  focuses	  on	  planning	  for	  a	  crisis	  they	  assume	  will	  actually	  happen	  (Balamir	  2001,	  
2002).	  These	  four	  characteristics	  have	  six	  primary	  indicators.	  1)	  Information	  is	  often	  
disorganized,	  2)	  Intervention	  only	  happens	  after	  the	  disaster	  has	  already	  happened,	  3)	  
Operations	  are	  politicized	  while	  the	  actual	  issue	  goes	  unsolved,	  4)	  Response	  procedures	  
are	  considered	  a	  tremendous	  effort	  across	  the	  community,	  5)	  Umbrella	  funds	  are	  used	  to	  
help	  with	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  social	  recovery,	  and	  6)	  Risk	  information	  is	  shared	  across	  
multiple	  community	  institutions	  (Balamir	  2001,	  2002).	  
	  	  	  <	  Disorganized	  Information	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Information	  System	  >	  
	  	  	  <	  Post-­‐Disaster	  Intervention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Pre-­‐Disaster	  Conduct	  >	  
	  	  	  <	  Political	  Operation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Technical	  Issue	  >	  
	  	  	  <	  Extraordinary	  Responses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Routine	  Procedures	  >	  
	  	  	  <	  Umbrella	  Funds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Specialized	  Funds	  >	  






























	   63	  
Balamir	  (2001,	  2002)	  characterizes	  a	  risk	  society	  by	  four	  primary	  processes.	  First,	  
the	  society	  has	  a	  strategy	  to	  protect	  from	  possible	  harm.	  Second,	  community	  institutions	  
and	  successful	  organizations	  have	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  be	  relatively	  self-­‐reliant	  
before,	  during,	  and	  after	  a	  disaster	  event.	  Third,	  the	  rhetoric	  used	  throughout	  the	  society	  is	  
inherently	  ‘preparedness’	  rhetoric,	  aimed	  more	  towards	  being	  prepared	  for	  an	  event	  and	  
less	  being	  able	  to	  heal	  losses	  and	  damages	  after	  an	  event.	  Finally,	  a	  risk	  society	  does	  not	  
plan	  for	  a	  crisis.	  Instead	  they	  plan	  for	  a	  future	  event	  that	  is	  possible	  but	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  
with	  any	  absolute	  certainty	  (Balamir	  2001,	  2002).	  There	  are	  six	  fundamental	  indicators	  
present	  in	  a	  risk	  society.	  1)	  Information	  is	  organized	  and	  systematic,	  2)	  Intervention	  is	  an	  
on-­‐going	  process	  that	  gradually	  happens	  before	  a	  disaster,	  3)	  Issues	  are	  dealt	  within	  a	  
technical	  capacity,	  with	  decision-­‐makers	  using	  systematic	  but	  conditional	  processes,	  4)	  
Response	  procedures	  are	  considered	  as	  routine	  as	  any	  other	  emergency	  response	  
procedure,	  5)	  Excess	  funds	  allocated	  are	  set	  aside	  especially	  for	  the	  reason	  of	  DRR	  as	  well	  
as	  response	  and	  recovery	  efforts	  (Balamir	  2001,	  2002).	  
There	  are	  characteristics	  of	  a	  fatalistic	  society	  that	  still	  very	  much	  dominate	  in	  the	  
Turkish	  culture	  of	  DRR.	  However,	  Turkey	  has	  recently	  demonstrated	  the	  use	  of	  ideas	  and	  
characteristics	  of	  a	  bourgeoning	  ‘risk’	  society.	  For	  example	  after	  the	  earthquakes	  1999,	  
more	  effective	  and	  efficient	  buildings	  inspection	  and	  land-­‐use	  regulations	  were	  established.	  
Although	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  implemented	  nation-­‐wide,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  principle	  
strengths	  the	  DRR	  system	  for	  the	  future.	  This	  transition	  can	  bring	  the	  Turkish	  society	  to	  
equilibrium,	  where	  they	  not	  only	  prepare	  for	  the	  risk,	  but	  they	  can	  respond	  and	  recover	  
from	  it	  as	  well	  (Unlu	  et	  al.	  2010).	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Deficiencies	  in	  the	  Turkish	  Construction	  Industry	  and	  Building	  Stock	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  Turkish	  society,	  there	  are	  other	  more	  
structural	  and	  organizational	  components	  of	  current	  EQRR	  policies	  that	  contribute	  to	  
increased	  risk	  and	  decreased	  coping	  capacity	  in	  Turkey.	  Most	  prevalent	  among	  these,	  
despite	  the	  multitude	  of	  contractor/construction	  building	  and	  design	  codes,	  is	  a	  significant	  
lack	  of	  enforcement	  and	  oversight	  that	  has	  created	  thousands	  of	  unsafe	  buildings	  and	  
dangerous	  living	  conditions	  in	  Turkey	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012)	  	  
Rapid	  population	  growth,	  migration	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas,	  environmental	  
negligence,	  and	  the	  massive	  demand	  for	  housing	  in	  Turkey’s	  urban	  areas	  has	  caused	  
uncontrolled	  and	  sub-­‐standard	  construction	  projects	  (Okay	  2005;	  Ural	  2008).	  This	  
continually	  exacerbates	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  at-­‐risk	  populations	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  live	  in	  
illegally	  built	  structures	  (Okay	  2005).	  Additionally,	  current	  government	  policies	  and	  land-­‐
use	  restrictions	  tend	  to	  facilitate	  illegal	  settlements	  and	  unsafe	  building	  practices	  in	  
metropolitan	  areas	  (Unlu	  et	  al.	  2010,	  170).	  	  
	  
“The	  legal	  framework	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  coherent	  statement	  on	  defining	  the	  
responsibilities	  of	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  buildings	  and	  other	  
components	  of	  the	  built	  environment.	  The	  situation	  is	  fundamentally	  
unchanged	  for	  institutional	  buildings…	  The	  Development	  Law	  falls	  short	  of	  
protecting	  consumers	  in	  acquiring	  disaster-­‐resistant	  houses.	  Municipalities	  
perceive	  no	  political	  incentive	  for	  enforcing	  strict	  building	  construction	  
supervision.	  Governorships	  do	  not	  usually	  have	  sufficiently	  qualified	  
personnel	  to	  enforce	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Law	  within	  the	  wide	  areas	  for	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The	  widespread	  building	  damage	  from	  the	  earthquakes	  in	  1999	  served	  as	  
unfortunate	  proof	  that	  the	  building	  stock	  in	  Turkey	  was	  severely	  inadequate,	  did	  not	  meet	  
earthquake	  building	  design	  codes,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  was	  located	  on	  structurally	  weak	  
alluvial	  soils,	  making	  even	  the	  most	  structurally	  sound	  building	  at	  risk	  of	  collapse	  during	  a	  
seismic	  event	  (Balamir	  2002).	  Land-­‐use	  planning	  is	  not	  a	  priority	  in	  Turkey’s	  conventional	  
disaster	  policy	  rhetoric.	  Moreover,	  oversight	  and	  control	  of	  construction	  sites	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
materials	  being	  used	  is	  minimal	  (Gulkan	  et	  al.	  2002).	  There	  are	  only	  a	  few	  private	  
companies	  that	  specialize	  in	  oversight	  and	  quality	  assurance.	  Even	  though	  the	  municipal	  
governments	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  regulating	  construction	  sites	  and	  materials,	  lack	  of	  
funding	  and	  expertise	  has	  led	  to	  an	  unregulated	  construction	  industry	  with	  dangerously	  
negligent	  practices.	  “We	  must	  underline	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  effective	  design	  and	  construction	  
supervision	  system	  cannot	  be	  created	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  legal	  text	  alone.	  A	  well-­‐
educated	  and	  experienced	  manpower	  is	  required	  for	  its	  full	  realization.	  This	  should	  be	  
supported	  further	  by	  such	  instruments	  as	  professional	  liability	  insurance,	  professional	  
supervision,	  and	  licensing”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2).	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  policy	  or	  piece	  of	  
legislation	  that	  directly	  dictates	  admonishment	  if	  there	  is	  not	  oversight	  or	  quality	  
assurance	  mechanisms	  present	  and/or	  if	  construction	  sites	  and	  materials	  do	  not	  meet	  
Turkish	  building	  codes	  (Corbacioglu	  et	  al.	  2006).	  “Elected	  local	  municipalities	  are	  where	  
urban	  environments	  are	  planned	  and	  permits	  for	  most	  construction	  are	  issued,	  but	  unless	  
codes	  and	  plans	  are	  adequately	  enforced,	  these	  become	  worthless	  documents	  that	  do	  not	  
serve	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  they	  purport	  to	  serve”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2).	  This	  
demonstrates	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  ‘fatalist’	  approach	  to	  social	  organization	  with	  regards	  to	  
“insufficient	  coordination	  across	  multiple	  organizations	  from	  different	  jurisdictions	  and	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sectors	  result[ing]	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  coordination	  and	  collective	  actions	  during	  emergencies”	  
(Corbacioglu	  et	  al.	  2005).	  
Misdirection	  and	  misuse	  of	  labor	  skills	  in	  Turkey’s	  urban	  areas	  contribute	  greatly	  to	  
a	  workforce	  that	  is	  inadequate	  for	  oversight	  and	  quality	  control	  (Okay	  2005).	  Furthermore,	  
“pardons	  for	  illegal	  construction	  impede	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  system”	  (Sengezer	  and	  KoÁ	  
2005).	  Okay	  claims,	  “proper	  enforcement	  of	  building	  codes	  and	  standards	  remains	  the	  most	  
critical	  challenge	  for	  Turkey	  to	  reduce	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  building	  stock”	  (2005,	  7).	  
The	  three	  crucial	  elements	  lacking	  in	  the	  building	  and	  construction	  industry	  are:	  1)	  
accountability	  of	  public	  officials	  to	  reinforce	  safety	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  2)	  transparency	  
of	  building	  design	  plans,	  and	  3)	  strict	  building	  construction	  supervision	  (Okay	  2005;	  USGS	  
2011;	  Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
The	  deficit	  of	  information	  sharing	  between	  central	  government	  and	  
provincial/district	  public,	  private,	  and	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  not	  only	  hinders	  the	  
collaborative	  efforts	  possible	  during	  the	  disaster	  response	  and	  recovery	  phase,	  but	  
provides	  an	  impenetrable	  stalemate	  when	  trying	  to	  execute	  mitigation	  and	  preparedness	  
initiatives	  (Corbacioglu	  et	  al.	  2006).	  In	  addition,	  “information	  available	  is	  largely	  produced	  
through	  voluntary	  activities	  of	  separate	  research	  bodies	  and	  represents	  incompatible	  piles	  
of	  data”	  (Balamir	  2002,	  41).	  The	  UNISDR	  emphasizes	  in	  most	  DRR	  documents	  that	  multi-­‐
level	  cross-­‐organizational	  dialogue	  and	  decision-­‐making	  are	  key	  components	  to	  effective	  
DRR	  implementation	  and	  enforcement	  within	  a	  community.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  structure	  of	  
Turkish	  bureaucracy	  is	  too	  rigid	  and	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  cross-­‐organizational	  cooperation	  
and	  integration	  (Okay	  2005).	  Governorships	  and	  municipalities	  are	  often	  given	  similar	  
responsibilities	  and	  cannot	  work	  together	  as	  the	  governorships	  are	  delegated	  by	  the	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national	  government	  while	  local	  voters	  determine	  municipal	  leadership.	  “Experience	  to	  
date	  has	  shown	  a	  lack	  of	  adequate	  coordination	  between	  central	  authorities	  and	  the	  
provincial	  administrations	  during	  the	  critical	  period	  immediately	  following	  a	  natural	  
disaster”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2).	  There	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  misdistribution	  of	  resources	  
between	  the	  governorships	  and	  municipalities	  since	  the	  municipality	  is	  only	  concerned	  
with	  local	  issues	  and	  governorships	  are	  governed	  by	  an	  entity	  often	  thousands	  of	  miles	  
away	  that	  manages	  thousands	  of	  other	  governorships.	  Responsibilities	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
disaster	  are	  unclear	  and	  while	  many	  local	  governorships	  are	  given	  authority	  to	  handle	  risk	  
and	  disaster	  management	  mechanisms,	  they	  are	  not	  given	  the	  resources	  to	  exercise	  this	  
power	  (Bakir	  2004a).	  Municipalities	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  do	  not	  have	  authority	  when	  
managing	  risks,	  but	  have	  a	  plethora	  of	  resources.	  
	  
Governmental	  Decrees:	  Helpful	  Stepping	  Stones	  or	  Bureaucratic	  Impediments?	  
There	  are	  Turkish	  decrees	  that	  address	  proper	  enforcement	  of	  building	  codes	  and	  
standards	  (strengthening	  the	  power	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘self-­‐reliant’	  society),	  but	  the	  Pacific	  
Disaster	  Center	  (PDC)	  and	  the	  Earthquakes	  and	  Megacities	  Initiative	  (EMI)	  have	  recognized	  
weaknesses	  that	  prove	  these	  decrees	  to	  be	  more	  abstract	  and	  harmful	  than	  concrete	  and	  
helpful	  (Initiative	  2011).	  
Governmental	  decree	  4708	  requires	  construction	  supervision	  firms	  in	  Turkey	  to	  
supervise	  and	  control	  construction.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  legislation	  stipulating	  the	  
education	  or	  experience	  of	  the	  engineers	  employed.	  The	  building	  supervision	  system	  in	  
Turkey	  is	  highly	  centralized,	  as	  a	  commission	  consisting	  of	  five	  members	  located	  in	  the	  
capital	  of	  Ankara	  provides	  all	  of	  the	  certificates	  for	  building	  supervision	  firms	  nationwide	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(USGS	  2011).	  Also,	  the	  decree	  has	  made	  the	  building	  supervision	  firms,	  contractors,	  
laboratory	  staff	  testing	  the	  materials,	  and	  control	  engineers	  all	  responsible	  for	  any	  damage	  
that	  could	  occur	  with	  or	  without	  seismic	  activity.	  The	  sharing	  of	  responsibilities	  make	  the	  
already	  existing	  legal	  sanctions	  ineffective,	  although	  it	  could	  vastly	  improve	  work	  ethic	  and	  
quality	  (Cilingir	  2010).	  
The	  governmental	  decree	  587	  stipulates	  the	  creation	  of	  compulsory	  earthquake	  
insurance	  for	  residential	  buildings	  and	  offices.	  Instead	  of	  providing	  new	  homes	  for	  the	  
collapsed	  ones,	  the	  government	  formed	  the	  Turkish	  Catastrophic	  Insurance	  Pool	  (TCIP).	  
Coverage	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $17,000	  would	  be	  provided	  for	  each	  damaged	  or	  collapsed	  
insured	  home	  by	  TCIP	  but	  private	  insurers	  supply	  coverage	  in	  excess	  of	  this	  (USGS	  2011),	  
making	  them	  a	  more	  desirable	  alternative.	  Also,	  the	  insurance	  penetration	  for	  the	  TCIP	  is	  
quite	  low	  (14%).	  One	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  low	  Compulsory	  Earthquake	  Insurance	  (CEI)	  
penetration	  is	  the	  low	  level	  of	  public	  awareness	  about	  CEI.	  Communities,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  
are	  not	  informed	  that	  only	  those	  who	  have	  paid	  the	  CEI	  premiums	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  
receiving	  the	  $17,000	  in	  coverage	  (Cilingir	  2010).	  
Unfortunately,	  soon	  after	  the	  Bingol	  earthquake	  in	  2003,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  
announced	  that	  new	  homes	  would	  be	  constructed	  by	  the	  government	  for	  those	  families	  
whose	  buildings	  were	  damaged	  in	  the	  earthquake	  regardless	  of	  their	  participation	  in	  TCIP.	  
This	  discouraged	  involvement	  in	  TCIP	  and	  was	  unfair	  to	  citizens	  who	  paid	  the	  CEI	  
premiums.	  There	  is	  no	  political	  will	  to	  enforce	  the	  CEI	  or	  a	  driving	  mechanism	  to	  encourage	  
participation	  in	  TCIP.	  Also,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  legal	  ramifications	  for	  those	  citizens	  who	  do	  
not	  insure	  their	  buildings	  according	  to	  TCIP	  (Cilingir	  2010).	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It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  TCIP	  does	  not	  address	  or	  encourage	  mitigation.	  
They	  reduce	  financial	  risk.	  This	  is	  mode	  of	  DRR,	  but	  the	  mismanagement	  and	  lack	  of	  
enforcement	  of	  CEI	  furthers	  Turkey’s	  inability	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  ‘self-­‐reliant’	  approach	  of	  
governance.	  
The	  final	  decree	  relevant	  to	  disaster	  and	  emergency	  management	  is	  4734,	  the	  
Procurement	  Law.	  An	  assessment	  of	  the	  Bingol	  and	  Pulumur	  earthquakes	  that	  occurred	  in	  
2003	  showed	  that	  one	  of	  causes	  of	  the	  devastation	  was	  the	  heavy	  damage	  in	  public	  
buildings	  such	  as	  schools,	  which	  revealed	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Public	  Procurement	  
system.	  By	  integrating	  DRR	  concepts	  in	  the	  procurement	  of	  materials	  and	  resources	  for	  
building	  critical	  infrastructure,	  the	  resiliency	  of	  the	  buildings	  would	  be	  at	  their	  maximum.	  
This	  prevents	  damage	  to	  the	  building	  or	  anything	  of	  fiscal	  value	  when	  a	  seismic	  event	  does	  
happen	  and	  therefore	  is	  financially	  prudent.	  This	  also	  ensures	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  people	  
inside.	  Following	  the	  1999	  Kocaeli	  earthquake,	  the	  Procurement	  Law	  was	  updated,	  but	  
there	  is	  still	  no	  report	  of	  whether	  the	  Turkish	  Public	  Procurement	  system	  has	  been	  
effective	  since	  a	  seismic	  event	  that	  would	  test	  the	  procurement	  processes	  has	  not	  
happened.	  Still,	  Turkish	  scholars	  say	  that	  the	  update	  of	  the	  Procurement	  System	  has,	  
insofar	  as	  it	  has	  been	  enacted,	  displayed	  mutual	  considerations	  for	  both	  ‘fatalistic’	  societal	  
approaches	  to	  risk	  management	  as	  well	  as	  ‘self-­‐reliant’	  approaches	  (Bakir	  and	  Boduroglu	  
2004).	  
Despite	  a	  strong	  presence	  of	  DRR	  ideas	  and	  strategies	  within	  the	  Turkish	  
government,	  many	  scholars	  and	  researchers	  are	  worried	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  legislative	  focus	  
on	  EQRR	  policies	  in	  Turkey.	  Of	  the	  EQRR	  policies	  that	  do	  have	  a	  legal	  foundation,	  there	  is	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concern	  that	  these	  are	  ineffective	  or	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  to	  truly	  
implement	  the	  ideas	  and	  strategies	  of	  a	  prepared	  society	  (Erdik	  and	  Durukal	  2007).	  	  
“An	  effective	  disaster	  mitigation	  strategy	  must	  depend	  on	  two	  basic	  
premises:	  One	  is	  the	  crafting	  of	  an	  effective	  spatial	  (physical)	  planning	  
system	  in	  which	  disaster	  occurrence	  is	  considered	  explicitly	  as	  a	  prime	  
parameter.	  The	  second	  includes	  strict	  building	  construction	  supervision	  
plans,	  the	  transparency	  of	  their	  preparation,	  and	  accountability	  of	  public	  
officials	  reinforce	  the	  safety	  considerations”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  4).	  	  
	  
Public	  Education	  of	  DRR	  
As	  Turkey	  is	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  role	  legislation	  and	  social	  policies	  play	  in	  
social	  organization	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐disaster,	  there	  is	  another	  influential	  mechanism	  
contributing	  to	  the	  relatively	  low	  coping	  capacity	  of	  Turkey.	  Education	  for	  public	  disaster	  
preparedness	  and	  disaster	  mitigation	  has	  been	  under	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  central	  
government	  (Initiative	  2011).	  Local	  governments	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  do	  
not	  play	  a	  sufficient	  role	  in	  these	  issues.	  “The	  hierarchical	  top-­‐down	  nature	  of	  the	  disaster	  
management	  system	  tends	  to	  discourage	  local	  initiative	  and	  undermines	  the	  role	  of	  local	  
authorities	  who	  must	  face	  the	  affected	  people”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  1).	  Education	  about	  
earthquake	  risk	  is	  offered	  in	  primary	  and	  high	  schools,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  systematic	  education	  
program	  for	  the	  general	  public.	  Development	  of	  standards	  for	  public	  education	  and	  
community	  organizations,	  reaching	  the	  public	  at	  large,	  active	  participation	  of	  the	  public,	  
‘training	  the	  trainers,’	  and	  production	  of	  training	  materials	  has	  not	  been	  considered	  to	  the	  
extent	  where	  a	  blossoming	  ‘culture	  of	  resiliency’	  could	  grow	  (Initiative	  2011).	  
Although	  the	  educational	  efforts	  underway	  so	  far	  are	  valuable	  and	  have	  reached	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  people,	  the	  current	  situation	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  a	  pervasive	  state	  of	  un-­‐
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preparedness	  (Center	  2005).	  Communities	  across	  Turkey,	  specifically	  those	  with	  high	  
seismic	  risk,	  are	  presented	  with	  information	  on	  earthquakes,	  demonstrated	  the	  importance	  
of	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  and	  how	  to	  properly	  execute	  it,	  and	  are	  shown	  what	  to	  do	  
during	  an	  earthquake.	  This	  focus	  is	  certainly	  important,	  but	  does	  not	  feed	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  
culture	  of	  resiliency.	  Clearly	  another	  focus	  is	  required;	  which	  is	  to	  find	  the	  mechanisms	  to	  
get	  the	  public	  to	  take	  action	  with	  the	  education	  they	  receive	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  that	  
earthquakes	  present	  in	  Turkey	  (Initiative	  2011).	  This	  would	  greatly	  increase	  the	  
independence	  of	  the	  Turkish	  community,	  as	  the	  public	  would	  have	  the	  ability	  and	  the	  
authority	  to	  increase	  future	  coping	  capacity.	  
Significant	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  Turkish	  construction	  industry	  and	  building	  stock,	  
ineffective	  and	  out	  of	  touch	  governmental	  decrees,	  and	  incomplete	  vision	  of	  DRR	  education	  
for	  the	  public	  are	  key	  reasons	  why	  Turkey’s	  social	  organization	  is	  still	  primarily	  ‘fatalistic’.	  
There	  are	  many	  advocates	  and	  leaders	  working	  towards	  changing	  these	  variables	  of	  social	  
organization	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  ‘self-­‐prepared’	  structure,	  but	  there	  are	  still	  barriers	  that	  
stifle	  this	  transition	  in	  social	  organizational	  structures.	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  steps	  being	  taken	  
towards	  a	  ‘risk’	  society	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
In	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  I	  offer	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  DRR	  activities	  in	  two	  case	  
study	  communities	  in	  Turkey:	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya.	  Using	  themes	  and	  core	  ideas	  found	  in	  
qualitative	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  Turkey,	  I	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  
private	  sector,	  education,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  organizations	  in	  reducing	  disaster	  
risk.	  I	  then	  explore	  how	  these	  institutional	  engagements	  in	  DRR	  foster	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  
resiliency’.	  This	  will	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  understanding	  of	  how	  community	  institutions	  
engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  Turkey.	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  barriers	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and	  resource	  needs	  that	  respondents	  reported	  as	  being	  key	  to	  the	  slow	  transition	  from	  
‘fatalistic’	  to	  a	  ‘risk’	  society.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  METHODOLOGY	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  methodological	  design	  I	  used	  in	  order	  to	  
answer	  my	  research	  questions,	  including	  a	  discussion	  of	  sampling,	  data	  collection	  
strategies,	  and	  methods	  of	  analysis.	  I	  first	  introduce	  my	  research	  questions	  and	  then	  
explain	  the	  mixed	  methodological	  approach	  that	  was	  taken	  into	  order	  to	  answer	  those	  
questions.	  I	  then	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  both	  research	  sites,	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  and	  
describe	  the	  types	  of	  community	  institutions	  that	  I	  studied.	  Next,	  I	  describe,	  in	  more	  detail,	  
the	  strategies	  used	  to	  collect	  and	  analyze	  the	  primary	  data.	  Finally,	  I	  address	  the	  




Multiple	  community	  institutions,	  focusing	  on	  government,	  business,	  education,	  
healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  organizations,	  advocate	  for	  and	  participate	  in	  disaster	  risk	  
reduction	  (DRR)	  practices.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  DRR	  capacities	  within	  a	  community	  
as	  a	  whole,	  for	  example	  Turkey,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  primary	  community	  
institutions	  that	  help	  structure	  and	  sustain	  a	  community,	  participate	  in	  DRR	  practices.	  The	  
two	  primary	  research	  questions	  I	  explore	  in	  this	  thesis	  include:	  	  
1.	  How	  do	  different	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  and	  use	  DRR	  strategies,	  
practices,	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  Turkey?	  
2.	  How	  do	  DRR	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR	  help	  to	  foster	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  
resilience’	  in	  Turkey?	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MIXED	  METHODS	  APPROACH	  
	  
	   DRR	  is	  a	  multi-­‐	  and	  interdisciplinary	  social	  mechanism,	  and	  therefore	  should	  be	  
researched	  with	  multi-­‐	  and	  interdisciplinary	  methods	  that	  “…	  take	  into	  account	  reality	  and	  
are	  most	  apt	  to	  generate	  solutions	  for	  complicated	  challenges”	  (McEntire	  2006,	  2).	  
Qualitative	  methods	  are	  most	  effectively	  used	  when	  trying	  to	  obtain	  information	  on	  nature,	  
affect,	  or	  meaning.	  Quantitative	  methods	  complement	  this	  type	  of	  knowledge	  by	  measuring	  
structural,	  contextual,	  and	  institutional	  features	  (Ragin	  2004).	  	  
When	  exploring	  how	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR	  and	  how	  these	  
institutions	  help	  foster	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  resilience,’	  qualitative	  data	  enhances	  and	  
contextualizes	  quantitative	  data.	  A	  holistic	  and	  dynamic	  analysis	  and	  understanding	  of	  
these	  community	  institutions	  comes	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  both	  types	  of	  data.	  The	  
qualitative	  observations	  supplement	  quantitative	  data	  by	  explaining	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  
the	  data.	  “…	  mixing	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  approaches	  can	  enable	  researchers	  to	  
explore	  the	  structure	  (or	  form)	  of	  networks	  from	  an	  ‘outsiders’	  view	  and	  the	  content	  and	  
processes	  of	  networks	  from	  an	  ‘insiders’	  view”	  (Edwards	  2010,	  2).	  Both	  qualitative	  analysis	  
and	  quantitative	  data	  are	  necessary	  in	  social	  research	  because	  qualitative	  approaches	  do	  
not	  lend	  themselves	  to	  systematic	  numerical	  accounts.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  quantitative	  
approaches	  “over-­‐abstracts	  and	  over-­‐simplifies	  the	  social	  world…	  and	  produces	  measures	  
that	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  interpreted	  when	  divorced	  from	  the	  social	  context”	  (Edwards	  
2010	  –	  quoting	  Crossley	  2009).	  The	  combination	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  and	  the	  
quantitative	  deductions	  gathered	  from	  surveys	  taken	  in	  the	  field	  allow	  for	  both	  in-­‐depth	  
and	  more	  broad-­‐ranging	  analyses	  (Stallings	  1997).	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Edwards	  (2010)	  exclaims	  that,	  like	  the	  relationships	  between	  structure	  and	  agency,	  
a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  either	  qualitative	  or	  quantitative	  approaches	  requires	  the	  other.	  It	  
also	  offers	  the	  best	  chances	  to	  obtain	  useful	  and	  holistic	  answers	  to	  research	  questions.	  
Johnson	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  state	  that	  research	  approaches	  should	  be	  mixed	  in	  ways	  that	  offer	  the	  
best	  opportunity	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question(s).	  They	  also	  point	  out	  that	  a	  mixed	  
methods	  approach	  increases	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  research	  since	  it	  rejects	  dogmatism	  and	  
does	  not	  restrict	  or	  constrain	  researchers	  choices	  or	  the	  types	  of	  results	  that	  may	  come	  
from	  their	  research.	  
Qualitative	  data	  collected	  from	  my	  interviews	  allows	  for	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  
construction,	  reproduction,	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  chosen	  community	  institutions:	  
government,	  business,	  education,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots.	  Quantitative	  data	  collected	  
from	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	  provides	  what	  is,	  but	  fails	  to	  explain	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  
what	  is	  or	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  (Edwards	  2010).	  Both	  research	  questions	  
ask	  ‘how’,	  demanding	  not	  only	  an	  answer,	  but	  also	  an	  explanation	  to	  the	  answer.	  Mixing	  the	  
two	  research	  methods	  exercises	  a	  methodological	  pluralism,	  “which	  frequently	  results	  in	  
superior	  research	  (compared	  to	  mono-­‐method	  research)”	  (Johnson	  et	  al.	  2004,	  14).	  	  	  
	  
Qualitative	  
Creswell	  (1998,	  19)	  suggests	  that	  “we	  ask	  open-­‐ended	  research	  questions,	  wanting	  
to	  listen	  to	  the	  participants	  we	  are	  studying	  and	  shaping	  the	  questions	  after	  we	  ‘explore’,	  
and	  we	  refrain	  from	  assuming	  the	  role	  of	  the	  expert	  researcher	  with	  the	  ‘best’	  questions.”	  
Open-­‐ended	  questions	  permit	  for	  an	  unlimited	  number	  of	  possible	  answers	  allowing	  for	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unanticipated	  findings	  from	  the	  respondent	  to	  be	  discovered.	  Complex	  issues	  can	  be	  
explored	  further	  while	  creativity,	  self-­‐expression,	  and	  richness	  of	  detail	  are	  all	  permitted	  
(Neuman	  2006).	  The	  questions	  were	  designed	  to	  discourage	  the	  interviewer	  from	  leading	  
the	  interviewee	  at	  all	  times.	  Also,	  probes	  were	  designed	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  additional	  
information	  according	  to	  the	  answers	  and	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  conversation.	  Probes	  are	  
defined	  as	  “a	  follow-­‐up	  question	  in	  survey	  research	  interviewing	  that	  asks	  a	  respondent	  to	  
clarify	  or	  elaborate	  on	  an	  incomplete	  or	  inappropriate	  answer”	  (Neuman	  2004,	  306).	  As	  
open-­‐ended	  questions	  can	  lead	  interviewees	  into	  tangents	  or	  cause	  repetition	  in	  the	  things	  
they	  are	  saying,	  probes	  are	  an	  effective	  technique	  used	  to	  steer	  the	  interview	  back	  towards	  
the	  question	  of	  interest.	  Probes	  should	  be	  a	  neutral	  request	  for	  the	  respondent	  to	  clarify	  an	  
ambiguous	  statement.	  
Qualitative	  research	  is	  a	  means	  to	  gather	  detailed	  information	  about	  a	  particular	  set	  
of	  informants	  and	  to	  learn	  how	  they	  behave	  and	  think.	  Unlike	  quantitative	  data,	  this	  
involves	  discovery	  in	  lieu	  of	  verification	  (Ambert	  1995).	  	  This	  research	  project	  was	  
designed	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  the	  way	  that	  social	  institutions	  engage	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  DRR.	  
This	  exploration	  called	  for	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  during	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  where	  
unfettered	  dialogue	  meant	  the	  interview	  could	  uncover	  and	  span	  new	  territory.	  
	  
Quantitative	  	  
Survey	  questionnaires	  handed	  to	  each	  interviewee	  following	  the	  initial	  interview	  
were	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  contextual	  structure	  to	  the	  specific	  community	  institutions	  
engagement	  in	  DRR.	  Quantifying	  data	  that	  was	  discussed	  during	  the	  interview	  and	  
recognized	  as	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  how	  organizations	  engaged	  in	  DRR	  was	  needed	  so	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that	  meaning	  found	  in	  the	  qualitative	  interviews	  was	  given	  a	  clear	  structure.	  For	  example,	  
the	  survey	  questionnaires	  identified	  the	  public’s	  lack	  of	  interest	  is	  their	  seismic	  risk	  as	  an	  
extreme	  barrier	  to	  DRR	  implementation	  in	  both	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya.	  This	  survey	  finding	  
was	  then	  complimented	  by	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  which	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  processes	  that	  
informed	  the	  barriers.	  	  
RESEARCH	  SITES	  
	  
Two	  experts	  in	  qualitative	  research	  design,	  Marshall	  and	  Rossman	  (2011),	  discuss	  
the	  importance	  of	  being	  critical	  when	  choosing	  sites	  to	  study,	  which	  increases	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  data	  that	  is	  gathered.	  They	  recommend	  choosing	  research	  locations	  where	  “(a)	  entry	  is	  
possible;	  (b)	  there	  is	  a	  high	  probability	  that	  a	  rich	  mix	  of	  the	  processes,	  people,	  programs,	  
interactions,	  and	  structures	  of	  interest	  is	  present;	  (c)	  the	  researcher	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
build	  trusting	  relationships	  with	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  study;	  (d)	  the	  study	  can	  be	  
conducted	  and	  reported	  ethically,	  and	  (e)	  data	  quality	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  study	  are	  
reasonably	  assured”	  (Marshall	  2011,	  101).	  This	  provided	  a	  logical	  framework	  to	  begin	  the	  
city	  selection	  criteria	  process.	  
The	  two	  case	  study	  sites	  where	  I	  conducted	  research	  for	  this	  thesis	  were	  
determined	  by	  a	  set	  of	  guidelines.	  Each	  location	  needed	  to	  have	  high	  seismic	  risk	  and	  be	  
safe	  enough	  to	  travel	  in.	  Two	  different	  geographic	  locations	  and	  population	  sizes	  were	  
sought	  out	  because	  they	  are	  influential	  to	  how	  earthquake	  risk	  is	  perceived	  and	  acted	  upon.	  
It	  was	  also	  important	  that	  each	  community	  had	  been	  recently	  exposed	  to	  a	  seismic	  event,	  
since	  this	  would	  influence	  their	  EQRR	  experience	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  additional	  
information	  on	  how	  the	  cities	  were	  selected	  for	  this	  study).	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According	  to	  the	  USGS,	  Turkey	  is	  the	  fifth	  highest-­‐ranking	  nation	  for	  seismic	  
damages	  and	  losses;	  only	  proceeded	  by	  China,	  Japan,	  Italy,	  and	  Iran.	  This	  includes	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  fatalities	  and	  the	  number	  of	  earthquakes	  killing	  more	  than	  10,000	  (Gurenko	  
2006).	  Globally,	  it	  is	  the	  17th	  most	  heavily	  populated	  nation	  and	  is	  the	  95th	  fastest	  growing.	  
Two	  fault	  lines	  run	  through	  Turkey.	  The	  North	  Anatolian	  fault	  line	  spans	  the	  entire	  
northern	  border	  and	  the	  East	  Anatolian	  fault	  line	  runs	  north	  to	  south	  on	  the	  eastern	  side	  of	  
the	  country.	  The	  Hellenic	  Arc/Trench	  is	  located	  in	  the	  southwestern	  corner	  of	  the	  nation	  
and	  digresses	  into	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  Turkey	  is	  considered	  a	  democratic	  country,	  
absent	  of	  any	  political	  unrest,	  and	  was	  deemed	  a	  safe	  travel	  zone.	  
The	  project	  team	  chose	  two	  different	  cities	  in	  Turkey	  for	  study	  based	  on	  population	  
size	  and	  the	  recency	  of	  exposure	  to	  an	  earthquake.	  Istanbul	  is	  the	  21st	  largest	  city	  in	  the	  
world	  and	  is	  the	  biggest	  metropolis	  in	  Turkey	  (Dursun	  2010).	  The	  city	  is	  also	  ranked	  to	  
have	  the	  6th	  highest	  seismic	  risk	  in	  the	  world	  according	  to	  the	  Earthquake	  Disaster	  Risk	  
Index	  (Davidson	  et	  al.	  1997).	  Istanbul	  has	  always	  been	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  
due	  to	  its	  strategic	  location	  at	  an	  important	  junction	  of	  land	  and	  sea	  trade	  routes.	  This	  
historic	  city	  generates	  21.2%	  of	  Turkey’s	  GNP.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  only	  city	  in	  the	  world	  that	  sits	  
on	  both	  the	  European	  and	  Asian	  continent	  (CIA	  2011).	  It’s	  most	  recent	  devastating	  quake	  
was	  in	  1999,	  when	  approximately	  17,000	  died,	  50,000	  were	  injured,	  and	  500,000	  Turks	  
were	  left	  homeless	  (USGS	  1999).	  	  
The	  Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  Municipality	  has	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  DRR	  departments	  and	  
initiatives.	  Their	  DRR	  management	  structure	  extends	  into	  almost	  every	  sector	  of	  the	  city	  
and	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  model	  in	  which	  other	  city	  governments	  structure	  their	  DRR	  
management	  systems	  around	  (Center	  2005).	  Istanbul	  was	  considered	  an	  ideal	  location	  to	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seek	  out	  professionals	  who	  actively	  work	  in	  DRR	  because	  they	  are	  considered	  a	  leader	  in	  
DRR	  and	  have	  relatively	  recent	  exposure	  to	  seismic	  activity,	  which	  has	  greatly	  influenced	  
their	  interest	  and	  engagement	  in	  DRR.	  
The	  other	  location	  I	  studied	  in	  Turkey	  was	  Antakya.	  It	  lies	  on	  the	  southeastern	  
border	  of	  Turkey	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  closest	  Turkish	  cities	  to	  the	  Syrian	  border.	  Interviewing	  
professionals	  in	  two	  different	  locations	  in	  the	  same	  country	  helped	  me	  to	  gain	  perspective	  
of	  how	  the	  nation	  of	  Turkey	  interacts	  with	  DRR	  and	  expanded	  the	  possibilities	  for	  
discovery	  of	  new	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  my	  second	  location	  needed	  to	  have	  a	  vastly	  
different	  demographic	  make-­‐up	  and	  hazards	  history	  than	  Istanbul.	  The	  city	  of	  Antakya	  is	  
also	  landlocked	  and	  with	  a	  population	  of	  215,000,	  is	  much	  less	  populated,	  smaller	  in	  size,	  
and	  more	  suburban	  than	  Istanbul.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  EQRR	  practices	  that	  take	  place	  in	  
Antakya	  result	  from	  national	  mandates.	  Often	  times,	  enforcement	  from	  the	  capital,	  Ankara,	  
is	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  the	  correct	  resources	  to	  be	  mobilized	  to	  satisfy	  a	  new	  federal	  DRR	  
policy.	  	  
The	  most	  recent	  earthquake	  to	  shake	  Antakya	  was	  in	  June	  of	  1998	  and	  was	  followed	  
by	  a	  destructive	  aftershock	  in	  July	  1998.	  Approximately	  140	  people	  lost	  their	  lives	  and	  
3,000	  people	  were	  injured	  (EERI	  1998a).	  Even	  though	  this	  is	  the	  most	  recent	  destructive	  
quake,	  Antakya’s	  DRR	  structure	  did	  not	  change	  until	  after	  the	  tragic	  1999	  Kocaeli	  
earthquake	  that	  devastated	  the	  western	  part	  of	  Turkey	  (Sezen	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Antakya’s	  DRR	  
management	  is	  smaller	  in	  scale,	  less	  advanced,	  and	  overall	  very	  different	  than	  Istanbul’s,	  
but	  they	  have	  both	  proven	  effective	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  Finding	  representatives	  of	  each	  
of	  the	  five	  community	  institutions	  in	  these	  two	  different	  geographical	  locations	  in	  Turkey	  
fulfilled	  the	  goal	  of	  having	  “reasonable	  variation	  in	  the	  phenomena,	  settings,	  or	  people”	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(Marshall	  2011,	  103)	  and	  gave	  me	  a	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  types	  of	  DRR	  
strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  different	  institutions	  engage	  in	  across	  Turkey.	  
	  
DISASTER	  RISK	  REDUCTION	  COMMUNITY	  INSTITUTIONS	  
	  
When	  defining	  ‘community	  institutions’	  for	  this	  thesis,	  it	  was	  important	  for	  the	  
chosen	  community	  institutions	  to	  have	  a	  role	  or	  be	  active	  in	  DRR	  practices	  within	  their	  
community.	  I	  am	  using	  the	  UNISDR	  as	  well	  as	  the	  HFA	  established	  by	  the	  UNISDR	  in	  order	  
to	  define	  DRR.	  I	  also	  used	  the	  UNISDR	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  types	  of	  community	  
institutions	  that	  would	  be	  central	  to	  research.	  The	  five	  community	  institutions	  are	  1)	  
government,	  2)	  business,	  3)	  education,	  4)	  healthcare	  and	  5)	  community-­‐based	  grassroots	  
organizations.	  These	  community	  institutions	  were	  chosen	  because	  the	  UNISDR	  stresses	  
that	  each	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  reducing	  risk	  and	  establishing	  a	  culture	  of	  safety	  in	  
communities.	  “UNISDR	  will	  utilize	  the	  extensive	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  networks	  in	  civil	  
society,	  government,	  private	  sector,	  international	  agencies,	  and	  the	  technical,	  scientific,	  and	  
academic	  institutions	  to	  consult	  on	  the	  post-­‐2015	  framework	  for	  disaster	  risk	  reduction”	  
(UNISDR	  2012,	  1).	  Additionally,	  the	  concept	  paper	  for	  the	  UNISDR’s	  Fourth	  Session	  of	  the	  
Global	  Platform	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  in	  2013	  outlines	  particular	  institutions	  that	  
will	  be	  given	  priority	  and	  special	  attention	  including:	  local	  governments	  and	  cities,	  
parliamentarians,	  DRR	  champions,	  academics	  and	  science	  networks.	  The	  conceptual	  design	  
for	  the	  Fourth	  Session	  of	  the	  Global	  Platform	  proposes	  three	  main	  organizations	  to	  include	  
in	  the	  agenda.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  three	  main	  constituencies	  is	  “to	  determine	  policies,	  practices,	  
and	  measures	  for	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  and	  take	  responsibility	  for	  reinforcing	  resilience	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to	  disasters”	  (UNISDR	  2012,	  3).	  These	  organizations	  are	  the	  private	  sector,	  potential	  
communities	  and	  networks,	  and	  national	  governments	  with	  local	  authorities.	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  research,	  two	  representatives	  from	  each	  of	  the	  five	  
community	  institutions	  were	  identified	  using	  key	  informant	  sampling.	  This	  involved	  
selecting	  a	  sample	  of	  professionals	  who	  have	  special	  expertise	  in	  DRR	  and	  would	  have	  the	  
ability	  to	  answer	  my	  interview	  questions.	  It	  was	  crucial	  that	  each	  of	  the	  interview	  
respondents	  be	  involved	  in	  EQRR	  and/or	  mitigation	  activities	  and	  have	  some	  capacity	  to	  
influence	  decision-­‐making	  within	  their	  organizations	  (see	  Appendix	  B	  for	  extended	  version	  
of	  the	  interviewee	  selection	  criteria).	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  interviewees	  from	  each	  sector	  held	  the	  
following	  job	  titles:	  branch	  manager,	  civil	  defense	  expert,	  civil	  engineer,	  geophysical	  
engineer,	  geological	  engineer,	  seismologist,	  archeologist,	  doctor,	  assistant	  director,	  
director,	  deputy	  director,	  deputy	  governor,	  and	  president.	  These	  individuals	  were	  
knowledgeable	  informants	  who	  could	  speak	  to	  their	  own	  roles	  as	  DRR	  professionals	  and	  to	  
their	  broader	  organizational	  mission	  (see	  Appendix	  H	  for	  complete	  list	  of	  the	  interviewees	  
and	  job	  titles).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  most	  reputable	  sources	  possible,	  Justin	  Moresco	  and	  I	  worked	  
with	  a	  local	  partner,	  Mahmure	  Ezgi	  Bakir.	  Ezgi	  is	  a	  Masters	  student	  at	  Boğaziçi	  University	  in	  
Istanbul	  and	  works	  at	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  and	  Earthquake	  Research	  Institute	  (KOERI)	  
in	  the	  Department	  of	  Geophysics.	  Ezgi	  was	  briefed	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  project	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  criteria	  that	  each	  interviewee	  must	  meet.	  It	  was	  not	  required	  of	  our	  
interviewees	  to	  speak	  English,	  so	  having	  a	  local	  partner	  fluent	  in	  both	  English	  and	  Turkish	  
was	  crucial.	  Ezgi	  contacted	  possible	  representatives	  of	  each	  community	  institution	  and	  was	  
able	  to	  set	  up	  nine	  interviews	  with	  representatives	  of	  the	  five	  community	  organizations	  in	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Istanbul	  in	  mid-­‐July	  2011.	  Ezgi	  also	  arranged	  11	  interviews	  in	  Antakya	  during	  late	  July	  
2011.	  The	  final	  sample	  for	  my	  research	  included	  20	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  nine	  of	  which	  are	  
from	  Istanbul	  and	  11	  were	  completed	  in	  Antakya	  (Appendix	  H).	  As	  some	  of	  the	  interviews	  
were	  with	  multiple	  people	  at	  once,	  the	  sample	  included	  25	  men	  and	  one	  woman	  





Prior	  to	  visiting	  the	  research	  sites	  of	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  I	  worked	  with	  a	  larger	  
project	  team	  to	  develop	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  guide.	  We	  developed	  preliminary	  
research	  questions	  that	  informed	  the	  design	  and	  eventually	  directed	  the	  interviews.	  This	  
allowed	  me	  to	  stay	  flexible	  in	  the	  field,	  so	  I	  could	  ask	  questions	  as	  the	  interview	  unfolded	  
(see	  Appendix	  D	  for	  the	  complete	  interview	  guide).	  All	  of	  the	  primary	  questions	  asked	  were	  
open-­‐ended,	  and	  allowed	  me	  to	  probe	  more	  deeply	  should	  the	  interviewee	  misunderstand	  
the	  question,	  not	  be	  descriptive	  enough,	  or	  mention	  something	  intriguing	  that	  would	  
enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  interview.	  Probes	  to	  the	  respondent’s	  answers	  were	  previously	  
designed,	  but	  I	  had	  the	  freedom	  to	  pursue	  questions	  in	  more	  detail	  as	  they	  emerged;	  this	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  qualitative	  data	  collection,	  which	  is	  highly	  flexible.	  The	  interview	  
questions	  were	  also	  designed	  to	  be	  translatable	  into	  the	  different	  rhetoric	  used	  by	  different	  
organizations.	  	  
Creating	  the	  interview	  questions	  was	  an	  ongoing	  process	  that	  changed	  and	  
developed	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  research	  (see	  Appendix	  D).	  Some	  interviewees	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would	  answer	  the	  majority	  of	  our	  questions	  by	  simply	  giving	  us	  a	  detailed	  answer	  to	  
questions	  one	  or	  two.	  Innovative	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐spot	  probes	  were	  needed	  for	  other	  
interviewees	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  information	  that	  was	  needed.	  Five	  main	  questions	  were	  
designed	  around	  five	  topical	  areas:	  1)	  Work,	  2)	  Programs	  –	  Understanding,	  Preparing	  for,	  
and	  Mitigating	  EQ	  Risk,	  3)	  Barriers,	  4)	  Partnerships,	  and	  5)	  EQ	  Risk	  Perception	  (see	  
Appendix	  D	  for	  complete	  interview	  guide).	  A	  series	  of	  interview	  probes	  to	  each	  question	  
were	  created	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  additional	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  research	  
questions.	  Academic	  risk	  reduction	  and	  risk	  communication	  literature	  was	  used	  to	  inform	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  questions	  and	  probes.	  	  
During	  the	  week	  of	  July	  17-­‐23,	  2011,	  Justin	  Moresco,	  M.	  Ezgi	  Bakir,	  and	  I	  conducted	  
interviews	  in	  Istanbul,	  Turkey.	  During	  the	  week	  of	  July	  24-­‐30,	  2011,	  we	  conducted	  
interviews	  in	  Antakya,	  Turkey.	  We	  rode	  the	  metro,	  hired	  taxis,	  or	  walked	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  
interviewees,	  primarily	  at	  their	  place	  of	  work.	  We	  tailored	  our	  schedule	  around	  our	  
interviewee’s	  schedule.	  	  
Before	  the	  official	  recording	  of	  each	  interview	  began,	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  project	  
and	  our	  goals	  and	  desires	  was	  explained	  to	  the	  interviewee.	  If	  the	  participant	  did	  not	  speak	  
English,	  Ezgi	  would	  brief	  the	  interviewee	  in	  Turkish.	  Even	  when	  the	  interviewee	  did	  speak	  
English,	  Justin	  and	  I	  came	  the	  conclusion	  early	  on	  in	  the	  interview	  process	  that	  the	  ultimate	  
goal	  of	  our	  interview	  should	  not	  get	  lost	  in	  translation	  and	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  
participant	  in	  his	  or	  her	  native	  language.	  Permission	  to	  record	  the	  interview	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
acknowledgement	  from	  the	  interviewee	  of	  the	  time	  the	  interview	  would	  take	  was	  obtained.	  
When	  the	  official	  recording	  began,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  establish	  a	  common,	  respectful,	  but	  
easy-­‐going	  rapport	  with	  the	  interviewee.	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In	  order	  to	  establish	  rapport	  between	  the	  interviewee	  and	  myself,	  the	  first	  question	  
asked	  for	  the	  name	  and	  title	  of	  the	  interviewee	  as	  well	  as	  the	  name	  of	  the	  organization.	  
“Will	  you	  please	  say	  your	  name,	  title,	  and	  the	  name	  of	  your	  organization?	  Will	  you	  tell	  me	  
about	  your	  job	  here?”	  This	  topic	  laid	  the	  foundation	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  
specific	  practitioner	  work	  with	  DRR	  activities.	  The	  interviewee,	  being	  previously	  briefed	  on	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  interview,	  would	  often	  continue	  their	  train	  of	  thought,	  explaining	  what	  his	  
or	  her	  job	  was	  at	  the	  organization	  and	  how	  they	  engaged	  in	  seismic	  risk	  reduction	  
practices.	  	  
The	  second	  question	  was	  designed	  to	  help	  me	  understand	  the	  programs	  used	  by	  the	  
particular	  community	  organization	  to	  prepare	  for	  and	  mitigate	  earthquake	  risk.	  “	  What	  
earthquake	  education,	  preparedness,	  or	  mitigation	  activities	  is	  your	  organization	  involved	  in?	  
The	  discussion	  following	  this	  question	  also	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  
how	  their	  organization	  engaged	  in	  DRR	  and	  fostered	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  Additionally,	  
this	  question	  provided	  me	  with	  information	  regarding	  what	  is	  needed	  as	  well	  as	  what	  
organizations	  already	  have	  in	  terms	  of	  knowledge,	  tools,	  and	  resources.	  This	  information	  
helped	  me	  further	  understand	  how	  the	  organization	  might	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  DRR.	  For	  
example,	  though	  they	  might	  be	  legally	  mandated	  to	  implement	  DRR,	  they	  might	  need	  
additional	  tools	  and	  resources	  to	  be	  effective.	  	  
The	  third	  open-­‐ended	  question	  was	  designed	  to	  determine	  the	  needs,	  challenges,	  or	  
barriers	  the	  organization	  had	  experienced	  engaging	  in	  DRR.	  “What	  barriers	  have	  emerged	  
with	  designing	  or	  implementing	  your	  earthquake	  [hazards]	  program?”	  Data	  collected	  from	  
the	  answers	  to	  this	  question	  help	  determine	  why	  certain	  organizations	  participated	  in	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particular	  DRR	  practices,	  but	  not	  in	  others.	  This	  data	  can	  also	  inform	  how	  they	  would	  most	  
likely	  engage	  in	  DRR,	  if	  they	  had	  the	  capacity	  and	  ability	  to	  overcome	  barriers.	  
The	  fourth	  question	  prompted	  the	  interviewee	  to	  consider	  the	  DRR	  partnerships	  
and	  networks	  they	  were	  a	  part	  of	  and	  what	  those	  partnerships	  have	  meant	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
professional	  development.	  “What	  lessons	  have	  you	  learned	  from	  other	  leading	  individuals	  or	  
organizations	  about	  understanding	  or	  reducing	  earthquake	  risk?”	  This	  topic	  allowed	  me	  to	  
identify	  how	  networks	  of	  DRR	  professionals	  and	  organizations	  worked	  together	  to	  reduce	  
risk.	  This	  identification	  gave	  me	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  Turkey,	  as	  a	  nation	  full	  of	  
community	  institutions,	  was	  fostering	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  
The	  final	  question	  we	  asked	  prompted	  the	  respondent	  to	  think	  about	  and	  explain	  
how	  they	  think	  about	  risk	  and	  DRR	  within	  their	  community.	  “When	  you	  think	  about	  the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  major	  earthquake	  happening	  in	  your	  community,	  what	  concerns	  you	  the	  
most?”	  This	  topic	  helped	  me	  understand	  how	  local	  DRR	  advocates	  and	  leaders	  perceived	  
earthquake	  risk.	  
Justin	  Moresco,	  Ezgi,	  and	  I	  would	  debrief	  after	  each	  interview	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  
success	  of	  the	  interview	  protocol	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  we,	  as	  a	  team,	  were	  as	  effective	  as	  
possible.	  These	  debriefings	  helped	  us	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  were	  on	  the	  same	  page	  about	  what	  
was	  working,	  and	  not	  working,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  question-­‐and-­‐answer	  format	  in	  the	  open-­‐
ended	  interviews.	  This	  ultimately	  gave	  us	  a	  chance	  to	  alter	  the	  interview	  structure	  and	  to	  
critique	  one	  another	  on	  different	  interview	  techniques	  and	  methods	  of	  communication.	  	  
	  Following	  each	  interview,	  the	  team	  administered	  a	  brief,	  two-­‐page	  survey	  
questionnaire	  to	  each	  interviewee	  (see	  Appendix	  E	  for	  full	  survey	  questionnaire	  in	  English;	  
Appendix	  K	  for	  full	  survey	  questionnaire	  in	  Turkish).	  Following	  the	  survey,	  another	  set	  of	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interview	  questions	  were	  designed	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  why	  the	  interviewee	  answered	  the	  
way	  he	  or	  she	  did	  on	  the	  survey.	  Three	  primary	  questions	  were	  asked	  following	  the	  survey.	  
1)	  Of	  those	  items	  you	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to,	  which	  would	  be	  most	  helpful/useful	  to	  you?	  2)	  
Of	  those	  items	  you	  do	  have,	  how	  would	  you	  like	  the	  information	  delivered	  (maps,	  charts,	  
online,	  etc)?	  3)	  What	  online	  tools	  and	  resources	  would	  you	  like	  developed	  to	  make	  your	  
institutions	  more	  effective	  at	  reducing	  earthquake	  risk?	  	  
	  
Surveys	  
The	  two-­‐page	  survey	  (which	  was	  administered	  in	  Turkish)	  (see	  Appendix	  E	  –	  
English/Appendix	  K	  -­‐Turkish)	  allowed	  us	  to	  collect	  quantitative	  data	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
barriers	  present	  in	  DRR	  creation	  and	  implementation,	  the	  types	  of	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  
exposure	  information	  that	  the	  respondents	  did	  and	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to,	  how	  they	  
preferred	  to	  receive	  this	  information,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  their	  institutional	  efficacy	  could	  be	  
improved	  upon.	  The	  survey	  was	  designed	  so	  that	  the	  language	  used	  was	  simple	  and	  
accessible	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  professionals	  with	  a	  strong	  DRR	  background	  (see	  
Appendix	  E	  –	  English/Appendix	  K-­‐Turkish).	  
	   The	  survey	  first	  asked	  each	  interviewee	  to	  identify	  their	  access,	  or	  lack-­‐thereof,	  of	  
certain	  types	  of	  DRR	  data	  and	  information	  available	  in	  their	  professional	  work.	  For	  
example,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  whether	  they	  have	  access	  to:	  “Projected	  ground	  shaking	  
intensity	  in	  an	  earthquake”	  and	  then	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  mark	  either	  “already	  have”,	  “would	  
like	  to	  have”,	  or	  “do	  not	  need”.	  	  
The	  second	  section	  of	  the	  survey	  asks	  the	  respondent	  about	  the	  types	  of	  barriers	  
present	  when	  their	  institution	  or	  program	  implements	  EQRR	  activities.	  For	  example,	  the	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barrier	  “lack	  of	  money”	  is	  listed	  and	  the	  interviewee	  was	  asked	  to	  respond	  by	  marking	  
“minor	  barrier”,	  “major	  barrier”,	  or	  “not	  a	  barrier”.	  	  
The	  third	  section	  of	  the	  survey	  asked	  interviewees	  to	  consider	  how	  they	  prefer	  to	  
receive	  and	  share	  information	  for	  professional	  purposes	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  usefulness	  of	  
a	  list	  of	  information	  sources.	  For	  example,	  “newspapers”,	  “email”,	  and	  “government	  
websites”	  were	  listed	  and	  the	  respondent	  was	  asked	  to	  mark	  “low”,	  “medium”,	  “high”,	  “not	  
available”,	  or	  “available	  but	  not	  useful”	  so	  as	  to	  determine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  information	  
sources	  used	  by	  their	  organization.	  	  
The	  final	  survey	  section	  asked	  respondents	  to	  mark	  what	  types	  of	  information	  they	  
have	  or	  they	  most	  want	  should	  the	  building	  where	  they	  work	  be	  damaged	  in	  a	  seismic	  
event.	  Types	  of	  information	  offered	  were	  “projected	  cost	  to	  repair	  the	  building	  after	  the	  
earthquake”	  and	  “projected	  likelihood	  that	  the	  building	  would	  collapse”.	  Interviewees	  were	  
then	  asked	  to	  recognize	  these	  potential	  pieces	  of	  information	  as	  “already	  have”,	  “would	  like	  
to	  have”,	  or	  “do	  not	  need”.	  
Finally,	  the	  interviewee	  was	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  and	  turn	  in	  a	  brief	  demographic	  form	  
about	  themselves	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  community.	  At	  the	  close	  of	  
each	  interview,	  I	  would	  collect	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	  and	  demographic	  form	  and	  thank	  
the	  participants	  for	  their	  time	  and	  knowledge	  (see	  Appendix	  F	  for	  demographic	  form).	  	  
	  
Literature	  
In	  addition	  to	  interviewing	  DRR	  professionals	  that	  represent	  their	  individual	  
communities	  as	  well	  as	  their	  specific	  institutions,	  I	  endeavored	  to	  understand	  the	  existing	  
Turkish	  DRR	  regulations.	  Thus,	  to	  supplement	  the	  original	  data	  I	  collected	  for	  this	  thesis,	  I	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read	  historical	  documents	  depicting	  prior	  DRR	  guidelines,	  seismic	  activity,	  and	  reactions	  to	  
seismic	  activity.	  I	  also	  reviewed	  literature	  that	  assessed	  the	  Turkish	  publics	  sentiments	  
regarding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  DRR	  mitigation	  policies	  and	  response	  and	  recovery	  
measures.	  The	  information	  gathered	  from	  my	  readings	  connects	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  the	  
interviews	  and	  surveys	  to	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  DRR	  efforts	  that	  Turkish	  community	  
institutions	  are	  engaged	  in.	  This	  information	  informed	  my	  analysis	  and	  presentation	  of	  the	  





After	  data	  collection,	  Sandy	  Adler,	  a	  professional	  transcriptionist,	  prepared	  
verbatim	  transcripts	  of	  the	  audio-­‐recorded	  interviews.	  The	  transcripts	  of	  the	  recorded	  
interviews	  were	  then	  loaded	  into	  the	  qualitative	  software	  analysis	  program,	  Atlas.ti.	  Atlas.ti	  
is	  a	  program	  with	  an	  interface	  that	  allowed	  me	  to	  read	  and	  label	  (or	  code)	  each	  interview	  
according	  the	  particular	  topics	  and	  themes	  that	  emerged.	  	  
To	  begin	  my	  data	  analysis,	  I	  read	  each	  transcript	  multiple	  times	  without	  physically	  
coding	  it	  in	  Atlas.ti.	  Instead,	  I	  simply	  made	  mental	  and	  physical	  notes	  of	  the	  types	  of	  themes	  
and	  patterns—or	  the	  “…fuzzy	  constructs,	  which	  investigators	  identify	  before,	  during,	  and	  
after	  data	  collection”	  (Ryan	  2003,	  1)—that	  appeared	  in	  the	  initial	  readings.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
interview	  guide,	  the	  survey,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  personal	  field	  notes	  and	  knowledge	  from	  
conducting	  the	  actual	  interviews	  helped	  establish	  a	  foundational	  set	  of	  themes	  and	  patterns	  
before	  I	  started	  physically	  coding	  the	  transcripts	  in	  the	  software	  program.	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Once	  I	  had	  identified	  a	  preliminary	  set	  of	  themes	  in	  my	  initial	  reading	  of	  the	  
interview	  transcripts,	  I	  then	  translated	  them	  into	  codes.	  Charmaz	  (1983,	  111-­‐112)	  defines	  
codes	  as	  “shorthand	  devices	  to	  label,	  separate,	  compile,	  and	  organize	  data…	  Codes	  serve	  to	  
summarize,	  synthesize,	  and	  sort	  many	  observations	  made	  of	  the	  data.	  By	  providing	  the	  
pivotal	  link	  between	  the	  data	  collection	  and	  its	  conceptual	  rendering,	  coding	  becomes	  the	  
fundamental	  means	  of	  developing	  the	  analysis.”	  When	  I	  coded	  the	  transcripts,	  I	  started	  by	  
searching	  for	  the	  most	  general	  themes	  and	  patterns	  that	  emerged.	  Next,	  axial	  coding	  helped	  
me	  identify	  more	  generalizable	  thematic	  patterns.	  During	  axial	  coding,	  a	  researcher	  
organizes	  the	  codes,	  links	  them	  together,	  and	  discovers	  and	  examines	  key	  analytical	  
categories	  (Neuman	  2004).	  Finally,	  representative	  coding	  involved	  me	  selecting	  relevant	  
quotes	  in	  the	  transcripts	  that	  would	  reinforce	  my	  findings	  and	  allow	  me	  to	  illustrate	  them	  
in	  the	  actual	  text	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
In	  the	  end,	  I	  developed	  a	  codebook,	  in	  consultation	  with	  the	  larger	  research	  team	  
that	  spanned	  well	  over	  a	  dozen	  typed	  pages.	  This	  codebook	  included	  both	  code	  names	  as	  
well	  as	  memos	  that	  helped	  to	  elucidate	  the	  meaning	  behind	  the	  code	  (see	  Appendix	  J	  for	  
the	  final	  codebook).	  	  
	  
METHODOLOGICAL	  CHALLENEGES	  AND	  LIMITATIONS	  
	  
As	  with	  any	  research	  project,	  I	  encountered	  many	  challenges	  throughout.	  While	  this	  
was	  not	  my	  first	  time	  in	  Turkey,	  I	  found	  that	  not	  being	  able	  to	  communicate	  with	  some	  of	  
our	  interviewees	  in	  Turkish	  to	  be	  challenging.	  We	  were	  completely	  reliant	  on	  Ezgi	  to	  get	  
the	  types	  of	  information	  that	  were	  crucial	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  questions.	  Thankfully,	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the	  majority	  of	  our	  interviewees	  did	  speak	  English	  very	  well,	  so	  we	  were	  able	  to	  converse	  
with	  the	  interviewee	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  ideas	  and	  questions	  were	  not	  lost	  in	  translation.	  
Translation	  from	  English	  to	  Turkish	  and	  then	  from	  Turkish	  back	  to	  English	  in	  order	  
to	  get	  the	  answers	  recorded	  accurately	  in	  the	  transcript	  proved	  exhausting	  at	  times.	  Ezgi	  
worked	  very	  hard	  and	  without	  complaint	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  a	  successful	  interview	  with	  
usable	  data.	  It	  was	  important	  that	  Ezgi	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  research	  so	  that	  she	  
was	  capable	  of	  asking	  the	  right	  questions	  in	  Turkish.	  The	  first	  few	  interviews	  presented	  a	  
challenge	  in	  that	  Ezgi	  did	  not	  quite	  understand	  one	  particular	  idea	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  get	  
the	  interviewee	  to	  discuss.	  She	  resolved	  this	  by	  rephrasing	  the	  question	  entirely,	  in	  
Turkish,	  as	  the	  direct	  translation	  of	  the	  idea	  did	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  our	  first	  few	  
interviewees.	  
Another	  challenge	  that	  I	  enjoyed	  tackling	  was	  using	  the	  data	  compiled	  for	  the	  larger	  
research	  project	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions.	  Although	  the	  larger	  project	  goals	  and	  
this	  thesis	  research	  questions	  were	  similar,	  I	  did	  have	  to	  use	  data	  that	  resulted	  from	  
questions	  that	  were	  not	  directly	  aligned	  with	  the	  types	  of	  information	  I	  wanted	  to	  collect.	  
This	  forced	  me	  to	  look	  at	  themes,	  codes,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  interviews	  through	  a	  funnel;	  
gathering	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  broader	  picture	  at	  first,	  and	  then	  digging	  deeper	  into	  the	  details	  
and	  specifics	  of	  the	  interviewee’s	  responses.	  In	  the	  final	  transcripts,	  the	  answers	  to	  my	  
research	  questions	  were	  not	  always	  obvious.	  This	  made	  me	  look	  at	  the	  data	  from	  multiple	  
different	  perspectives,	  change	  my	  ideas	  of	  what	  I	  thought	  was	  useful	  data	  within	  the	  
interviews,	  and	  made	  me	  more	  thorough	  when	  reading	  and	  rendering	  a	  meaning	  from	  the	  
respondent’s	  answers.	  I	  also	  sought	  out	  secondary	  literature	  to	  augment	  my	  understanding	  
of	  the	  DRR	  context	  in	  Turkey.	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Another	  challenge	  and	  limitation	  of	  the	  study	  was	  that	  I	  could	  only	  spend	  a	  limited	  
amount	  of	  time	  in	  Turkey.	  This	  also	  affected	  my	  sample	  size.	  I	  was	  not	  in	  Turkey	  long	  
enough	  to	  get	  the	  representative	  sample	  I	  desired.	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  get	  a	  larger	  sample	  
population	  in	  which	  to	  work	  with	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  the	  emergent	  themes	  that	  I	  identified	  in	  
this	  exploratory	  work.	  	  
I	  also	  felt	  limited	  by	  the	  time	  constraints	  of	  each	  interview.	  Each	  participant	  was	  
informed	  that	  we	  would	  take	  up	  approximately	  1-­‐1.5	  hours	  of	  his	  or	  her	  time.	  This	  meant	  
that	  we	  had	  to	  be	  very	  clear	  with	  what	  kind	  of	  information	  we	  were	  asking	  for	  and	  steer	  the	  
interviewee	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  should	  the	  interviewee	  start	  discussing	  unrelated	  topics.	  I	  
understand	  the	  need	  for	  a	  time	  limit	  in	  any	  interview,	  but	  had	  the	  interview	  time	  be	  longer,	  
or	  unfixed,	  we	  may	  have	  learned	  more	  about	  each	  participant	  and	  their	  organizations	  role	  
in	  DRR	  in	  their	  community.	  
Even	  with	  these	  challenges	  and	  limitations,	  I	  still	  learned	  that	  clarity,	  consistency,	  
and	  kindness	  are	  three	  fundamental	  traits	  that	  one	  must	  have	  and	  exercise	  in	  an	  interview.	  
I	  learned	  that	  despite	  cultural	  or	  professional	  differences,	  people	  are	  truly	  keen	  to	  help	  you	  
achieve	  your	  goal,	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  times	  that	  might	  mean	  repeating	  a	  question	  or	  an	  
idea.	  Despite	  the	  methodological	  challenges,	  the	  mixed	  methods	  approach	  used	  to	  examine	  
how	  different	  institutions	  user	  DRR	  variables	  is	  a	  model	  that	  proved	  useful	  for	  this	  thesis:	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CHAPTER	  4:	  CASE	  STUDY	  –	  ISTANBUL	  
Istanbul	  is	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  populated	  metropolis	  in	  Turkey	  and	  the	  city	  plays	  a	  
crucial	  role	  in	  the	  economic,	  cultural,	  and	  financial	  success	  of	  the	  nation.	  As	  of	  December	  
2010,	  the	  population	  of	  Istanbul	  was	  estimated	  at	  13	  million	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  population	  
growth	  has	  averaged	  approximately	  3.45%	  per	  year	  (Municipality	  2008).	  The	  influx	  of	  
people	  to	  Istanbul	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rapid	  migration	  from	  rural	  to	  urban	  areas	  as	  people	  try	  
to	  find	  employment	  and	  an	  increased	  standard	  of	  living.	  Additionally,	  the	  rapid	  rate	  of	  
population	  growth	  increases	  the	  demand	  for	  housing,	  infrastructure,	  and	  civil	  and	  critical	  
facilities.	  	  
The	  North	  Anatolian	  Fault	  line	  lies	  directly	  beneath	  the	  city.	  Geologists	  and	  
seismologists	  predict	  that	  a	  7.6	  magnitude	  earthquake	  happening	  on	  the	  North	  Anatolian	  
Fault	  before	  2030	  is	  greater	  than	  60%	  (Traynor	  2006).	  “If	  a	  major	  earthquake	  hit	  Istanbul,	  
much	  of	  the	  city	  would	  be	  devastated,	  due	  to	  unlicensed,	  jerry-­‐built	  construction”	  (Lonely	  
Planet	  Turkey	  2011,	  662).	  Moreover,	  given	  the	  historical	  prominence	  of	  the	  city	  and	  the	  
cultural	  value	  it	  retains	  for	  Turks	  all	  around	  the	  world,	  the	  loss	  of	  critical	  facilities,	  
residential	  buildings,	  and	  historic	  structures	  would	  also	  mean	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  
supports	  and	  shapes	  the	  entire	  nation.	  Researching	  and	  understanding	  how	  key	  
community	  institutions	  in	  Istanbul	  engage	  in	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  (DRR)	  is	  imperative	  in	  
order	  to	  understand	  the	  vulnerability—and	  potential	  resilience—of	  this	  historic	  city.	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  activities	  
already	  underway	  in	  Istanbul,	  Turkey.	  Specifically,	  the	  sections	  that	  follow	  describe	  the	  
DRR	  programs	  and	  initiatives	  that	  are	  currently	  in	  place;	  explore	  the	  tools	  and	  resources	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that	  DRR	  professionals	  and	  other	  community	  leaders	  use	  to	  assess	  and	  mitigate	  their	  risk;	  
examine	  the	  key	  concerns	  that	  motivate	  DRR	  action;	  and	  present	  barriers	  that	  hinder	  DRR	  
activity	  in	  Istanbul.	  The	  chapter	  is	  organized	  around	  the	  five	  primary	  community	  
institutions	  that	  I	  studied—government,	  business,	  education,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  
groups	  working	  to	  reduce	  disaster	  risk	  in	  the	  city.	  	  
	  
Government	  
	   The	  local	  government	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  extremely	  involved	  in	  DRR	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  
EQRR	  activities.	  Government	  officials	  in	  Istanbul	  have	  completed	  training	  and	  capacity	  
building	  activities	  targeting	  both	  the	  staff	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  public	  (Madji	  2011).	  One	  of	  
their	  primary	  EQRR	  projects	  is	  the	  Istanbul	  Seismic	  Risk	  Mitigation	  and	  Emergency	  
Preparedness	  Capacity	  Enhancement	  Project	  (ISMEP).	  The	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  loaned	  financial	  resources	  to	  the	  city	  
so	  the	  government	  could	  create	  and	  enact	  ISMEP.	  The	  project	  consists	  of	  three	  core	  
components:	  1)	  Enhancing	  the	  Capacity	  of	  Emergency	  Preparedness,	  2)	  Seismic	  Risk	  
Mitigation	  for	  Priority	  Public	  Buildings,	  and	  3)	  Implementing	  Zoning	  and	  Building	  
Legislation.	  Osman	  Kilic,	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  Ground	  and	  Soil	  Research	  Directorate	  is	  
Istanbul,	  explains	  that	  once	  the	  risks	  are	  identified,	  it	  is	  the	  “government’s	  responsibility	  to	  
determine	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  risks.”	  
	   Two	  of	  the	  government’s	  primary	  concerns,	  as	  explained	  through	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  
ISMEP	  project,	  are:	  1)	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  buildings	  in	  the	  city	  and	  2)	  the	  application	  and	  
enforcement	  of	  building	  codes	  standards.	  Through	  the	  ISMEP	  project,	  the	  government	  of	  
Istanbul	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  retrofit	  for	  800	  public	  buildings,	  most	  of	  them	  schools.	  The	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government	  hires	  local	  experts	  to	  inspect	  the	  buildings	  and	  these	  experts	  are	  responsible	  
for	  identifying	  the	  magnitude	  of	  risk	  presented	  to	  the	  building	  as	  well	  as	  recommending	  
which	  buildings	  should	  be	  retrofitted.	  
	   To	  enhance	  the	  capacity	  of	  emergency	  preparedness,	  the	  first	  priority	  of	  ISMEP,	  the	  
government	  provides	  free	  training	  seminars	  and	  first	  aid	  training	  to	  the	  municipal	  
employees	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  people	  aware	  of	  their	  risk	  and	  to	  
provide	  information	  about	  what	  mitigation	  and	  preparedness	  activities	  they	  can	  do	  to	  
reduce	  that	  risk.	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  ISMEP	  project	  is	  conducted	  through	  the	  
government	  of	  Istanbul,	  ISMEP	  also	  helps	  the	  Istanbul	  Provincial	  Disaster	  and	  
Preparedness	  Department	  financially	  support	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  DRR	  efforts.	  
This	  contradicts	  the	  paternalistic	  structure	  many	  criticize	  as	  being	  the	  most	  pervasive	  
weakness	  characteristic	  of	  the	  DRR	  system	  and	  the	  most	  difficult	  attitude	  to	  correct.	  Still,	  it	  
must	  be	  noted	  that	  Istanbul	  is	  a	  mega-­‐city,	  and	  some	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  city	  government	  
is	  not	  localized	  enough	  to	  implement	  appropriate	  DRR.	  District	  governments	  and	  local	  
neighborhoods	  would	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  government	  entity	  to	  implement	  a	  project	  
such	  as	  ISMEP,	  but	  on	  scale	  apt	  for	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  neighborhood	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  
2012).	  
The	  Risk	  Management	  and	  Urban	  Development	  Department	  in	  Istanbul	  was	  loaned	  
funds	  by	  JICA	  to	  conduct	  a	  province	  wide	  loss	  estimation	  study	  in	  2009.	  This	  partnership	  
addressed	  two	  of	  the	  key	  components	  of	  ISMEP:	  1)	  Seismic	  Risk	  Mitigation	  for	  Priority	  
Public	  Buildings,	  and	  2)	  Implementing	  Zoning	  and	  Building	  Legislation.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
study	  have	  since	  informed	  many	  of	  the	  government’s	  urban	  transformation	  projects.	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Local	  officials	  and	  the	  Mass	  Housing	  Administration	  have	  continuously	  undertaken	  
numerous	  urban	  development	  and	  renewal	  projects	  in	  the	  past	  decade	  (Dursun	  2010).	  The	  
mission	  of	  these	  projects	  is	  to	  create	  new	  centers	  at	  the	  end	  nodes	  of	  the	  city,	  to	  transform	  
the	  dilapidated	  historic	  neighborhoods	  through	  urban	  renewal	  projects,	  to	  rehabilitate	  
squatter	  settlements	  through	  mass	  housing	  projects,	  and	  to	  design	  existing	  built	  areas	  and	  
residential	  structures	  as	  manifestations	  of	  disaster	  and	  earthquake	  risk	  safety.	  Kilic	  
explains	  that	  earth	  science	  data	  in	  addition	  to	  building	  quality	  examinations	  informs	  the	  
government	  of	  the	  buildings	  that	  need	  to	  be	  renovated	  or	  retrofitted	  as	  well	  as	  the	  areas	  in	  
which	  buildings	  should	  not	  even	  exist	  in	  Istanbul,	  new	  or	  old.	  The	  urban	  transformation	  
projects	  are	  intended	  to	  guide	  the	  structure	  of	  current	  and	  future	  government	  public	  
building	  plans.	  This	  is	  includes	  land-­‐use	  planning,	  planning	  for	  retrofitting,	  planning	  for	  
resident	  relocation,	  and	  planning	  contingent	  with	  seismic	  building	  codes.	  	  
The	  government	  regularly	  provides	  their	  findings	  regarding	  the	  specific	  buildings	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  vacated	  or	  retrofitted,	  the	  areas	  that	  have	  deficiencies,	  which	  adds	  to	  their	  
vulnerability,	  and	  supplemental	  risk	  awareness	  assessments	  to	  the	  public	  and	  private	  
sector.	  Due	  to	  specific	  barriers	  among	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  the	  city,	  government’s	  
ability	  to	  act	  upon	  the	  information	  and	  data	  they	  collect	  is	  limited.	  Especially	  with	  regards	  
to	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  the	  government	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  private	  sector’s	  
buildings	  because	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  authority	  in	  decision-­‐making	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  
government	  is	  interested	  in	  these	  buildings,	  since	  public	  and	  private	  buildings	  often	  
intermingle,	  and	  therefore	  what	  affects	  one	  will	  most	  likely	  affect	  both.	  However,	  they	  do	  
not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  manipulate	  property	  they	  do	  not	  own.	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The	  intended	  consequences	  of	  the	  earthquake	  based	  urban	  transformation	  projects	  
involve	  forcing	  people	  to	  relocate	  from	  structures	  that	  are	  collapse	  hazards,	  destroying	  
unsafe	  buildings,	  and	  building	  structures	  that	  are	  resistant	  to	  possible	  EQ	  activity	  in	  
Istanbul.	  The	  government	  uses	  its	  elected	  leaders	  as	  well	  as	  experienced	  professionals	  to	  
help	  persuade	  residents	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  urban	  transformation	  projects.	  Kilic	  
explains	  that	  in	  order	  to	  eventually	  establish	  an	  earthquake	  resistant	  district	  within	  the	  city	  
of	  Istanbul,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  will	  be	  have	  to	  be	  relocated	  and	  uprooted.	  The	  will	  of	  
the	  government	  and	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people	  are	  often	  incompatible,	  and	  this	  presents	  a	  
primary	  barrier	  between	  effective	  DRR	  and	  building	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  Since	  the	  
government	  has	  decided	  to	  address	  Istanbul’s	  seismic	  risk,	  Kilic	  says	  that	  the	  “government	  
or	  the	  municipality	  [should]	  use	  other	  tools,	  other	  legal	  tools”	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  urban	  
transformation	  projects.	  
Another	  project	  the	  government	  of	  Istanbul	  is	  working	  on	  is	  the	  Megacity	  Indicator	  
System	  (MIS)	  or	  Istanbul	  Disaster	  Risk	  Indicator	  system.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  help	  
city	  officials	  identify	  the	  tools	  they	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  priorities,	  to	  set	  up	  benchmarks,	  
and	  track	  progress	  in	  their	  disaster	  management	  systems,	  so	  they	  can	  justify	  decisions	  and	  
investment	  in	  DRR.	  The	  MIS	  is	  a	  tool	  to	  communicate	  the	  risk	  and	  promote	  discussion	  
around	  relevant	  local-­‐level	  risk	  parameters	  that	  enable	  disaster	  risk	  management	  
professionals	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  develop	  disaster	  risk	  management	  strategies.	  This	  
project	  will	  show	  the	  risk	  levels	  of	  different	  areas	  within	  the	  city	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  geological	  
profile,	  building	  stock	  quality,	  as	  well	  as	  social	  vulnerability	  indicators.	  
Extensive	  networks	  and	  relationships	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  professionals	  who	  can	  
contribute	  to	  the	  database	  of	  DRR	  knowledge	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  city	  to	  manage	  its	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risk	  and	  enhance	  preparedness	  efforts.	  The	  government	  respondents	  expressed	  how	  
important	  it	  was	  for	  them	  to	  have	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  professionals	  in	  the	  city	  to	  
support	  and	  implement	  DRR	  action	  so	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  outside	  professionals	  to	  
help	  inform	  their	  DRR	  activities.	  Support	  from	  local	  sources	  also	  bolsters	  the	  local	  economy	  
and	  strengthens	  the	  idea	  of	  DRR	  as	  a	  standard	  cultural	  entity.	  The	  primary	  local	  resource	  
that	  many	  community	  institutions	  use	  to	  inform	  their	  EQ	  risk	  as	  well	  as	  their	  mitigation	  
and	  preparedness	  activities	  is	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  and	  Earthquake	  Research	  Institute	  
(KOERI).	  
We	  are	  very	  lucky,	  because	  Boğaziçi	  University,	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  and	  Earthquake	  
Research	  Institute,	  exists	  in	  Istanbul.	  The	  observatory	  gives	  them	  information,	  and	  they	  
use	  [this	  to	  inform]	  a	  system	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  disaster	  and	  risk.	  Necmi	  Ercin,	  
Department	  Chief	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Provincial	  Disaster	  and	  Preparedness	  Department	  
	  
Ercin	  expressed	  his	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  recent	  DRR	  and	  emergency	  preparedness	  
conference	  his	  department	  organized.	  Many	  professionals	  came	  from	  all	  over	  Turkey	  and	  
shared	  information	  about	  EQRR	  techniques,	  strategies,	  and	  mechanisms.	  These	  networking	  
opportunities	  and	  information	  sharing	  venues	  are	  a	  particular	  resource	  and	  asset	  that	  the	  
government	  of	  Istanbul	  intends	  to	  capitalize	  on.	  Fostering	  these	  opportunities	  broadens	  
the	  scope	  of	  possibilities	  for	  DRR	  government	  officials	  and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  support	  
system	  to	  ensure	  best	  management	  practices.	  
The	  Istanbul	  Provincial	  Disaster	  and	  Preparedness	  Department	  has	  a	  fully	  
functioning	  command	  and	  control	  center	  that	  is	  used	  to	  monitor,	  direct,	  and	  maintain	  order	  
in	  the	  city	  following	  a	  disastrous	  seismic	  event.	  Though	  this	  center	  is	  considered	  a	  response	  
mechanism,	  it	  has	  been	  financed	  and	  exists	  as	  a	  precautionary	  measure,	  so	  the	  provincial	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government	  is	  ready	  to	  respond	  at	  the	  highest	  capacity	  necessary.	  It	  is	  a	  model	  of	  DRR	  
technology	  and	  does	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  government	  preparedness.	  
Although	  the	  local	  government	  of	  Istanbul	  has	  made	  tremendous	  progress	  over	  the	  
past	  13	  years	  in	  terms	  of	  DRR	  activities,	  challenges	  remain.	  In	  particular,	  government	  
respondents	  discussed	  three	  major	  barriers	  to	  DRR.	  These	  include	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  
politics/election	  periods,	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  government’s	  needs	  and	  the	  
resident’s	  desires,	  and	  the	  result	  of	  the	  time	  lapse	  between	  the	  last	  event	  and	  the	  present.	  
Additionally,	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate	  of	  personnel	  in	  institutions	  causes	  a	  loss	  of	  knowledge	  
and	  continuous	  restructuring	  of	  organizational	  relationships	  and	  partnerships.	  I	  will	  also	  
explain	  how	  government	  respondents	  have	  overcome	  the	  barrier	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  social	  
vulnerability	  indicators	  used	  in	  data	  collection	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Kilic	  explains	  that	  urban	  transformation	  projects,	  as	  with	  any	  government	  project,	  
are	  a	  political	  game.	  These	  are	  projects	  that	  place	  the	  dysfunctions	  of	  a	  city	  (earthquake	  
risk	  in	  Istanbul)	  at	  the	  center	  of	  its	  scope.	  They	  work	  to	  reclaim	  urban	  spaces	  and	  
economies	  in	  order	  to	  restructure	  and	  improve	  urban	  landscapes	  (Sakizlioglu	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Many	  decision	  makers	  and	  officials	  bend	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people	  and	  what	  they	  want	  in	  the	  
short	  term	  in	  lieu	  of	  understanding	  what	  they	  need	  to	  keep	  them	  safe,	  which	  are	  often	  long-­‐
term	  processes.	  This	  is	  particularly	  noticeable	  during	  election	  season.	  Promises	  are	  made	  
that	  cannot	  be	  kept	  while	  slanderous	  insults	  are	  batted	  back	  in	  forth.	  Whoever	  can	  get	  
voters	  to	  believe	  them,	  trust	  them,	  and	  like	  them,	  will	  most	  likely	  win.	  Lying,	  over-­‐
exaggerating,	  and	  fudging	  the	  facts	  and	  figures	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  form	  of	  
winning,	  according	  to	  the	  government	  respondents	  in	  this	  study.	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But	  there	  is	  an	  interesting	  negative	  point	  for	  the	  success	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  transformation	  
project,	  that	  especially	  in	  election	  periods.	  The	  other	  party	  is	  always	  trying	  to	  give	  to	  
the	  people	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  everything	  from	  you.	  They	  are	  using	  it	  political	  
tools	  to	  win,	  to	  reach	  their	  target.	  Osman	  Kilic,	  Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  Municipality	  
Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  Earthquake	  and	  Soil	  Research	  Directorate	  
	  
The	  government	  also	  found	  that	  while	  their	  goal	  was	  to	  make	  the	  districts	  of	  the	  city	  
safer	  and	  more	  resilient	  to	  seismic	  activity,	  the	  perceived	  goal	  of	  most	  of	  the	  residents	  was	  
to	  live	  in	  a	  “bigger	  and	  better	  flat”	  after	  the	  renovation	  or	  retrofit	  was	  done.	  Kilic	  notes	  they	  
learned	  that	  scientific	  and	  practical	  realities	  are	  important	  to	  consider,	  but	  people	  cared	  
more	  about	  their	  rights	  and	  how	  they	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  project.	  Kilic	  also	  mentions	  
that	  the	  residents	  did	  not	  want	  to	  move	  or	  to	  be	  uprooted	  during	  the	  renovation,	  and	  they	  
did	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  their	  neighborhoods,	  so	  they	  often	  did	  not	  even	  care	  about	  the	  purpose	  
of	  the	  project.	  	  
While	  the	  government	  has	  made	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  a	  priority,	  most	  
residents	  of	  Istanbul	  are	  not	  reminded	  of	  their	  seismic	  risk	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  People	  forget	  
about	  their	  risk	  and	  therefore	  their	  desire	  to	  be	  prepared.	  The	  government	  officials	  I	  
interviewed	  argued	  that	  adolescence	  is	  the	  right	  age	  range	  to	  be	  learning	  about	  and	  
exercising	  DRR	  activities.	  However,	  since	  the	  last	  seismic	  event	  was	  thirteen	  years	  ago,	  
many	  young	  people	  in	  Istanbul	  do	  not	  recall	  the	  event.	  For	  someone	  who	  is	  twenty-­‐six,	  
thirteen	  years	  have	  passed,	  half	  of	  their	  lifetime,	  since	  the	  drastic	  reminder	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  DRR	  in	  Turkey.	  Since	  the	  1999	  earthquake,	  other	  more	  pressing	  issues,	  in	  
the	  community	  as	  well	  as	  in	  people’s	  individual	  lives,	  have	  occurred	  and	  taken	  precedence	  
over	  DRR.	  Their	  risk	  as	  well	  as	  DRR	  tools	  and	  strategies	  become	  little	  if	  an	  absent	  priority	  
due	  to	  the	  significant	  time	  lapse	  since	  the	  1999	  earthquake	  to	  the	  present.	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One	  barrier	  mentioned	  by	  government	  respondents	  was	  their	  lack	  of	  social	  
vulnerability	  data	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  They	  emphasized	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  quality	  data	  
on	  specific	  social	  vulnerability	  indicators	  and	  not	  fully	  understanding	  and	  considering	  
vulnerability	  indicators	  for	  each	  district	  in	  the	  city	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  fair	  
assessment	  of	  risks	  and	  projected	  needs.	  To	  address	  and	  overcome	  this	  barrier,	  the	  
Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  Municipality	  established	  the	  Megacities	  Indicator	  System.	  The	  MIS	  
overlays	  important	  data	  that	  is	  considered	  in	  urban	  planning	  and	  urban	  investment	  
opportunities	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  as	  well	  as	  dangerous	  locations	  in	  
the	  city.	  The	  types	  of	  information	  overlaid	  include	  information	  on	  the	  geological	  profile	  
(geological	  bedrock,	  topography,	  local	  soil	  classification,	  average	  shear	  wave	  velocity,	  
surface	  geology,	  liquefaction,	  landslide	  risk,	  and	  land	  suitability)	  of	  Istanbul,	  the	  city	  layout,	  
building	  type	  and	  quality.	  These	  types	  of	  information	  overlaid	  with	  different	  social	  
vulnerability	  indicators	  such	  as	  age,	  income,	  and	  educational	  attainment	  provide	  a	  
comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  level	  of	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  different	  districts	  in	  
Istanbul.	  
Two	  contingent	  analyses	  of	  the	  overall	  risk	  of	  different	  districts	  in	  Istanbul	  were	  
conducted	  using	  several	  different	  earthquake	  scenarios.	  The	  most	  probable	  being	  a	  
magnitude	  7.5	  event	  and	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  a	  magnitude	  7.7.	  The	  Megacities	  Indicator	  
System	  estimated	  70,000-­‐90,000	  would	  be	  dead,	  500,000-­‐600,00	  would	  be	  left	  homeless,	  
and	  the	  total	  economic	  loss	  would	  be	  $40	  billion	  in	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  (Tabarly	  2010).	  
The	  amount	  of	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  social	  vulnerability	  indicators	  was	  debatably	  minimal.	  
Though	  they	  have	  the	  tools	  and	  personnel,	  progress	  getting	  good	  and	  statistically	  
significant	  data	  on	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  Istanbul	  is	  inadequate	  as	  it	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  collected	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and	  analyzed.	  Also,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  social	  vulnerability	  indicators	  have	  been	  used	  
and	  recorded	  by	  the	  IMM.	  While	  this	  study	  has	  been	  active	  for	  quite	  some	  time,	  how	  to	  
score	  indicators	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  determined.	  
[It’s	  important	  for	  me	  to	  know	  the]	  impacts	  [on]	  different	  population	  groups.	  We	  want	  
to	  have	  information	  about	  the	  older	  people.	  We	  want	  to	  reach	  older	  people	  after	  the	  
natural	  disaster.	  It’s	  very	  important,	  and	  we	  have	  a	  problem	  about	  it.	  Necmi	  Ercin,	  
Department	  Chief	  of	  the	  Istanbul	  Provincial	  Disaster	  and	  Preparedness	  Department	  
	  
Business	  
	   Businesses	  active	  in	  DRR	  in	  Istanbul	  focus	  their	  programs	  and	  activities	  towards	  
promotion	  of	  their	  product,	  increasing	  profit,	  and	  programs	  that	  help	  DRR	  become	  a	  part	  of	  
the	  culture.	  The	  business	  respondents	  asserted	  that	  programs	  that	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  
resilience	  ultimately	  benefit	  their	  enterprises	  in	  the	  long	  run	  as	  their	  DRR	  products	  and	  
services	  may	  become	  a	  necessity	  for	  members	  of	  the	  community.	  It	  is	  therefore,	  from	  their	  
perspective,	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  these	  businesses	  active	  in	  DRR	  to	  strongly	  advocate	  for	  
risk	  reduction	  efforts	  in	  their	  community.	  	  
One	  respondent,	  a	  mechanical	  engineer,	  runs	  a	  business	  that	  addresses	  structural	  
and	  non-­‐structural	  engineering	  components	  for	  buildings.	  Another	  respondent	  is	  the	  
coordinator	  for	  the	  Turkish	  Catastrophe	  Insurance	  Pool	  (TCIP),	  and	  deals	  only	  with	  
earthquake	  insurance	  for	  residential	  buildings.	  These	  respondents	  work	  in	  for-­‐profit	  
businesses	  that	  ‘market’	  different	  types	  of	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms.	  For	  example,	  
the	  mechanical	  engineer’s	  business	  promotes	  and	  sells	  the	  latest	  structural	  and	  non-­‐
structural	  components	  necessary	  to	  enhance	  the	  structural	  integrity	  of	  a	  building	  or	  to	  
conform	  to	  earthquake	  building	  codes.	  No	  matter	  their	  business,	  though,	  they	  continue	  to	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interact	  in	  the	  market,	  trying	  to	  inform	  what	  a	  good	  or	  bad	  DRR	  product	  might	  look	  like,	  or	  
which	  services	  are	  most	  needed	  for	  a	  community	  at	  risk	  considering	  cultural	  and	  
traditional	  restraints.	  	  
The	  business	  respondents	  I	  interviewed	  also	  act	  as	  seismic	  risk	  awareness	  
advocates	  by	  simply	  being	  in	  business.	  The	  success	  of	  a	  business	  that	  uses,	  promotes,	  and	  
demands	  DRR	  also	  helps	  the	  larger	  community	  become	  more	  resilient	  to	  earthquakes.	  
Should	  insurance	  penetration	  increase,	  the	  TCIP	  will	  benefit	  and	  more	  people	  will	  be	  
financially	  protected	  from	  an	  earthquake	  taking	  away	  all	  they	  have.	  The	  more	  businesses	  
succeed	  in	  this	  regard,	  the	  more	  they	  help	  DRR	  become	  a	  central	  component	  of	  cultural	  and	  
social	  life.	  For	  example,	  a	  mechanism	  that	  buildings	  sit	  on	  top	  of	  that	  increases	  the	  
flexibility	  and	  movement	  capacity	  of	  the	  buildings	  can	  be	  sold	  to	  contractors	  and	  designers.	  
As	  contractors	  and	  designers	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  safety	  implications	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
success	  of	  the	  product,	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  buy	  and	  use	  this	  mechanism.	  Gradually,	  this	  
DRR	  mechanism	  will	  be	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  standard	  building	  procedure	  and	  its	  use	  and	  
necessity	  will	  benefit	  the	  businesses	  that	  sell	  the	  product	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	   Beyond	  the	  individuals	  that	  I	  interviewed,	  the	  products	  of	  many	  businesses	  in	  
Istanbul	  directly	  reduce	  the	  risk	  that	  earthquakes	  pose.	  TCIP	  not	  only	  provides	  insurance	  in	  
case	  of	  earthquake	  damage	  or	  losses,	  but	  they	  also	  model	  risk,	  and	  conduct	  loss	  estimation	  
studies.	  These	  provide	  additional	  knowledge	  and	  can	  act	  as	  an	  effective	  resource	  in	  order	  
to	  positively	  reinforce	  DRR	  activities.	  
	   Another	  important	  contribution	  of	  businesses	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  their	  significant	  
expansion	  in	  the	  DRR	  network.	  As	  multiple	  industries	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  
structure	  and	  the	  function	  of	  the	  city,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  that	  multiple	  industries	  are	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considered	  and	  work	  together	  in	  DRR.	  All	  businesses	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  DRR,	  as	  their	  potential	  
continuity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disaster	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  success	  of	  DRR.	  	  
…	  no	  single	  company	  or	  any	  single	  institution	  or	  any	  single	  industry	  can	  handle	  this	  by	  
himself.	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  Chile,	  and	  Japan,	  it	  was	  proven,	  this	  theory.	  So	  we	  are	  telling	  
insurance	  companies,	  public	  officers,	  adjusting	  associations,	  etc.,	  that	  we	  have	  to	  
coordinate	  in	  that	  respect.	  And	  construction	  companies	  as	  well.	  So	  we	  are	  invest[ing]	  
in	  the	  coordination.	  Ismet	  Gungor,	  Executive	  Vice	  President	  and	  Coordinator	  of	  the	  
Turkish	  Catastrophe	  Insurance	  Pool	  (TCIP)	  
	  
Frequent	  meetings,	  seminars,	  and	  conferences	  allow	  businesses	  to	  share	  knowledge	  and	  
information,	  receive	  the	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  training,	  and	  provide	  a	  venue	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
able	  to	  market	  and	  compare	  their	  products	  to	  others	  of	  a	  similar	  nature.	  Businesses	  can	  
also	  instill	  trust	  or	  distrust.	  When	  a	  business	  uses	  data	  from	  an	  NGO,	  this	  relationship	  
exhibits	  trust	  in	  the	  NGO.	  Also,	  if	  skewed	  data	  is	  published	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  particular	  
businesses	  product,	  a	  businesses	  reputation	  can	  suffer.	  Businesses	  understand	  that	  a	  factor	  
in	  their	  continuity	  and	  success	  is	  the	  network	  connections	  they	  develop.	  	  
	   Businesses	  also	  act	  as	  educators	  and	  enforcers	  of	  DRR	  principles.	  Eren	  Kalafat,	  
mechanical	  engineer	  and	  owner	  of	  his	  own	  engineering	  firm,	  provides	  products	  that	  
enhance	  the	  strength	  of	  physical	  structures.	  He	  also	  raises	  awareness	  of	  and	  provides	  
products	  that	  are	  used	  for	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  practices.	  Kalafat	  explains	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  most	  effectively	  advertise	  his	  product,	  he	  must	  convince	  contractors,	  engineers,	  
and	  other	  customers	  that	  it	  will	  help	  them	  meet	  national	  and	  international	  building	  codes,	  
regulations,	  and	  laws.	  This	  informs	  the	  customer	  that	  a	  risk	  does	  exist	  and	  there	  is	  
something	  available	  that	  can	  help	  reduce	  the	  risk.	  This	  also	  gives	  Kalafat	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
explain	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation,	  as	  many	  people	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	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non-­‐structural	  risks	  present	  in	  their	  buildings.	  Also,	  businesses	  use	  their	  own	  money,	  in	  
lieu	  of	  funding	  from	  outside	  investors	  (such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank)	  or	  using	  the	  tax	  payer’s	  
money	  to	  invest	  in	  DRR.	  This	  way,	  they	  can	  control	  every	  aspect	  of	  their	  operation,	  from	  
the	  quality	  and	  methodology	  of	  research	  and	  data	  collection	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  used	  to	  
market	  their	  product.	  Since	  they	  are	  using	  their	  own	  money,	  respondents	  say	  that	  it	  is	  in	  
their	  best	  interest,	  financially,	  to	  educate	  and	  enforce	  DRR	  principles	  and	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  
resilience.	  
	   It	  is	  clearly	  important	  for	  businesses	  to	  market	  their	  products.	  However,	  the	  
business	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  expressed	  challenges	  and	  barriers	  associated	  with	  
articulating	  the	  goals	  and	  uses	  of	  some	  of	  the	  products	  that	  they	  produce.	  The	  way	  the	  
message	  is	  conveyed	  is	  also	  important	  in	  overcoming	  resistance	  to	  risk	  reduction.	  	  For	  
example,	  Kalafat	  explains	  when	  talking	  to	  a	  building	  designer	  or	  contractor,	  it	  is	  often	  best	  
to	  emphasize	  the	  benefits	  and	  added	  value	  that	  structural	  and	  nonstructural	  mitigation	  
components	  will	  add	  to	  their	  project,	  rather	  than	  instilling	  fear	  about	  the	  risk	  and	  
underscoring	  the	  enormous	  losses	  that	  could	  occur.	  	  
	   Yet,	  Kalafat	  explains	  that	  awareness	  of	  seismic	  risk	  and	  therefore	  of	  possibilities	  for	  
seismic	  protection	  is	  not	  enough	  in	  Istanbul.	  As	  the	  government	  struggle	  with	  people	  
forgetting	  about	  their	  risk	  and	  DRR	  activities,	  businesses	  struggle	  with	  people	  not	  believing	  
in	  the	  necessity	  of	  DRR.	  Gungor	  reports	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  convince	  the	  public	  to	  think	  about	  
reducing	  their	  risk.	  People	  have	  told	  him	  that	  “no	  one	  asked	  me”	  about	  whether	  I	  should	  
reduce	  risk,	  and	  “we	  believe	  in	  our	  destiny”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  earthquakes,	  and	  “it’s	  not	  
going	  to	  happen	  to	  us”.	  He	  says	  people	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  not	  properly	  informed	  of	  their	  risk	  
and	  some	  believe	  their	  building	  is	  resting	  on	  a	  solid	  and	  safe	  place.	  Another	  skewed	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perception	  that	  the	  public/customers	  have	  of	  DRR	  that	  business	  respondents	  mentioned	  
was	  the	  cost	  of	  DRR.	  They	  struggle	  because	  many	  customers	  do	  not	  realize	  that	  DRR	  is	  
much	  cheaper	  than	  they	  imagine	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  costs	  significantly	  less	  than	  if	  DRR	  
action	  was	  not	  taken	  and	  a	  disaster	  did	  occur.	  
People	  think	  still	  that	  the	  insurance	  is	  expensive.	  However,	  when	  we	  tell	  them	  the	  price,	  
they	  are	  surprised	  because	  it’s	  so	  cheap.	  And	  we	  say	  it’s	  less	  than	  one	  bread	  a	  day;	  
monthly	  premium	  is	  less	  than	  one	  pack	  of	  cigarettes.	  They	  are	  quite	  surprised.	  So	  it’s	  
an	  excuse,	  but	  the	  price	  itself	  is	  not	  an	  issue.	  Ismet	  Gungor,	  Executive	  Vice	  President	  
and	  Coordinator	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Catastrophe	  Insurance	  Pool	  TCIP	  
	   	  
Businesses	  also	  struggle	  with	  having	  trustworthy	  information	  and	  convincing	  
potential	  users	  of	  their	  actual	  motives.	  Since	  they	  are	  for-­‐profit	  organizations,	  the	  business	  
respondents	  encounter	  some	  who	  believed	  they	  might	  have	  manipulated	  their	  data	  to	  fit	  
their	  profit-­‐driven	  agenda.	  For	  example,	  one	  respondent	  emphasized	  that	  professors	  can	  be	  
rather	  distrustful	  of	  for-­‐profit	  organizations	  and	  their	  products	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  
because	  they	  have	  an	  agenda	  (to	  make	  money),	  their	  data	  and	  knowledge	  is	  biased.	  While	  
suggestions	  can	  be	  made,	  often	  times	  the	  academics	  leave	  it	  up	  to	  the	  businesses	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  data	  for	  themselves	  and	  inform	  their	  own	  decisions	  since	  it	  will	  ultimately	  effect	  
their	  business	  model	  more	  than	  the	  academics	  reputation.	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Education	  	  
	   The	  Turkish	  government	  subsidizes	  education	  at	  all	  levels	  and	  law	  enforces	  
attendance	  at	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools,	  which	  accounts	  for	  eight	  years	  of	  education.	  
However,	  due	  to	  the	  insufficient	  number	  of	  higher	  education	  institutions,	  only	  a	  select	  few	  
of	  candidates	  for	  college	  actually	  get	  to	  attend.	  There	  are	  approximately	  200	  schools	  in	  the	  
city	  of	  Istanbul.	  Istanbul	  Technical	  University	  (1773)	  is	  the	  world’s	  third	  oldest	  technical	  
university	  that	  is	  entirely	  dedicated	  to	  engineering	  sciences.	  There	  are	  approximately	  45	  
major	  private	  universities	  and	  120	  well-­‐known	  public	  and	  private	  high	  schools	  within	  
Istanbul.	  Approximately	  15	  high	  school	  facilities	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  classified	  
(NationsEncyclopedia	  2012).	  
The	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  the	  education	  sector	  is	  to	  educate	  youth	  and,	  by	  
extension,	  the	  public	  about	  their	  potential	  risks	  and	  how	  they	  can	  prepare	  and	  protect	  
themselves	  against	  a	  seismic	  event.	  By	  educating	  new	  generations	  of	  risk-­‐aware-­‐youth,	  the	  
education	  sector	  strives	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  culture	  of	  risk	  reduction	  in	  Istanbul.	  This	  is	  an	  
important	  goal,	  as	  over	  one-­‐fourth,	  or	  26.6%,	  of	  Turkey’s	  population	  is	  younger	  than	  15	  
years	  old	  (CIA	  2012).	  	  
Following	  the	  1999	  Kocaeli	  earthquake,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  changed	  school	  
curricula	  radically	  with	  the	  help	  of	  universities	  to	  focus	  much	  more	  explicitly	  on	  DRR	  than	  
response	  and	  recovery	  (Cilingir	  2010).	  JICA	  proposed	  a	  school-­‐based	  education	  project	  that	  
is	  being	  implemented	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  The	  project	  aims	  to	  improve	  school-­‐
based	  disaster	  education	  in	  the	  Marmara	  Region.	  This	  program	  targets	  primary	  and	  
secondary	  school	  teachers	  and	  administrators.	  The	  program	  is	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  disaster	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management	  systems	  in	  schools	  and	  increasing	  disaster	  education	  capacity	  of	  teachers	  
including	  DRR	  training.	  
In	  Turkey,	  DRR	  educational	  materials	  and	  strategies	  are	  targeted	  primarily	  at	  
children.	  Their	  aim	  is	  to	  increase	  young	  people’s	  awareness	  about	  earthquakes	  and	  to	  teach	  
them	  preparedness	  skills	  that	  they	  would	  then	  take	  home,	  share	  with	  their	  families	  and	  
communities,	  and,	  ideally,	  would	  maintain	  throughout	  their	  life.	  	  
KOERI	  at	  Boğaziçi	  University	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  the	  central	  source	  for	  DRR	  educational	  
material	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  is	  considered	  a	  well-­‐known	  and	  trusted	  organization	  that	  works	  
daily	  to	  reduce	  seismic	  risk.	  It	  is	  the	  organization	  that	  others	  go	  to	  when	  information	  about	  
seismic	  risk	  and	  EQRR	  is	  needed.	  Kandilli’s	  Community	  Impact	  Project	  (CIP),	  supported	  by	  
the	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (USAID)	  significantly	  increased	  the	  
educational	  capacity	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  CIP	  primarily	  targets	  students	  and	  schools,	  but	  has	  
materials	  and	  strategies	  for	  other	  institutions	  as	  well.	  The	  CIP	  is	  made	  up	  of	  four	  key	  
programs	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  the	  educational	  capacity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  overall	  seismic	  risk	  
awareness	  in	  Istanbul.	  These	  four	  programs	  are	  all	  directed	  towards	  student	  learning	  and	  
programs	  #2	  and	  #3	  are	  directed	  towards	  improving	  the	  structure	  of	  schools.	  The	  four	  
programs	  are	  1)	  basic	  disaster	  awareness	  training	  module,	  2)	  nonstructural	  mitigation	  
program,	  3)	  structural	  awareness	  training	  program,	  and	  4)	  a	  community	  volunteer	  
program	  directed	  at	  disaster	  response.	  The	  educational	  program	  in	  the	  Disaster	  
Preparedness	  Unit	  at	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  and	  USAID	  created	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  
materials.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  four	  programs,	  materials	  such	  as	  booklets,	  posters,	  presentations,	  
short	  films,	  and	  interactive	  learning	  devices	  were	  created.	  For	  example,	  an	  earthquake	  
simulator	  was	  developed	  in	  order	  for	  children	  to	  witness	  as	  well	  as	  experience	  the	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importance	  of	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation.	  Additionally,	  a	  school	  disaster	  management	  
project	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  is	  aimed	  at	  preparing	  the	  
structural	  and	  nonstructural	  components	  of	  the	  actual	  school	  building	  as	  well	  as	  designing	  
the	  management	  plan	  for	  the	  entire	  school	  should	  an	  earthquake	  take	  place.	  
While	  most	  of	  the	  materials	  are	  directed	  towards	  children,	  the	  CIP	  also	  created	  
educational	  materials	  for	  museums,	  hospitals,	  and	  more	  vulnerable	  populations	  like	  
persons	  with	  disabilities.	  Educational	  materials	  are	  regularly	  provided	  in	  paper	  format	  as	  
well	  as	  online	  to	  increase	  accessibility.	  There	  are	  three	  types	  of	  E-­‐Learning	  systems	  
tailored	  towards	  the	  general	  public,	  teachers,	  and	  students.	  Teachers	  can	  access	  an	  E-­‐
Learning	  program	  called	  Disaster	  Risk	  Educational	  Materials	  Content	  Management	  System	  
(DREAMS).	  In	  addition	  to	  Kandilli’s	  E-­‐Learning	  website,	  they	  also	  work	  with	  and	  educate	  
other	  professionals	  about	  seismic	  risk	  and	  risk	  reduction.	  Professionals	  that	  should	  be	  
involved	  in	  DRR	  are	  provided	  with	  resources	  available	  through	  the	  Observatory	  that	  will	  
not	  only	  increase	  their	  awareness	  and	  knowledge	  of	  seismic	  risk	  in	  Istanbul,	  but	  also	  
educate	  them	  about	  the	  tools	  and	  resources	  available	  in	  order	  to	  be	  prepared	  for	  an	  
earthquake.	  They	  also	  have	  a	  train-­‐the-­‐trainer	  program	  for	  professionals	  specifically	  
working	  in	  civil	  defense	  and	  emergency	  management.	  	  
	   Educational	  institutions	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  responsible	  for	  reinforcing	  the	  DRR	  
networks	  within	  the	  city.	  Not	  only	  are	  universities	  the	  primary	  developers	  and	  producers	  
of	  information	  and	  data	  concerned	  with	  seismic	  risk,	  vulnerability,	  and	  DRR	  in	  Istanbul,	  
they	  also	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  conveying	  risk	  information	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  
organizations.	  Seyhun	  Puskulcu,	  a	  geophysical	  engineer	  and	  Head	  of	  the	  Educational	  
Program	  –	  Disaster	  Preparedness	  Unit	  at	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  notes	  that	  the	  majority	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of	  teachers	  know	  the	  Observatory	  and	  the	  extensive	  opportunities	  offered.	  By	  working	  with	  
a	  variety	  of	  organizations	  across	  Istanbul,	  Kandilli	  has	  developed	  the	  capacity	  to	  bridge	  the	  
gap	  between	  EQRR	  tools	  and	  those	  who	  desire	  them.	  
	   Barriers	  that	  impede	  the	  creation	  and/or	  success	  of	  the	  education	  sectors	  DRR	  
activities	  are	  few	  in	  Istanbul.	  Educational	  institutions,	  with	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  
leading	  the	  way,	  have	  the	  technology	  and	  capabilities	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  DRR.	  Still,	  
educational	  organizations	  often	  run	  into	  budget	  constraints	  when	  trying	  to	  execute	  their	  
informative	  programs	  and	  create	  and	  disseminate	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  educational	  materials.	  
Puskulcu	  also	  noted	  that	  Istanbul’s	  large	  population	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  building	  stock	  
requires	  extreme	  actions	  by	  educational	  institutions	  to	  make	  Istanbul	  residents	  more	  
aware	  and	  informed	  of	  their	  seismic	  risk	  as	  well	  as	  DRR	  activities	  that	  can	  be	  implemented.	  
However,	  in	  a	  city	  of	  approximately	  13	  million	  people,	  reaching	  out	  to	  all	  educational	  
institutions	  and	  actually	  impacting	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  students	  and	  the	  general	  public	  as	  a	  
whole	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  challenge.	  Puskulcu	  has	  a	  plethora	  of	  information	  and	  materials	  
that	  are	  primarily	  targeted	  at	  children.	  She	  explains	  that	  because	  of	  the	  significant	  lag	  time	  
between	  large	  seismic	  events,	  people,	  especially	  children	  who	  have	  never	  been	  through	  a	  
seismic	  event,	  forget	  about	  their	  risk.	  This	  combined	  with	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  people	  that	  
need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  their	  risk	  puts	  Istanbul	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  unpreparedness.	  
We	  are	  trying	  to	  be	  ready,	  but	  [we’re]	  not	  ready…	  They	  are	  doing	  very	  good	  things,	  but	  
not	  enough	  of	  course.	  Our	  population	  is	  very	  high.	  Seyhun	  Puskulcu,	  Head	  Educational	  
Program	  –	  Disaster	  Preparedness	  Unit	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Grassroots	  Organizations	  
	   Grassroots	  organizations	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  politics	  of	  local	  communities.	  They	  
derive	  most	  of	  their	  power	  and	  reason	  from	  the	  local	  community	  and	  common	  ordinary	  
people.	  Grassroots	  are	  characterized	  by	  organizing	  in	  specific	  communities	  or	  among	  
specific	  types	  of	  people	  to	  advocate	  for	  change.	  The	  term	  ‘grassroots’	  implies	  that	  the	  
people	  supporting	  and	  moving	  the	  organization	  are	  natural	  and	  spontaneous,	  highlighting	  
the	  differences	  between	  this	  type	  of	  organization	  and	  that	  which	  is	  orchestrated	  by	  
traditional	  power	  structures	  (Klein	  2008).	  There	  are	  hundreds	  of	  these	  organizations	  in	  
Istanbul,	  which	  can	  be	  funded	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  the	  private	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  
donations.	  I	  use	  information	  from	  grassroots	  organizations	  that	  focus	  on	  risk	  awareness	  
and	  DRR	  in	  my	  sample.	  
Grassroots	  organizations	  involved	  in	  DRR	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  responsible	  for	  broader-­‐
based	  community	  outreach	  and	  education.	  These	  organizations	  coordinate,	  in	  large	  part,	  
the	  disaster	  volunteer	  structure	  and	  provide	  funds	  and	  assistance	  to	  volunteer	  group’s	  
working	  towards	  enhancing	  DRR	  in	  their	  communities.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  in	  
Istanbul,	  similar	  to	  many	  other	  places,	  rely	  on	  active	  volunteer	  involvement	  in	  terms	  of	  
personnel,	  as	  well	  as	  continued	  community	  recognition	  and	  support.	  Grassroots	  
organizations	  in	  Istanbul	  essentially	  act	  to	  give	  the	  community	  the	  power	  to	  enhance	  their	  
own	  capacity	  to	  prepare	  for	  and	  cope	  with	  extreme	  events.	  Moreover,	  these	  organizations	  
work	  with	  communities	  to	  provide	  strategies,	  activities,	  and	  mechanisms	  the	  community	  
can	  employ	  to	  reduce	  their	  risk	  to	  disasters.	  	  
Some	  grassroots	  organizations	  must	  wait	  for	  an	  invitation	  into	  an	  area	  in	  order	  to	  
execute	  their	  resources	  and	  skills,	  but	  these	  are	  primarily	  search	  and	  rescue	  organizations	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that	  do	  not	  target	  reducing	  risk	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  response	  and	  recovery.	  Still,	  non-­‐
profit	  search	  and	  rescue	  organizations	  often	  provide	  free	  earthquake	  awareness	  training	  
sessions,	  seminars,	  and	  materials.	  Grassroots	  and	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  in	  
Istanbul	  often	  create	  their	  own	  educational	  materials	  and	  strategies	  when	  raising	  
awareness	  about	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  DRR	  measures.	  
Our	  main	  project	  is	  the	  Neighborhood	  Disaster	  Volunteer	  Project,	  which	  basically	  
developing	  a	  certain	  capacity	  at	  the	  neighborhood	  level.	  It’s	  a	  community-­based	  DRM	  
[disaster	  risk	  management],	  very	  typical.	  We	  go	  into	  neighborhoods,	  we	  train	  
volunteers,	  [and]	  we	  try	  to	  create	  volunteer	  teams.	  On	  top	  of	  it,	  we	  provide	  the	  basic	  
equipment	  to	  those	  teams	  and	  organize	  them	  in	  a	  very	  simple	  way	  and	  help	  them	  keep	  
going.	  So	  in	  that	  sense,	  we	  have	  quite	  a	  widespread	  network	  in	  Turkey,	  especially	  in	  
the	  Marmara	  region.	  Mustafa	  Elvan	  Cantekin,	  general	  director	  of	  the	  Neighborhood	  
Disaster	  Volunteers	  in	  Istanbul	  
	  
Grassroots	  organizations	  provide	  training	  to	  the	  public,	  enhancing	  their	  ability	  to	  
deal	  with	  a	  disaster.	  The	  Neighborhood	  Disaster	  Volunteer	  Foundation	  offers	  a	  36-­‐hour	  
training	  program	  that	  includes	  five	  different	  modules	  for	  emergency	  responders.	  They	  
introduce	  risks,	  provide	  first	  aid	  training,	  give	  basic	  lessons	  in	  firefighting,	  present	  light	  
search	  and	  rescue	  strategies,	  and	  introduce	  the	  psychological	  impacts	  disasters	  have.	  	  
The	  grassroots	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  emphasized	  that	  they	  aim	  to	  work	  with	  
neighborhoods	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible.	  For	  this	  reason,	  neighborhood	  
heads	  and	  other	  elected	  officials	  are	  often	  the	  first	  point	  of	  contact	  for	  grassroots	  
organizations.	  From	  the	  neighborhood	  head,	  a	  core	  group	  of	  neighborhood	  leaders	  interact	  
with	  grassroots	  and	  other	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  DRR	  efforts	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locally	  and	  increase	  risk	  awareness	  throughout	  the	  community.	  This	  establishes	  a	  network	  
of	  neighborhoods	  in	  Istanbul	  that	  can	  share	  DRR	  information,	  knowledge,	  and	  resources.	  
Interestingly,	  the	  network	  structure	  that	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  created	  in	  
Istanbul	  has	  actually	  proven	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  barrier	  to	  DRR	  than	  an	  advantage.	  Because	  
local	  grassroots	  in	  Istanbul	  often	  work	  at	  the	  neighborhood	  or	  district	  level,	  and	  different	  
neighborhoods	  have	  different	  status	  levels,	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  get	  them	  to	  work	  with	  one	  
another.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  trying	  to	  establish	  
community/neighborhood-­‐based	  volunteer	  teams,	  but	  coming	  together	  as	  one	  
community/neighborhood	  has	  proven	  difficult	  and	  the	  social	  differences	  of	  each	  district	  
prevent	  a	  cohesive	  participatory	  rhetoric.	  
The	  overcrowded	  nature	  and	  increasing	  population	  of	  this	  urban	  area	  has	  also	  
proved	  detrimental	  to	  the	  overall	  efforts	  of	  grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Istanbul.	  The	  large	  
number	  of	  people,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  socially	  segregated	  nature	  of	  the	  city,	  inhibits	  the	  
grassroots	  groups	  from	  instilling	  the	  “culture	  of	  prevention”	  that	  so	  many	  of	  these	  
organizations	  strive	  to	  promote.	  	  
Respondents	  also	  emphasized	  that	  their	  organizations	  are	  also	  largely	  incapable	  of	  
harnessing	  the	  types	  of	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  necessary	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
destruction	  that	  an	  earthquake	  event	  would	  have	  on	  the	  already	  chaotic	  city.	  Within	  
districts,	  community-­‐based	  DRR	  has	  proven	  difficult	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  people	  and	  
activities	  in	  every	  neighborhood.	  
The	  major	  problem	  is	  we	  are	  overcrowded…	  and	  still	  Istanbul	  is	  receiving	  
immigrants...	  I	  think	  first	  of	  all	  this	  is	  what	  we	  should	  do,	  just	  to	  decrease	  the	  
population	  of	  Istanbul.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  there’s	  only	  one	  solution	  for	  Istanbul	  to	  be	  
earthquake-­resistant,	  earthquake	  resilient…	  because	  of	  this	  overpopulation	  pressure	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that	  these	  very	  bad	  quality	  buildings	  are	  connected	  and	  people,	  they	  have	  no	  other	  
chance...	  they	  have	  to	  live	  in	  those	  buildings…	  With	  this	  situation,	  there’s	  no	  possibility	  
that	  we	  can	  make	  this	  city	  disaster-­resilient.	  Ali	  Nasuh	  Mahruki,	  President	  of	  AKUT,	  
Search	  and	  Rescue	  Association	  
	  
Due	  to	  significant	  bureaucratic	  impositions,	  grassroots	  groups	  have	  no	  official	  
power,	  authority,	  or	  leadership	  position	  in	  Istanbul	  in	  disasters.	  Each	  district	  in	  Istanbul	  is	  
assigned	  a	  district	  governor	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  However,	  the	  municipal	  system	  
acts	  parallel	  and	  within	  a	  similar	  capacity	  and	  has	  similar	  responsibilities	  as	  the	  
governorships.	  Municipalities	  have	  mayors	  that	  are	  elected	  by	  the	  locals,	  while	  the	  
governor	  is	  assigned	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  The	  governor	  has	  the	  authority	  in	  the	  
event	  of	  a	  disaster,	  but	  the	  means	  and	  resources	  are	  in	  the	  mayor’s	  control.	  Municipalities	  
have	  the	  equipment,	  resources,	  and	  personnel	  since	  their	  leadership	  only	  deals	  with	  the	  
one	  municipality	  while	  the	  central	  government	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  of	  the	  governorships.	  This	  
creates	  confusion	  and	  a	  mismatch	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  different	  levels	  of	  
government	  (national,	  regional,	  cross-­‐regional,	  local).	  Cantekin,	  general	  director	  of	  the	  
Neighborhood	  Disaster	  Volunteers	  in	  Istanbul,	  reports	  that	  municipalities	  often	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  cooperate	  with	  DRR	  activities	  because	  this	  might	  represent	  an	  endorsement	  of	  the	  
risk	  present	  in	  their	  neighborhood	  and	  consequently,	  would	  lower	  property	  values.	  
However,	  he	  says	  that	  the	  district	  governors	  will	  work	  with	  grassroots	  organizations.	  
Grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Istanbul	  also	  experience	  low	  volunteer	  rates.	  One	  
respondent	  asserted	  that	  as	  time	  passes	  without	  a	  disaster	  or	  a	  small	  seismic	  event	  to	  serve	  
as	  a	  reminder	  of	  risk,	  an	  estimated	  10%	  of	  volunteers	  drop	  out	  every	  year.	  This	  highlights	  
the	  importance	  of	  small	  local	  seismic	  events	  or	  outside	  sensational	  events	  that	  receive	  a	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large	  amount	  of	  media	  coverage	  for	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
recruiting	  new	  volunteers	  and	  generating	  higher	  levels	  of	  risk	  awareness.	  	  
Grassroots	  groups	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  not	  always	  as	  confident	  in	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  
materials	  that	  they	  provide,	  for	  free,	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  They	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  
they	  are	  even	  read	  and	  how	  much	  information	  they	  truly	  digest.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  
feel	  as	  though	  the	  time,	  money,	  and	  effort	  that	  goes	  into	  creating	  free	  DRR	  materials	  for	  the	  
public	  is	  misspent.	  As	  one	  respondent	  asserted,	  DRR	  materials,	  activities,	  strategies	  and	  
mechanisms	  are	  useless	  if	  they	  do	  not	  influence	  the	  community’s	  perceptions	  and	  reactions	  
towards	  DRR.	  	  
	  
Healthcare	  
	   There	  are	  an	  estimated	  90	  public	  and	  private	  healthcare	  facilities	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  the	  
city	  has	  two	  of	  the	  nation’s	  medial	  schools.	  Healthcare	  throughout	  Turkey	  is	  dominated	  by	  
a	  centralized	  state	  system	  run	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  In	  2003,	  a	  new	  healthcare	  reform	  
program	  was	  introduced	  that	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  the	  ratio	  of	  private	  to	  state	  health	  
provision	  and	  making	  healthcare	  available	  to	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  population.	  Between	  80-­‐
90%	  of	  the	  Turkish	  population,	  including	  the	  self-­‐employed,	  have	  healthcare	  provided	  by	  
the	  national	  pension	  system,	  but	  the	  low	  quality	  of	  care	  encourages	  the	  use	  of	  private	  
healthcare	  providers.	  Still,	  in	  2006,	  there	  was	  one	  doctor	  for	  every	  700	  people,	  one	  nurse	  
for	  every	  580,	  and	  one	  hospital	  bed	  for	  every	  380	  people.	  These	  ratios	  are	  the	  lowest	  
among	  all	  European	  countries	  (Division	  2008).	  	  
The	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Istanbul	  plays	  a	  significant	  but	  mostly	  undefined	  role	  in	  
DRR.	  Primarily	  concerned	  with	  emergency	  response,	  their	  involvement	  in	  directly	  reducing	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risk	  is	  limited.	  Yet,	  the	  state	  mandates	  that	  there	  are	  many	  disaster	  contingency	  plans	  that	  
each	  healthcare	  institution	  must	  develop,	  review	  annually,	  and	  file	  with	  the	  Health	  
Ministry.	  Under	  Health	  Ministry	  regulations,	  every	  hospital	  should	  have	  trained	  disaster	  
managers	  as	  well	  as	  at	  least	  10	  people	  who	  are	  trained	  in	  search	  and	  rescue	  and	  disaster	  
management.	  There	  are	  also	  mandatory	  annual	  training	  programs	  with	  the	  Health	  Ministry	  
designed	  to	  educate	  employees	  about	  how	  to	  create	  and	  implement	  this	  disaster	  plan.	  	  
Physician	  and	  deputy	  chief	  of	  the	  hospitals	  come	  here	  and	  they	  give	  some	  information	  
about	  disaster	  and	  then	  they	  say	  to	  them	  “Now	  you	  make	  a	  plan	  about	  natural	  disaster	  
for	  your	  hospital”	  …	  these	  people	  which	  are	  involved	  in	  hospital	  administration,	  they	  
share	  their	  plans	  with	  other	  people,	  with	  other	  big	  hospital	  administrations.	  And	  they	  
go	  to	  their	  hospitals,	  the	  people	  who	  are	  trained	  here,	  and	  then	  do	  some	  practices	  and	  
also	  this	  unit	  goes	  to	  hospitals	  to	  control	  [monitor]	  how	  they	  do	  this.	  Dr.	  M	  Turkay	  
Esin,	  Head	  of	  Disaster	  Healthcare	  Services	  in	  the	  Marmara	  region	  
	  
Training	  is	  offered	  through	  hospitals	  for	  health	  sector	  officials	  such	  as	  doctors,	  nurses,	  
paramedics,	  technicians,	  and	  police	  services.	  In-­‐house	  training	  is	  aimed	  at	  educating	  
employees	  about	  what	  they	  should	  and	  should	  not	  do	  during	  any	  type	  of	  disastrous	  event.	  
In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  healthcare	  employees	  remain	  risk	  aware,	  all	  healthcare	  personnel	  
are	  required	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  complete	  one	  hour	  of	  disaster	  preparedness	  training	  
a	  year.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  community	  institutions	  I	  
studied,	  healthcare	  institutions	  are	  more	  disconnected	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  DRR	  dialogue	  
and	  networks	  in	  Istanbul	  in	  terms	  of	  sharing	  information	  across	  the	  sectors.	  However,	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  information	  sharing	  between	  healthcare	  institutions,	  their	  networks	  and	  
DRR	  dialogue	  is	  equally	  robust.	  Healthcare	  institutions	  regularly	  share	  information	  with	  
	  
	   116	  
one	  another.	  They	  have	  a	  tight	  knit	  network	  of	  information	  sharing	  and	  DRR	  dialogue	  with	  
a	  multitude	  of	  healthcare	  professionals	  constantly	  reevaluating	  best	  possible	  strategies.	  
Though	  disjointed	  from	  other	  key	  institutions,	  the	  healthcare	  institutions	  work	  closely	  with	  
one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  their	  effectiveness	  during	  a	  disaster.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  healthcare	  institutions	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  DRR	  are	  response	  and	  
recovery	  organizations.	  The	  International	  Search	  and	  Rescue	  Advisory	  Group	  (INSARAG)	  
creates	  a	  space	  in	  which	  search	  and	  rescue	  organizations	  can	  share	  information.	  Most	  
importantly,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  INSARAG,	  classifications	  must	  be	  earned	  and	  
standards	  and	  regulations	  must	  be	  followed.	  This	  institutionalization	  of	  search	  and	  rescue	  
operations	  strengthens	  preparedness	  by	  mandating	  specific	  capacities	  while	  increasing	  the	  
network	  of	  responders.	  
The	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Istanbul	  creates	  its	  own	  DRR	  training	  and	  educational	  
materials	  in	  coordination	  with	  INSARAG’s	  standards	  and	  regulations.	  They	  report	  that	  they	  
do	  not	  use	  information	  from	  other	  local	  DRR	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory.	  
Healthcare	  institutions	  instead	  work	  primarily	  with	  each	  other	  and	  through	  the	  Health	  
Ministry,	  and	  often	  other	  networks	  of	  information	  sharing	  are	  not	  present.	  Because	  of	  this	  
highly	  insular	  structure	  of	  DRR	  dialogues,	  healthcare	  professionals	  see	  their	  DRR	  efforts	  as	  
more	  tailored	  to	  their	  needs	  and	  therefore	  more	  effective.	  DRR	  dialogue	  within	  the	  
healthcare	  system	  goes	  from	  top	  to	  bottom	  and	  also	  from	  bottom	  to	  top.	  This	  change	  in	  the	  
way	  that	  DRR	  information	  is	  shared	  across	  healthcare	  institutions	  has	  changed	  how	  
healthcare	  professionals	  feel	  about	  their	  DRR	  capacities.	  Where	  healthcare	  professionals	  
felt	  unimportant	  and	  excluded	  from	  DRR	  dialogue	  and	  information	  sharing	  in	  the	  past,	  now	  
they	  feel	  respected	  and	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  DRR	  efforts.	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   In	  addition	  to	  training	  and	  contingency	  planning,	  healthcare	  institutions	  provide	  
hospitals	  with	  emergency	  response	  and	  recovery	  materials	  that	  will	  be	  needed	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  a	  disaster.	  The	  hospitals	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  utilize	  the	  resources	  provided	  and	  if	  they	  
do	  not	  show	  that	  they	  are	  properly	  prepared,	  the	  Health	  Ministry	  requires	  the	  completion	  
of	  additional	  special	  training	  seminars.	  
	   Many	  healthcare	  professionals	  work	  to	  improve	  the	  health	  of	  the	  community	  and	  
the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  city	  through	  their	  jobs	  and	  extra-­‐curricular	  activities.	  For	  example,	  Dr.	  
Huseyin	  Nail	  Kavlakoglu,	  Head	  of	  the	  Besiktas	  Tuberculosis	  Defense	  Center	  in	  the	  Health	  
Ministry,	  works	  with	  at-­‐risk	  youth	  and	  recovering	  addicts	  in	  his	  spare	  time.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  
his	  work,	  he	  provides	  young	  people	  with	  basic	  risk	  awareness	  and	  preparedness	  
knowledge,	  but	  he	  says	  “the	  educational	  level	  of	  society	  and	  investment	  to	  an	  individual	  as	  
a	  policy	  of	  the	  whole	  country	  is	  lacking.”	  Dr.	  Kavalakoglu	  is	  determined	  to	  implement	  an	  
educational	  framework	  for	  schools	  (and	  eventually	  the	  general	  public)	  that	  would	  be	  
created	  primarily	  by	  community	  healthcare	  organizations,	  or	  in	  collaboration	  with	  
healthcare	  organizations	  and	  other	  institutions	  well-­‐versed	  in	  DRR.	  
What	  we	  want	  is	  institutional	  schedules,	  lessons	  at	  the	  elementary	  schools,	  disaster	  
management,	  disaster	  awareness,	  whatever	  you	  name	  it,	  one	  hour	  a	  week	  or	  one	  hour	  
a	  month.	  This	  is	  an	  investment	  to	  the	  society,	  the	  individual.	  Dr.	  Huseyin	  Nail	  
Kavalakoglu,	  Head	  of	  the	  Besiktas	  Tuberculosis	  Defense	  Center	  in	  Health	  Ministry	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  their	  disconnect	  from	  other	  community	  institutions,	  the	  major	  
obstacle	  that	  hinders	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Istanbul	  to	  effectively	  
implement	  DRR	  is	  that	  healthcare	  professionals	  have	  low	  levels	  of	  risk	  awareness,	  even	  
with	  the	  annual	  training	  sessions.	  The	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  noted	  that	  healthcare	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employees	  are	  “wearisome”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  DRR	  and	  consider	  DRR	  a	  non-­‐critical	  part	  of	  
their	  professional	  responsibilities.	  Dr.	  Esin	  explains	  that	  reminding	  professionals	  daily	  
about	  their	  risk—and	  the	  important	  role	  they	  will	  play	  in	  an	  event	  of	  a	  catastrophe—has	  
proven	  to	  be	  a	  difficult	  mission.	  
***	  
	   In	  the	  conclusion	  chapter,	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  strengths	  and	  barriers	  across	  the	  five	  
community	  institutions	  and	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  what	  I	  found	  throughout	  the	  
interviews	  and	  the	  survey	  questionnaire.	  Through	  the	  strengths	  and	  barriers	  present	  in	  the	  
creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  DRR	  practices	  in	  Istanbul,	  I	  hope	  to	  further	  an	  
understanding	  of	  how	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR	  and	  how	  this	  contributes	  to	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  CASE	  STUDY	  –	  ANTAKYA	  
	   The	  city	  of	  Antakya	  lies	  on	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  nation	  from	  Istanbul	  and	  is	  
significantly	  less	  populated.	  Still,	  with	  approximately	  215,000	  people,	  Antakya	  is	  
considered	  more	  cosmopolitan	  than	  most	  other	  Turkish	  cities,	  primarily	  due	  to	  its	  close	  
proximity	  to	  Syria.	  Antakya	  lies	  atop	  the	  Eastern	  Anatolian	  Fault	  line	  and	  has	  experienced	  
multiple	  devastating	  earthquakes	  in	  the	  past	  few	  decades.	  In	  1998,	  140	  people	  were	  killed	  
and	  approximately	  1,000	  buildings	  were	  irreparably	  damaged	  during	  a	  magnitude	  6.2	  
seismic	  event.	  Similar	  to	  Istanbul,	  insufficient	  building	  stock	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  consideration	  for	  
seismic	  construction	  and	  design	  were	  the	  two	  main	  causes	  of	  the	  enormous	  losses	  in	  
Antakya.	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  Antakya’s	  DRR	  structures	  and	  framework	  because	  of	  its	  
size	  and	  population	  relative	  to	  other	  seismically	  vulnerable	  cities	  in	  Turkey.	  Antakya	  also	  
offered	  an	  important	  case	  for	  comparison	  and	  contrast	  to	  Istanbul	  in	  my	  examination	  of	  
DRR	  programs,	  needs,	  and	  barriers	  in	  Turkey.	  	  	  
	  
Government	  
The	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  the	  local	  government	  in	  Antakya,	  as	  in	  Istanbul,	  is	  to	  
increase	  the	  public’s	  awareness	  of	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  implement	  activities	  and	  tools	  that	  
will	  help	  make	  DRR	  a	  normative	  part	  of	  the	  local	  culture.	  Maintaining	  the	  local	  
government’s	  website	  as	  well	  as	  responding	  to	  public	  information	  requests	  is	  a	  primary	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  local	  government	  officials.	  Government	  respondents	  in	  Antakya	  
emphasized	  that	  EQRR	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  must	  translate	  into	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general	  risk	  reduction,	  increased	  coping	  capacity,	  and	  safer	  everyday	  lives	  for	  the	  people	  of	  
their	  city.	  Some	  of	  the	  EQRR	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  government	  include	  identifying	  risks	  
and	  coordinating	  with	  different	  departments	  and	  community	  institutions	  also	  involved	  in	  
DRR.	  Similar	  to	  Istanbul’s	  ISMEP	  program,	  Antakya	  has	  the	  Seramar	  program,	  which	  is	  
significantly	  smaller	  in	  scale	  than	  ISMEP.	  The	  goals	  of	  Seramar	  are	  to	  identify	  potentially	  
vulnerable	  buildings	  throughout	  Antakya,	  measure	  how	  they	  would	  fair	  in	  an	  earthquake,	  
and	  then	  persuade	  residents	  of	  at-­‐risk	  public	  buildings	  to	  retrofit.	  
In	  order	  to	  increase	  awareness	  of	  seismic	  risk	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  local	  government	  
also	  hosts	  seminars	  around	  the	  province	  to	  educate	  the	  general	  public	  as	  well	  as	  NGO’s	  and	  
other	  government	  agencies.	  Government	  officials	  also	  regularly	  attend	  meetings	  and	  
conferences	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  knowledge	  of	  seismic	  risk	  and	  DRR.	  These	  networks	  that	  
are	  created	  through	  seminars,	  meetings,	  and	  conferences	  are	  an	  outlet	  for	  the	  government	  
to	  learn	  as	  well	  as	  to	  share	  information	  with	  other	  community	  organizations,	  other	  
governments,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public.	  
To	  increase	  the	  public’s	  knowledge	  of	  risk	  and	  DRR,	  the	  local	  government	  in	  
Antakya	  has	  held	  parades	  in	  the	  city	  focusing	  on	  EQ	  preparedness	  and	  safety.	  Another	  
awareness	  tool	  directed	  towards	  students	  is	  a	  movie	  about	  earthquakes,	  which,	  as	  
Assistant	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  Hatay,	  Kadim	  Dogan	  claims	  “keep	  this	  issue	  a	  hot	  subject	  on	  
the	  minds	  of	  students.”	  In	  addition	  to	  attempting	  to	  reach	  the	  general	  public,	  the	  
government	  in	  Antakya	  also	  reaches	  out	  to	  “special	  needs”	  populations,	  such	  as	  the	  elderly	  
and	  the	  local	  prison	  population.	  
The	  government	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  providing	  EQ	  risk	  and	  DRR	  information	  to	  
the	  primary,	  middle	  schools,	  and	  high	  schools.	  This	  information	  reaches	  approximately	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70,000	  students,	  who	  then,	  ostensibly,	  take	  this	  information	  home	  and	  share	  it	  with	  their	  
family.	  In	  Antakya,	  DRR	  government	  officials	  go	  classroom	  by	  classroom	  to	  talk	  with	  the	  
students	  face-­‐to-­‐face.	  Schools	  also	  participate	  in	  a	  seismic	  evacuation	  drill	  after	  a	  
government	  DRR	  official	  has	  been	  to	  all	  of	  the	  classrooms.	  
Because	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  population	  in	  the	  city	  center,	  many	  construction	  sites	  
(both	  legal	  and	  illegal)	  have	  emerged	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  Most	  of	  these	  buildings	  do	  not	  
implement	  the	  seismic	  safety	  code	  regulations	  and,	  therefore,	  even	  newer	  buildings	  are	  not	  
resistant	  to	  earthquakes.	  The	  local	  government,	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  local	  university,	  
seeks	  out	  these	  ‘squatter’	  settlements	  and	  encourages	  people	  to	  take	  precautionary	  
measures	  to	  increase	  the	  resilience	  of	  their	  building	  by	  constructing	  (or	  retrofitting)	  
according	  to	  seismic	  building	  regulations.	  	  
According	  the	  law	  and	  regulation	  on	  ‘The	  Preservation	  of	  Deteriorated	  Historic	  and	  
Cultural	  Immovable	  Properties	  by	  Rehabilitation	  and	  Renovation”	  (effectual	  in	  2005),	  
municipalities	  have	  been	  given	  primary	  authority	  to	  transform	  old	  cities.	  The	  foundation	  of	  
this	  law	  is	  to	  incentivize	  moving	  from	  the	  older	  more	  developed	  city	  center	  to	  newer	  
construction	  sites	  outside	  the	  city	  that	  are	  less	  vulnerable	  (Debold-­‐Kritter	  et	  al.	  
2006/2007).	  This	  law	  gives	  municipalities	  across	  Turkey	  the	  power	  to	  remove	  residents	  
from	  their	  current	  residential	  buildings	  and	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  parcel	  or	  alternative	  
place	  to	  live	  outside	  the	  old	  city,	  where	  newer	  buildings	  are	  built	  to	  code,	  therefore	  
reducing	  their	  vulnerability.	  Though	  multiple	  types	  of	  incentives	  are	  offered,	  the	  
government	  does	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  dictate	  where	  individuals	  build	  their	  new	  homes	  
once	  there	  are	  removed	  from	  their	  old	  homes.	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Let’s	  say	  you	  have	  a	  building,	  it’s	  not	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  you	  
cannot	  do	  construction,	  it’s	  risky,	  let’s	  say,	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  government	  
will	  give	  you,	  let’s	  say,	  buy	  your	  place	  and	  give	  you	  another	  place	  outside	  the	  city	  or	  
some	  other	  place	  where	  it’s	  more	  stable	  to	  building	  your	  own	  building.	  Kadim	  Dogan,	  
Assistant	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  Hatay	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  relocating	  thousands	  of	  people,	  the	  city	  of	  Antakya	  wants	  to	  restore	  
old	  historic	  buildings	  in	  the	  city	  center	  back	  to	  their	  original	  designs,	  but	  with	  earthquake	  
safety	  regulations	  and	  practices	  in	  mind.	  Antakya	  is	  an	  old	  and	  historic	  city	  where	  many	  
historical	  structures	  have	  not	  been	  discovered	  or	  explored.	  The	  officials	  whom	  I	  
interviewed	  emphasized	  that	  the	  government	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  maintain	  the	  cultural	  
memory	  of	  their	  city,	  through	  protecting	  and	  preserving	  these	  historical	  sites.	  
As	  in	  Istanbul,	  urban	  transformation	  and	  development	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
local	  government	  in	  Antakya.	  Even	  though	  they	  have	  made	  progress,	  Dogan	  says	  that	  not	  
enough	  has	  been	  done.	  Additionally,	  residents	  have	  confronted	  officials	  with	  indignation.	  
Residents	  have	  no	  desire	  to	  move	  and	  uproot	  their	  lives,	  regardless	  of	  the	  risk.	  In	  one	  
instance,	  described	  by	  Dogan,	  a	  professor	  from	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  Technical	  University	  
came	  to	  Antakya,	  went	  door	  to	  door,	  and	  convinced	  residents	  living	  in	  one	  particularly	  
dangerous	  building	  that	  retrofitting	  would	  not	  require	  them	  to	  leave	  their	  homes	  and	  that	  
there	  would	  be	  minimal	  interference	  from	  construction.	  After	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  situation	  was	  
clear	  to	  the	  residents,	  their	  concern	  about	  their	  risk	  and	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  building	  became	  
their	  first	  priority.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  local	  government,	  in	  this	  case,	  employed	  a	  trusted	  
academic	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  people	  living	  at	  risk.	  Rather	  than	  the	  government	  telling	  the	  
building	  residents	  what	  to	  do,	  the	  professor	  shared	  risk	  assessment	  information	  and	  gave	  
the	  building	  residents	  vital	  information	  regarding	  the	  building	  retrofit.	  Rather	  than	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exercising	  authority	  and	  instilling	  fear	  into	  their	  citizens,	  the	  local	  government	  provided	  
them	  with	  information	  and	  instilled	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility.	  The	  government	  officials	  
emphasized	  repeatedly	  that	  this	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  implementing	  DRR;	  
not	  through	  fear,	  but	  through	  instilling	  a	  sense	  of	  commitment	  and	  responsibility	  to	  their	  
community	  that	  can	  be	  exercised	  through	  the	  improvement	  and	  strengthening	  of	  their	  local	  
buildings.	  
Local	  government	  officials	  collaborate	  with	  universities	  both	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  
Turkey	  and	  they	  provide	  support	  for	  NGO’s	  working	  at	  reducing	  risk	  in	  their	  community.	  
Kandilli	  Observatory,	  historical	  city	  organizations,	  and	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  University	  also	  
provide	  DRR	  support	  for	  the	  municipality	  of	  Antakya.	  However,	  because	  there	  are	  two	  
different	  ‘departments’	  of	  government	  in	  Antakya	  (governorship	  and	  municipality),	  there	  is	  
a	  misjudgment	  in	  needed	  resources,	  personnel,	  and	  data.	  For	  example,	  governorships	  are	  
not	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  urban	  layout	  and	  land	  use	  plan.	  Municipalities	  
are	  responsible	  for	  these	  development	  plans	  while	  governorships	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  verifying	  
and	  updating	  the	  ground	  survey	  reports.	  From	  these	  ground	  survey	  reports,	  the	  
governorship	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  regulating	  where	  buildings	  can	  and	  cannot	  be	  built.	  
Governorships	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  land	  use	  planning	  regulations.	  Dogan	  
noted	  that	  both	  ‘departments’	  of	  government	  are	  keen	  to	  work	  together	  on	  DRR,	  but	  
regulations	  often	  hinder	  the	  process.	  	  
Governorships—	  a	  body	  of	  federal	  government	  appointed	  officials—are	  particularly	  
restricted	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  public	  can	  ask	  the	  governorship	  whether	  
or	  not	  they	  should	  retrofit	  or	  strengthen	  their	  buildings.	  But	  the	  governorships	  are	  not	  
responsible	  for	  and	  do	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  physically	  do	  the	  retrofit	  of	  public	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buildings.	  Private	  sector	  engineering	  companies	  are	  tasked	  with	  retrofitting,	  while	  the	  
engineers	  at	  the	  governorship	  need	  an	  invitation	  to	  test	  the	  resilience	  of	  existing	  buildings	  
from	  the	  owner	  and/or	  occupants.	  The	  governorship	  respondents	  also	  claimed	  that	  they	  do	  
not	  communicate	  EQ	  risk	  and	  DRR	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  that	  the	  municipality	  has	  taken	  on	  that	  
responsibility.	  This	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  EQRR	  because	  two	  forms	  of	  government	  that	  dictate	  
similar	  processes	  at	  the	  local	  level	  do	  not	  consistently	  cooperate	  with	  one	  another.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  municipalities	  in	  this	  region	  also	  presents	  a	  barrier	  to	  DRR	  
progress.	  Currently,	  the	  municipality	  of	  Antakya	  can	  only	  work	  in	  40	  different	  sites.	  There	  
are	  17	  other	  smaller	  municipalities	  around	  Antakya	  where	  the	  municipality	  of	  Antakya	  has	  
no	  authority.	  Essentially,	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  the	  primary	  authority	  and	  17	  additional	  
different	  authorities;	  each	  drafting	  their	  own	  plans,	  with	  their	  own	  priorities,	  for	  the	  same	  
resources	  in	  the	  same	  at-­‐risk	  region.	  A	  new	  law	  is	  being	  drafted	  to	  combine	  these	  
municipalities	  into	  one,	  cohesive,	  metropolitan	  municipality.	  Dogan	  explains	  that	  it	  will	  be	  
easier	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  types	  of	  land	  use	  issues	  when	  the	  municipalities	  are	  capable	  of	  
working	  as	  one	  and	  have	  a	  centralized	  mechanism	  for	  collaboration	  and	  coordination.	  
The	  time	  lapse	  between	  a	  tragic	  event	  and	  the	  present	  has	  also	  become	  an	  issue	  
with	  regards	  to	  DRR	  awareness	  and	  implementation	  in	  Antakya.	  
Unfortunately,	  in	  Turkey,	  people	  react	  instantly	  to	  things	  and	  they	  forget	  about	  it.	  No	  
matter	  what	  we	  do	  on	  a	  local	  level	  or	  a	  national	  government	  level,	  we	  cannot	  bring	  the	  
people	  to	  the	  same	  level	  of	  awareness	  in	  Japan.	  People	  go	  about	  their	  daily	  life	  and	  
they	  forget	  and	  when	  they	  do	  their	  buildings,	  construct	  them,	  they	  don’t	  obey	  
regulations.	  Kadim	  Dogan,	  Assistant	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  Hatay	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Business	  
I	  could	  only	  obtain	  one	  interview	  with	  a	  for-­‐profit	  organization	  in	  Antakya.	  This	  will	  
influence	  my	  ability	  to	  determine	  how	  businesses	  engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  Antakya.	  This	  can	  be	  
attributed	  to	  the	  significantly	  small	  population	  in	  Antakya,	  a	  lack	  of	  private	  enterprises	  
engaged	  in	  DRR	  in	  Antakya,	  or	  explains	  the	  constant	  state	  of	  unpreparedness	  and	  the	  lack	  
of	  DRR	  capacity	  in	  the	  city.	  
For-­‐profit	  organizations	  are	  a	  primary	  resource	  engaged	  by	  local	  government	  
officials	  in	  Antakya	  during	  construction	  management	  and	  oversight.	  Businesses	  work	  with	  
or	  are	  often	  hired	  by	  local	  government	  in	  order	  to	  create,	  maintain,	  and	  promote	  DRR	  
throughout	  the	  community.	  While	  the	  government	  creates	  and	  sometimes	  enforces	  
building	  regulations	  and	  codes,	  they	  have	  placed	  the	  responsibility	  of	  quality	  control	  and	  
oversight	  of	  building	  materials	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  private	  enterprises.	  For	  example,	  the	  Sigma	  
Engineering	  Laboratory	  tests	  the	  quality	  of	  construction	  materials	  for	  new	  buildings	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  materials	  used	  in	  older	  buildings.	  According	  to	  Hakan	  Uslu,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Industry	  primarily,	  but	  indirectly,	  dictates	  his	  business	  model.	  They	  enter	  construction	  
sites,	  collect	  materials,	  test	  materials,	  and	  then	  make	  recommendations	  to	  the	  contractor	  
according	  to	  their	  findings.	  His	  business,	  the	  Sigma	  Engineering	  Laboratory	  works	  under	  
the	  control	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  although	  they	  also	  provide	  oversight	  and	  quality	  
control	  for	  the	  government.	  These	  are	  shared	  responsibilities	  as	  the	  government	  is	  in	  
charge	  of	  creating	  rules	  while	  businesses	  are	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  rules	  are	  enforced.	  The	  
government,	  however,	  executes	  penalties	  and	  punishments.	  	  
Business	  owners	  regularly	  attend	  meetings	  or	  public	  seminars	  where	  they	  provide	  
DRR	  information,	  which	  often	  coincides	  with	  the	  products	  and	  services	  offered	  by	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businesses.	  In	  this	  case,	  DRR	  promotes	  their	  business	  while	  their	  business	  promotes	  DRR.	  
Depending	  on	  their	  mission,	  businesses	  can	  also	  make	  people	  conscious	  of	  their	  risk,	  the	  
quality	  of	  their	  buildings,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  things	  they	  can	  do	  reduce	  their	  individual	  risk.	  For	  
example,	  brochures	  handed	  out	  at	  meetings	  and	  seminars	  give	  information	  about	  the	  
proper	  way	  to	  mix,	  pour,	  and	  harden	  concrete.	  
	   In	  Antakya,	  the	  business	  sector	  is	  widely	  trusted	  by	  the	  community	  and	  by	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Industry.	  Yet,	  prior	  to	  2002,	  buildings	  materials	  and	  the	  types	  of	  oversight	  for	  
the	  building	  materials	  were	  less	  than	  adequate.	  Civil	  engineers,	  aware	  of	  this	  issue,	  
contacted	  and	  discussed	  their	  issue	  with	  the	  Minister	  of	  Industry.	  
Lots	  of	  time	  he	  tell[s]	  the	  Minister	  of	  Industry,	  “OK,	  come	  up	  and	  see	  this	  type	  of	  
market,	  this	  type	  of	  materials.	  They	  are	  weak.	  You	  have	  to	  do	  something	  about	  it.”	  Lots	  
of	  time	  he	  told	  him,	  and	  he	  did	  –	  He	  accomplished…[translator	  referring	  to	  Uslu]	  Now	  
3%	  only,	  not	  according	  to	  standards…	  Before	  45%,	  now	  3%.”	  Hakan	  Uslu,	  Civil	  
Engineer	  and	  Owner	  of	  Sigma	  Engineering	  Laboratory	  
	  
The	  above	  quote	  represents	  just	  one	  example	  of	  the	  power	  and	  authority	  that	  for-­‐
profit	  organizations	  and	  private	  sector	  individuals	  have	  not	  only	  on	  the	  government	  but	  
also	  with	  regards	  to	  DRR.	  They	  have	  a	  knowledge	  base	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  
market	  and	  community.	  They	  also	  have	  the	  power	  to	  guide,	  improve,	  and	  change	  building	  
materials,	  design,	  and	  plans.	  Contacting	  the	  owners	  of	  a	  building	  under	  construction	  and	  
explaining	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  building	  materials	  has	  proved	  effective	  in	  terms	  of	  improving	  
building	  standards.	  Still,	  many	  are	  wary,	  as	  these	  are	  private	  enterprises,	  whose	  primary	  
goal	  is	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  More	  influential	  are	  the	  penalties	  and	  punishments	  that	  are	  now	  
enforced	  post-­‐2002,	  should	  building	  standards	  and	  codes	  not	  be	  met.	  Also,	  Uslu	  explains	  
that	  the	  network	  of	  contractors,	  building	  owners,	  engineers,	  and	  designers	  communicate	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with	  each	  other.	  Now,	  if	  a	  contractor	  is	  known	  to	  sell	  inadequate	  materials,	  they	  will	  soon	  
have	  a	  bad	  reputation	  and	  lose	  business.	  	  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  worry	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  industry	  and	  its	  products.	  Even	  
though	  contractors,	  engineers,	  building	  owners	  and	  designers	  are	  mandated	  to	  obey	  
national	  building	  code	  regulations.	  Before	  2002,	  Uslu	  claimed	  that	  not	  only	  the	  building	  
materials,	  but	  the	  oversight	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  building	  materials,	  did	  not	  exist	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  was	  compliable	  with	  the	  national	  building	  code	  regulations.	  
The	  problem	  is	  in	  the	  regulation	  it	  is	  written,	  but	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  merchants.	  They	  
don’t	  follow	  these	  regulations.	  He	  [translator	  is	  referring	  to	  Uslu]	  thinks	  that	  because	  
there	  is	  no	  control	  of	  quality.	  Hakan	  Uslu,	  Civil	  Engineer	  and	  Owner	  of	  Sigma	  
Engineering	  Laboratory	  
	  
Another	  interesting	  aspect	  about	  for-­‐profit	  organizations	  is	  that	  they	  tend	  not	  to	  
trust	  the	  public’s	  capacity	  to	  know	  the	  importance	  of	  good	  building	  materials.	  The	  
interviewees	  in	  this	  study	  emphasized	  that	  they	  trust	  science	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  
experience.	  Their	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  base	  often	  informs	  not	  only	  how	  they	  run	  
their	  businesses	  but	  also	  how	  they	  promote	  DRR	  information.	  Interviewees	  also	  reported	  
that	  they	  trust	  professors	  and	  academics	  for	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information.	  Online	  organizations	  
that	  provide	  materials	  and	  updated	  information,	  often	  ones	  that	  cost	  money	  to	  obtain	  
access	  to,	  are	  also	  readily	  available	  to	  businesses	  since	  they	  are	  using	  their	  own	  profits	  in	  
order	  to	  pay	  for	  this	  up-­‐to-­‐date,	  trustworthy,	  relevant	  information.	  
Between	  my	  experience[s],	  I	  compare	  to	  it	  and	  I’m	  thinking…	  If	  it	  is	  scientific	  things,	  I	  
believe	  it.	  If	  it	  isn’t,	  I	  don’t	  believe	  it.	  I	  don’t	  care	  who	  did	  it,	  who	  give	  this	  information,	  I	  
don’t	  care,	  but	  if	  its	  scientific	  things,	  I	  believe	  it.	  I	  trust	  it.	  Hakan	  Uslu,	  Civil	  Engineer	  
and	  Owner	  of	  Sigma	  Engineering	  Laboratory	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Uslu	  also	  explains	  how	  he	  wishes	  that	  quality	  building	  materials	  as	  well	  as	  other	  EQRR	  
activities	  were	  more	  dynamic.	  This	  will	  not	  only	  enhance	  their	  business’s	  continuity	  
capacity,	  but	  can	  increase	  DRR	  in	  the	  community,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  increase	  profits.	  
	  
Education	  
As	  stated	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  subsidizes	  education	  at	  all	  levels	  
and	  enforces	  attendance	  at	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools,	  which	  accounts	  for	  8	  years	  of	  
education.	  Due	  to	  the	  insufficient	  number	  of	  higher	  education	  institutions,	  only	  a	  select	  few	  
of	  the	  candidates	  for	  college	  actually	  get	  to	  attend.	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  
university,	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  University,	  in	  the	  entire	  province	  of	  Hatay	  while	  there	  are	  
approximately	  32	  primary	  schools.	  
Education	  in	  Antakya	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  and	  run	  by	  the	  Antakya	  Provincial	  
Education	  Directorate.	  This	  regional	  government	  department	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  National	  
Education	  Directorate,	  which	  is	  very	  closely	  governed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  in	  
Ankara.	  The	  federal	  government	  determines	  and	  guides	  the	  types	  of	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  
mechanisms	  that	  are	  disseminated	  to	  the	  public	  through	  the	  public	  school	  system.	  The	  
Ministry	  of	  Education	  maintains	  primary	  authority	  because	  they	  provide	  the	  funding	  for	  
structural	  and	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  activities	  in	  schools	  as	  well	  as	  educational	  
resources	  and	  materials	  that	  teachers	  and	  students	  use.	  
	  Each	  locale	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  provincial,	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  federal	  
government,	  for	  provisions	  including	  funds	  for	  school	  retrofits,	  training	  materials	  for	  
students	  and	  teachers,	  civil	  defense	  experts,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  types	  of	  information	  given	  to	  the	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teachers	  and	  students.	  The	  local	  education	  directorate	  in	  Samandag,	  a	  town	  in	  Antakya,	  has	  
a	  strong	  trust	  of	  the	  knowledge	  and	  materials	  given	  to	  them	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Antakya.	  
Zeki	  Huzmeli,	  the	  branch	  manager	  of	  the	  Samandag	  Education	  directorate	  proclaims,	  “We	  
trust	  the	  governorship	  of	  Antakya,	  so	  [if]	  these	  documents	  are	  sent	  by	  the	  government	  of	  
Antakya,	  so	  I	  trust	  them.”	  The	  governorship	  of	  Antakya	  sends	  schools	  documents,	  videos,	  
and	  presentations	  already	  produced	  by	  civil	  defense	  experts	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education.	  
The	  provinces	  trust	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  as	  well	  and	  “if	  they	  see	  it’s	  written	  ‘Kandilli	  
Observatory’,	  they	  trust.”	  All	  training	  and	  information	  documents	  are	  available	  online	  as	  
well.	  Teachers	  use	  these	  materials	  to	  inform	  their	  DRR	  practices.	  The	  messages	  that	  are	  
most	  often	  sent	  to	  students	  and	  teachers	  through	  these	  government	  produced	  materials	  
include:	  how	  to	  protect	  themselves	  against	  a	  plethora	  of	  natural	  disasters;	  what	  to	  do	  when	  
an	  earthquake	  occurs;	  how	  to	  prepare	  for	  an	  earthquake	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  happened;	  and	  
the	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  seismic	  event	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  evacuate	  their	  
school	  premises.	  
The	  branch	  manager	  of	  the	  Samandag	  Education	  Directorate	  in	  Antakya	  explains	  
that	  the	  risk	  reduction	  activities	  in	  the	  schools	  are	  divided	  into	  two	  types	  of	  DRR	  strategies.	  
First,	  they	  consider	  the	  physical	  safety	  of	  the	  school’s	  infrastructure.	  The	  provincial	  
government	  in	  Antakya	  has	  retrofitted	  approximately	  45	  school	  buildings	  in	  the	  city	  and	  
they	  have	  plans	  to	  continue	  to	  retrofit	  any	  existing	  educational	  structure	  that	  does	  not	  
comply	  with	  current	  earthquake	  building	  regulations.	  Second,	  they	  work	  towards	  
increasing	  the	  awareness	  and	  preparedness	  capacity	  of	  students	  and	  teachers.	  These	  two	  
types	  of	  DRR	  strategies	  are	  defined	  in	  a	  five-­‐year	  plan	  designed	  by	  the	  Antakya	  Provincial	  
Education	  Directorate.	  Despite	  the	  barrier	  that	  lack	  of	  funds	  presents,	  these	  five-­‐year	  plans	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allow	  the	  provincial	  education	  department	  to	  prioritize	  DRR	  activities.	  Of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  
activities	  that	  the	  educational	  directorates	  in	  Antakya	  engage	  in,	  Huzmeli	  explains,	  
“education	  is	  more	  important.	  Because	  he	  [translator	  is	  referring	  to	  Huzmeli]	  thinks	  that	  
the	  buildings	  don’t	  kill	  the	  people,	  but	  if	  people	  don’t	  get	  these	  information,	  they	  are	  killed.”	  
	   Most	  often,	  the	  provincial	  government	  uses	  civil	  defense	  experts	  to	  talk	  with,	  
inform,	  and	  train	  the	  teachers.	  The	  teachers	  are	  then	  responsible	  for	  how	  this	  DRR	  material	  
is	  disseminated	  to	  the	  students.	  Teachers	  organize	  classroom	  response	  and	  evacuation	  
routines,	  practice	  response	  techniques,	  and	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  report	  to	  the	  
provincial	  government	  about	  their	  experiences	  with	  DRR	  in	  the	  classroom.	  Additionally,	  
teachers	  are	  responsible	  for	  civil	  defense	  clubs	  that	  are	  designed	  directly	  to	  target	  the	  
students	  and	  improve	  the	  response,	  rescue,	  and	  evacuation	  strategies.	  Provincial	  experts	  
also	  provide	  the	  plans	  and	  sometimes	  execute	  practice	  exercises	  with	  regards	  to	  how	  to	  
respond	  to	  a	  seismic	  event.	  Experts	  of	  civil	  defense	  are	  directly	  involved	  with	  school	  
earthquake	  preparedness	  programs	  and	  practices	  on	  Civil	  Defense	  Day,	  February	  28th	  and	  
throughout	  the	  week	  of	  March	  1st	  –	  March	  7th	  each	  year.	  	  
Overall,	  education	  in	  Turkey	  is	  strongly	  paternalistic.	  The	  national	  government	  has	  
complete	  control	  of	  DRR	  in	  the	  schools.	  However,	  the	  national	  government	  is	  dependent	  
upon	  an	  educational	  institution,	  KOERI,	  for	  their	  educational	  materials,	  knowledge,	  and	  
seismic	  data.	  This	  supplements	  the	  two-­‐fold,	  top-­‐down/bottom-­‐up	  approach	  the	  
government	  in	  Turkey	  takes	  as	  they	  support	  educational	  institutions	  engaging	  in	  DRR.	  Also,	  
at	  the	  national	  level,	  the	  DRR	  standards	  are	  broad.	  They	  allow	  the	  provincial	  governments	  
their	  own	  devices	  and	  give	  plenty	  of	  allowance	  for	  the	  provinces	  to	  tailor	  DRR	  in	  schools	  to	  
their	  specific	  regional	  risk	  and	  risk	  perception.	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Grassroots	  Organizations	  	  
	   The	  grassroots	  community	  in	  Antakya	  is	  significantly	  smaller	  than	  the	  one	  in	  
Istanbul.	  However,	  the	  small	  number	  of	  grassroots	  organizations	  is	  relatively	  proportional	  
to	  the	  population.	  There	  is	  no	  exact	  report	  on	  the	  number	  of	  grassroots	  organizations	  
within	  Antakya.	  Still,	  these	  organizations	  are	  funded	  by	  governments,	  private	  investors,	  
donations,	  and	  contributions	  and	  are	  run	  primarily	  by	  volunteers.	  
	   Grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Antakya	  act	  as	  educators	  of	  the	  community.	  They	  hold	  
presentations,	  seminars,	  and	  workshops	  for	  the	  public	  as	  well	  as	  for	  different	  types	  of	  
professionals.	  They	  provide	  information	  about	  Turkey’s	  seismic	  risk,	  present	  information	  
specific	  to	  Antakya,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  explain	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  prepare,	  mitigate,	  and	  
respond	  to	  an	  earthquake.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  can	  reach	  out	  to	  all	  corners	  of	  a	  
community	  and	  are	  therefore	  imperative	  when	  expanding	  risk	  awareness	  and	  possible	  
DRR	  strategies	  among	  the	  public.	  
	   Grassroots	  organizations	  act	  as	  community	  educators	  by	  increasing	  their	  awareness	  
of	  risk,	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  mitigation,	  and	  teaching	  proper	  response	  
techniques.	  Prior	  to	  1992	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  University,	  grassroots	  
groups	  in	  Antakya	  coordinated	  their	  efforts	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  social	  issues	  surrounding	  
EQ	  risk.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  that	  grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Antakya	  started	  to	  
focus	  their	  efforts	  on	  projects	  geared	  towards	  the	  structural	  aspects	  of	  DRR.	  Following	  the	  
Kocaeli	  quake,	  despite	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  epicenter,	  the	  network	  of	  grassroots	  
organizations	  in	  Antakya	  realized	  that	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  issues	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  
addressed	  in	  their	  city	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  of	  building	  regulations.	  Now	  the	  
Chamber	  of	  Civil	  Engineering,	  a	  non-­‐profit	  dedicated	  to	  reducing	  the	  seismic	  risk	  of	  their	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community,	  along	  with	  the	  local	  government,	  participates	  in	  the	  Seramar	  Project	  where	  
members	  of	  the	  Chamber	  compare	  the	  structural	  integrity	  of	  old	  and	  new	  buildings	  in	  
Antakya.	  They	  provide	  their	  findings	  as	  well	  as	  their	  recommendations	  for	  action	  to	  the	  
local	  government	  to	  try	  to	  spur	  change	  and	  more	  stringent	  building	  codes.	  
	   Although	  their	  work	  is	  focused	  on	  projects	  whose	  aim	  is	  to	  strength	  the	  building	  
stock	  of	  the	  community,	  grassroots	  organizations	  still	  work	  with	  the	  public	  to	  actively	  
engage	  and	  normalize	  the	  want	  for	  DRR.	  
They	  inform	  people	  by	  presentations	  and	  also	  professors,	  they	  have	  lots	  of	  experiences	  
about	  it,	  and	  also	  professors	  help	  them	  to	  inform	  people…	  These	  presentations	  give	  
information	  to	  the	  people	  like	  what	  they	  should	  do	  during	  the	  earthquakes,	  also	  before	  
the	  earthquake	  and	  after	  the	  earthquake	  and	  also	  if	  their	  buildings	  are	  old,	  [they	  
request	  the	  resident	  to]	  please	  move	  to	  new	  buildings,	  which	  are	  built	  according	  to	  the	  
regulations.	  Murat	  Alkaya,	  Assistant	  Director	  of	  Hatay	  Chamber	  of	  Geological	  
Engineering	  
	  
The	  active	  involvement	  of	  grassroots	  organizations	  with	  the	  entire	  community	  
requires	  their	  knowledge	  to	  be	  translated	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  so	  a	  variety	  of	  people	  are	  
able	  to	  understand	  and	  use	  the	  information.	  Alkaya	  says	  “They	  give	  non-­‐scientific	  
engineering	  programs	  to	  the	  ordinary	  people…”	  These	  community	  organizations	  are	  also	  of	  
the	  opinion	  that	  children	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  their	  risk,	  how	  to	  mitigate	  and	  prepare,	  as	  well	  
as	  what	  to	  do	  when	  a	  seismic	  event	  does	  occur.	  Despite	  this	  recognition,	  their	  target	  
population	  is	  the	  community-­‐at-­‐large,	  while	  schools	  primary	  target	  population	  is	  the	  
regions	  youth.	  
In	  Antakya,	  grassroots	  organizations	  work	  closely	  with	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  as	  
well	  as	  Istanbul	  Technical	  University	  and	  Eastern	  Technical	  University	  in	  Ankara.	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Financially,	  non-­‐profits	  in	  Antakya	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works	  and	  
Settlements	  through	  the	  Governorship	  of	  Hatay.	  Unfortunately,	  interviewees	  representing	  
this	  sector	  reported	  that	  these	  funds	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  multiple	  grassroots	  
organizations	  to	  work	  effectively	  towards	  a	  comprehensive	  regional	  approach	  to	  DRR.	  
Interestingly,	  the	  representatives	  from	  the	  grassroots	  organizations	  were	  the	  only	  
respondents	  who	  spoke	  of	  seismic	  risk	  as	  a	  national	  issue	  with	  regional	  differences.	  They	  
are	  aware	  that	  while	  the	  North	  Anatolian	  fault	  zone	  affects	  Istanbul,	  the	  province	  where	  
Antakya	  is	  located,	  Hatay,	  is	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Anatolian	  fault	  zone.	  Therefore,	  different	  
methods	  of	  engineering	  structures	  and	  regional	  infrastructures	  are	  required.	  Another	  
grassroots	  organization,	  the	  Hatay	  Chamber	  of	  Geological	  Engineering,	  reports	  very	  
different	  findings	  of	  soil	  and	  ground	  water	  reports	  when	  compared	  with	  soil	  and	  ground	  
water	  reports	  in	  Istanbul.	  This	  results	  in	  different	  types	  of	  geologically	  safe	  locations	  in	  
which	  to	  build	  structures.	  Grassroots	  organizations	  are	  hyperaware	  of	  these	  differences	  
and	  continuously	  strive	  to	  tailor	  DRR	  to	  their	  regional	  characteristics.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  these	  organizations	  are	  not	  troubled	  with	  the	  demographic	  differences	  between	  
regions,	  yet.	  They	  are	  focused,	  primarily	  on	  the	  unique	  geography	  and	  hazards	  profile	  of	  
each	  region	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
Healthcare	  
	   Healthcare	  is	  subsidized	  by	  the	  national	  government,	  even	  though	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
push	  in	  recent	  years	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  private	  healthcare	  facilities	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
healthcare	  available	  to	  more	  people.	  Approximately	  80-­‐90%	  of	  all	  Turks	  have	  healthcare	  
coverage	  through	  the	  national	  pension	  system.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  low	  quality	  of	  care,	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private	  medical	  facilities	  are	  often	  preferred.	  There	  are	  three	  hospitals	  in	  Antakya,	  two	  
private	  and	  one	  public.	  They	  are	  all	  equipped	  with	  emergency	  plans,	  but	  these	  plans	  are	  for	  
all	  natural	  disasters,	  not	  just	  earthquakes.	  	  
	   As	  in	  Istanbul,	  the	  healthcare	  institutions	  in	  Antakya	  are	  the	  least	  connected	  to	  the	  
other	  community	  institutions	  in	  terms	  of	  collaborative	  DRR	  work.	  Interestingly,	  Dr.	  Alaattin	  
Ozturk	  explained	  that	  he	  would	  like	  DRR	  information	  provided	  to	  him	  through	  the	  same	  
networks	  and	  in	  the	  same	  means	  as	  the	  public	  receives	  DRR	  information.	  The	  reasoning	  
behind	  this	  preference	  is	  not	  clear.	  Potential	  speculations	  can	  be	  made	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  
because	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Antakya	  is	  wantonly	  trying	  to	  remain	  distant	  from	  other	  
DRR	  institutions	  and	  sharing	  in	  a	  DRR	  dialogue	  or	  because	  this	  type	  of	  information	  is	  the	  
most	  effective	  way	  for	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Antakya	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  DRR	  dialogue.	  
Unlike	  the	  other	  four	  DRR	  community	  institutions,	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Antakya	  has	  a	  
one-­‐way	  relationship	  with	  providers	  of	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory.	  	  
In	  Antakya,	  the	  healthcare	  representatives	  emphasized	  that	  to	  date,	  their	  primary	  
focus	  has	  been	  on	  effective	  emergency	  response.	  Dr.	  Ozturk	  noted	  that	  there	  have	  been	  
minimal	  DRR	  measures	  within	  hospitals	  in	  Antakya,	  but	  again,	  most	  of	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  
on	  preparing	  for	  emergency	  response	  services.	  Similar	  to	  the	  education	  system	  throughout	  
Antakya,	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  is	  a	  paternalistic	  community	  institution;	  highly	  dependent	  
on	  the	  national	  government	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Health	  for	  the	  information	  and	  knowledge	  
they	  use	  to	  prepare	  for	  a	  disaster.	  	  
The	  Minister	  of	  Health	  sent	  them	  documents	  about	  how	  they	  overcome	  natural	  
disaster	  and	  just	  people	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  preparedness	  of	  natural	  disaster	  
such	  as	  earthquake	  and	  they	  take	  these	  documents	  from	  the	  Ankara	  Health	  
Directorate.”	  Dr.	  Alaattin	  Ozturk,	  Director	  of	  Emergency	  Services	  
	  
	   135	  
Still,	  the	  ambulance	  services	  in	  Antakya	  execute	  practices	  and	  mock	  scenarios	  in	  
order	  to	  stay	  prepared.	  	  First	  responders	  are	  educated	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  are	  
constantly	  tested	  on	  their	  preparedness	  skills	  and	  capacities	  by	  their	  jobs	  and	  experiences.	  
Dr.	  Ozturk	  stated	  that	  practices	  and	  mock	  scenarios	  were	  few	  since	  they	  consider	  their	  
everyday	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  experiences	  as	  sufficient	  practice.	  Dr.	  Ozturk	  also	  claims	  that	  the	  
capacity	  of	  the	  ambulance	  services	  combined	  with	  the	  hospitals	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  
reach	  and	  assist	  all	  of	  those	  injured	  during	  a	  seismic	  event.	  
***	  
In	  the	  conclusion	  chapter,	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  strengths	  and	  barriers	  across	  the	  five	  
community	  institutions	  in	  Antakya.	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  what	  I	  found	  
throughout	  the	  interviews	  and	  the	  survey	  questionnaire.	  Through	  the	  strengths	  and	  
barriers	  present	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  DRR	  practices	  in	  Antakya,	  I	  hope	  to	  
further	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  community	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR	  and	  how	  this	  
contributes	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  in	  Turkey.	  
	  
	   136	  
	  
CHAPTER	  6:	  QUANTITATIVE	  SURVEY	  ANALYSIS	  
	   This	  chapter	  offers	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	  
distributed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  of	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  survey	  was	  to	  
collect	  quantitative	  information	  regarding	  barriers	  to	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  (DRR)	  
implementation	  and	  professional	  resource	  needs	  (see	  Appendix	  E	  for	  complete	  survey	  
questionnaire).	  
	  
Barriers	  to	  DRR	  Implementation	  
I	  interviewed	  many	  exceptionally	  talented	  earthquake	  safety	  practitioners	  who	  
want	  to	  reduce	  risk	  in	  their	  communities	  but	  are	  repeatedly	  stymied	  by	  obstacles	  to	  action.	  
Understanding	  those	  barriers	  provides	  a	  different	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  analyze	  DRR	  
engagement,	  and	  they	  should	  not	  be	  characterized	  as	  ignorance	  or	  lack	  of	  access.	  	  
“[Barriers	  are]	  shaped	  by	  a	  complex	  and	  interconnected	  array	  of	  social,	  cultural,	  
historical,	  and	  economic	  forces.	  In	  addition…	  knowledge	  does	  not	  always	  lead	  
directly	  to	  action…	  the	  knowledge-­‐to-­‐action	  process	  involves	  developing	  and	  
providing	  access	  to	  new	  technologies	  and	  resources,	  persuading	  potential	  users	  to	  
adopt	  the	  new	  technology,	  and	  acknowledging	  and	  overcoming	  barriers	  to	  adoption.	  
Understanding	  barriers	  is	  thus	  particularly	  important,	  because	  it	  helps	  to	  explain	  
why	  even	  knowledgeable	  individuals	  and/or	  well-­‐resourced	  organizations	  may	  be	  
unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  adopt	  and	  use	  a	  particular	  technology”	  (Peek	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  
	  
Potential	  barrier	  items	  drawn	  from	  a	  review	  of	  empirical	  research	  literature	  
regarding	  obstacles	  to	  accomplishing	  effective	  DRR	  activities	  were	  included	  in	  the	  survey.	  	  
Specifically,	  the	  survey	  asked	  participants	  to	  specify	  whether	  the	  following	  nine	  items	  were	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a	  ‘minor	  barrier’,	  ‘major	  barrier’,	  or	  ‘not	  a	  barrier’	  in	  their	  professional	  risk	  reduction	  
activities.	  	  
• Lack	  of	  money;	  
• Lack	  of	  time	  to	  dedicate	  to	  such	  activities;	  
• Lack	  of	  personnel	  available	  to	  work	  on	  such	  activities;	  
• Lack	  of	  technical	  expertise;	  
• Lack	  of	  earthquake	  information;	  
• Other,	  more	  urgent,	  social	  or	  economic	  problems;	  
• Other,	  more	  serious	  hazards;	  
• Lack	  of	  interest	  in	  earthquake	  hazards	  among	  colleagues;	  
• Lack	  of	  interest	  in	  earthquake	  hazards	  among	  the	  public.	  
	  
Table	  6.1	  summarizes	  and	  color-­‐codes	  barrier	  response	  counts	  and	  percentages,	  by	  
city,	  and	  for	  each	  of	  the	  nine	  barrier	  items	  on	  the	  survey.	  By	  adding	  the	  number	  of	  
respondents	  in	  each	  city	  that	  claimed	  a	  variable	  as	  ‘not	  a	  barrier’,	  ‘minor	  barrier’,	  or	  ‘major	  
barrier’,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  calculate	  1)	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  respondents	  that	  did	  not	  see	  the	  
variable	  as	  a	  barrier,	  or	  it	  was	  not	  present	  in	  their	  institutions;	  2)	  the	  percentage	  of	  
respondents	  that	  considered	  the	  barrier	  minor	  in	  DRR	  implementation;	  3)	  the	  percentage	  
of	  respondents	  that	  considered	  the	  barrier	  to	  be	  a	  major	  hindrance	  to	  DRR.	  Table	  6.1	  is	  
organized	  as	  follows.	  The	  two	  target	  cities	  are	  listed	  across	  the	  top	  row	  of	  the	  table,	  while	  
the	  nine	  barrier	  items	  assessed	  in	  the	  survey	  are	  listed	  along	  the	  far	  left	  column.	  When	  read	  
horizontally,	  the	  table’s	  numerical	  data	  show	  how	  many	  respondents	  in	  each	  city	  ranked	  a	  
variable	  as	  ‘not	  a	  barrier’,	  a	  ‘minor	  barrier’,	  or	  a	  ‘major	  barrier’.	  When	  read	  vertically,	  the	  
table’s	  data	  depicts	  how	  respondents	  from	  the	  two	  case	  study	  cities	  of	  Istanbul	  and	  
Antakya	  responded	  to	  each	  of	  the	  nine	  survey	  items.	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Table	  6.1.	  Barrier	  Response	  Counts	  and	  Percentages	  by	  City	  	  
	   Istanbul	   Antakya	  
Barrier	  	  
Item	  	  






















































































































































White:	  Low	  barrier,	  
where	  55%	  or	  fewer	  
respondents	  indicated	  
that	  the	  item	  is	  either	  a	  
minor	  or	  major	  barrier	  
Yellow:	  Moderate	  barrier,	  
where	  56-­‐69%	  of	  
respondents	  indicated	  
that	  the	  item	  is	  either	  a	  
minor	  or	  major	  barrier.	  
Orange:	  High	  barrier,	  
where	  70-­‐85%	  of	  
respondents	  indicated	  
that	  the	  item	  is	  either	  a	  
minor	  or	  major	  barrier.	  
Red:	  Extreme	  barrier	  
where	  86-­‐100%	  of	  
respondents	  indicated	  
that	  the	  item	  is	  either	  a	  
minor	  or	  major	  barrier	  
	  
	   After	  analyzing	  the	  survey	  data	  by	  each	  item,	  I	  calculated	  an	  overall	  barrier	  percent	  
score	  by	  adding	  the	  minor	  and	  major	  barrier	  percentages	  from	  the	  total	  column	  in	  Table	  
6.1.	  Istanbul	  has	  a	  minor	  barrier	  percent	  score	  of	  21%	  and	  a	  major	  barrier	  percent	  score	  of	  
45%,	  which	  yields	  an	  overall	  barrier	  percent	  score	  of	  66%.	  Antakya	  has	  a	  minor	  barrier	  
percent	  score	  of	  28%	  and	  a	  major	  barrier	  percent	  score	  of	  44%,	  yielding	  an	  overall	  barrier	  
percent	  score	  of	  72%.	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   Interestingly,	  the	  two	  cities	  looked	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  absolute	  number	  of	  minor	  
and	  major	  barriers	  that	  were	  expressed.	  Respondents	  from	  Istanbul	  expressed	  more	  
extreme	  barriers	  and	  more	  low	  barriers,	  while	  Antakya	  respondents	  fell	  in	  the	  moderate	  or	  
high	  range	  for	  all	  nine	  items.	  But	  again,	  the	  overall	  scores	  for	  the	  two	  cities	  looked	  very	  
similar,	  which	  is	  interesting	  given	  the	  other	  differences	  between	  the	  cities	  in	  terms	  of	  
population	  size,	  economic	  well-­‐being,	  primary	  available	  services,	  and	  recency	  of	  
earthquake	  experience.	  Below,	  I	  offer	  a	  more	  specific	  discussion	  of	  the	  barrier	  items,	  by	  
city.	  	  
Istanbul	  
Of	  the	  nine	  survey	  items,	  respondents	  from	  Istanbul	  indicated	  that	  three	  of	  the	  
items	  represented	  extreme	  barriers	  to	  DRR,	  one	  was	  a	  high	  barrier,	  two	  were	  moderate	  
barriers,	  and	  three	  were	  low	  barriers.	  Extreme:	  other	  social/economic	  problems,	  lack	  of	  
available	  personnel,	  and	  lack	  of	  public	  interest	  in	  DRR;	  High:	  Money;	  Moderate:	  Other	  
serious	  hazards	  present	  and	  colleagues	  lack	  of	  interest;	  Low:	  lack	  of	  technical	  expertise,	  
lack	  of	  earthquake	  information,	  and	  time.	  
The	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  helped	  illuminate	  these	  survey	  findings.	  For	  example,	  in	  
Istanbul,	  88%	  of	  respondents	  said	  that	  other	  pressing	  social	  and	  economic	  problems	  that	  
detract	  from	  DRR	  activities	  represent	  either	  a	  minor	  or	  major	  barrier	  to	  action.	  Turkey’s	  
strong	  desire	  and	  prolonged	  efforts	  to	  join	  the	  EU	  often	  takes	  attention	  away	  from	  many	  
social	  and	  economic	  problems,	  including	  the	  necessity	  for	  DRR.	  Even	  so,	  Turkey	  also	  has	  
pressing	  social	  and	  economic	  issues	  that	  require	  more	  urgent	  attention	  than	  DRR	  
strategies.	  For	  example,	  the	  rate	  of	  population	  growth	  has	  increased	  to	  the	  point	  where	  
illegal	  squatter	  settlements,	  dangerous	  even	  in	  areas	  where	  there	  is	  no	  risk	  for	  seismic	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activity,	  diminish	  the	  safety	  as	  well	  as	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  within	  communities	  in	  and	  
surrounding	  Istanbul.	  Also,	  jobs	  become	  harder	  to	  find	  as	  more	  people	  try	  to	  fill	  the	  same	  
space.	  Unfortunately,	  these	  other	  social	  and	  economic	  problems	  diminish	  the	  awareness	  of	  
earthquake	  risk	  as	  well	  as	  the	  on-­‐going	  need	  for	  DRR.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  respondents	  (90%)	  in	  Istanbul	  indicated	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  available	  
personnel	  to	  execute	  DRR	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  represents	  a	  minor	  or	  major	  barrier	  
to	  action.	  This	  influences	  the	  number	  of	  DRR	  advocates	  present	  in	  the	  community,	  adding	  
to	  the	  ability	  (or	  inability)	  of	  the	  community	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  	  
All	  of	  the	  respondents	  (100%)	  in	  Istanbul	  indicated	  that	  lack	  of	  public	  interest	  is	  a	  
major	  or	  minor	  barrier	  to	  DRR.	  The	  respondents	  proclaimed	  that	  many	  people	  are	  not	  
readily	  aware	  of	  their	  risk.	  They	  know	  about	  the	  probability	  of	  seismic	  activity	  in	  Istanbul,	  
but	  as	  a	  precipitating	  event	  (e.g.,	  the	  1999	  Kocaeli	  earthquake)	  drifts	  more	  and	  more	  into	  
the	  past,	  so	  does	  their	  awareness	  and	  their	  desire	  to	  mitigate	  and	  prepare	  for	  another	  
event.	  Interviewees	  also	  stated	  that	  even	  within	  their	  own	  organizations,	  the	  priority	  to	  
address	  earthquake	  risk	  has	  weakened,	  as	  their	  organizations	  are	  required	  to	  address	  
other	  pressing	  and	  more	  current	  issues.	  	  
Money,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  presents	  a	  high	  barrier	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  DRR	  in	  
Istanbul	  as	  well.	  The	  survey	  indicated	  that	  70%	  of	  survey	  respondents	  in	  Istanbul	  reported	  
lack	  of	  funding	  as	  a	  major	  or	  minor	  barrier	  to	  DRR	  action.	  Again,	  other	  social	  and	  economic	  
issues	  decrease	  not	  only	  the	  awareness	  of	  risk	  and	  DRR,	  but	  also	  the	  amount	  of	  funding	  
available	  for	  DRR.	  	  
The	  three	  barriers	  that	  the	  fewest	  respondents	  reported	  as	  being	  barriers	  to	  DRR	  
were	  lack	  of	  earthquake	  information	  (44%),	  lack	  of	  technical	  expertise	  (40%),	  and	  time	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(33%).	  It	  is	  still	  notable	  that	  between	  one-­‐third	  and	  nearly	  one	  half	  of	  respondents	  from	  
Istanbul	  saw	  these	  items	  as	  minor	  or	  major	  barriers	  to	  DRR.	  	  
Antakya	  
	   In	  Antakya,	  respondents	  ranked	  none	  of	  the	  nine	  items	  as	  extreme	  barriers.	  Four	  
high	  barriers	  were	  indicated	  on	  the	  survey:	  between	  77-­‐78%	  of	  all	  respondents	  indicated	  
that	  money,	  lack	  of	  available	  personnel,	  lack	  of	  technical	  expertise,	  and	  lack	  of	  public	  
interest	  were	  either	  minor	  or	  major	  barriers.	  The	  remaining	  five	  barrier	  items	  were	  ranked	  
as	  moderate	  barriers	  to	  DRR:	  other	  social/economic	  problems,	  lack	  of	  earthquake	  
information,	  other	  serious	  hazards,	  time,	  and	  colleagues	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  risk/DRR.	  
Between	  63-­‐67%	  of	  all	  survey	  respondents	  in	  Antakya	  reported	  that	  these	  items	  were	  
barriers	  to	  DRR	  action.	  
The	  survey	  revealed	  that	  78%	  of	  the	  interviewees	  in	  Antakya	  reported	  money	  as	  
being	  a	  barrier	  to	  DRR.	  Turkey’s	  desire	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  EU	  often	  dictates	  the	  flow	  of	  
money	  throughout	  the	  nation.	  Antakya’s	  demographic	  does	  not	  always	  register	  first	  on	  the	  
national	  radar	  since	  mega	  cities,	  such	  as	  Istanbul,	  or	  the	  capital,	  Ankara,	  tend	  to	  take	  
financial	  precedence.	  DRR	  tools	  and	  activities	  are	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  increasing	  or	  
enhancing	  Turkish	  economic	  strength,	  and	  therefore,	  funding	  is	  often	  not	  as	  robust	  as	  most	  
community	  institutions	  would	  need.	  DRR	  tools	  are	  not	  always	  considered	  directly	  related	  to	  
strengthening	  a	  community	  as	  small	  as	  Antakya.	  
Over	  three-­‐quarters	  (77%)	  of	  respondents	  reported	  lack	  of	  public	  interest	  as	  a	  DRR	  
barrier.	  In	  Antakya,	  it	  has	  been	  14	  years	  since	  a	  major	  earthquake	  happened.	  The	  
interviews	  revealed	  that	  respondents	  felt	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  has	  passed,	  combined	  with	  
other	  challenges,	  has	  diminished	  public	  interest	  in	  DRR.	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Lack	  of	  available	  personnel	  who	  can	  execute	  methods	  of	  DRR	  weakens	  the	  ability	  of	  
DRR	  advocates	  and	  leaders	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience,	  even	  during	  the	  most	  propitious	  
of	  times.	  Lack	  of	  technical	  expertise	  stifles	  not	  only	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience,	  
but	  it	  also	  greatly	  affects	  how	  community	  institutions	  are	  able	  (or	  not	  able)	  to	  interact	  with	  
methods	  of	  DRR.	  A	  majority	  of	  Antakya’s	  DRR	  champions	  are	  a	  result	  of	  a	  national	  decree	  
or	  mandate	  by	  a	  national	  ministry.	  The	  strong	  paternalistic	  structure	  of	  Turkey	  as	  a	  nation	  
has	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  smaller	  communities,	  like	  Antakya,	  to	  exercise	  DRR	  on	  their	  
own	  regional	  terms.	  Paternalism	  throughout	  Turkish	  social	  organization	  “gives	  assurances	  
to	  the	  people	  that	  the	  all-­‐powerful	  state	  will	  eventually	  replace	  all	  lost	  property,	  rebuild	  
every	  shop,	  and	  rehabilitate	  affected	  economic	  investments	  through	  low-­‐interest	  loans,	  
debt	  annulments,	  and	  free	  credits”	  (Ergunay	  et	  al.	  2012,	  2).	  The	  inherent	  characteristics	  of	  
this	  social	  organization	  hinder	  the	  small	  community	  of	  Antakya	  from	  taking	  on	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  their	  own	  local	  risk.	  A	  majority	  of	  survey	  respondents	  in	  Antakya	  (77%)	  
agreed	  that	  lack	  of	  available	  personnel	  and	  lack	  of	  technical	  expertise	  stifles	  DRR.	  
Two-­‐thirds,	  or	  66%,	  of	  all	  respondents	  in	  Antakya	  reported	  lack	  of	  earthquake	  
information,	  lack	  of	  colleague’s	  interest,	  and	  time	  as	  minor	  or	  major	  barriers	  to	  DRR	  action.	  
Without	  the	  proper	  data	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  knowledge	  about	  earthquakes,	  creation	  of	  DRR	  is	  
stifled,	  which	  in	  return	  completely	  stalemates	  DRR	  implementation.	  Although	  DRR	  leaders	  
in	  Antakya	  have	  access	  to	  general	  earthquake	  information,	  it	  is	  not	  specific	  enough	  to	  the	  
region.	  The	  city	  requires	  DRR	  leaders	  to	  advocate	  for	  more	  data	  on	  more	  DRR	  variables	  in	  
order	  to	  successfully	  assess	  as	  well	  as	  address	  their	  risk.	  	  
Additionally,	  lack	  of	  colleague’s	  interest	  in	  either	  risk	  or	  DRR	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  barrier.	  
Local	  DRR	  advocates	  are	  often	  given	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  handling	  a	  variety	  of	  regional	  or	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local	  disasters.	  For	  example,	  in	  2011,	  thousands	  of	  Syrian	  refugees	  had	  fled	  to	  the	  outskirts	  
of	  Antakya	  to	  escape	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  Syria.	  A	  lack	  of	  interest	  among	  those	  who	  
participate	  in	  the	  organization	  can	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  how	  the	  organization	  interacts	  with	  
DRR.	  Also,	  the	  time	  available	  to	  professionals	  to	  dedicate	  to	  such	  actions	  can	  be	  limited	  
when	  individuals	  and	  their	  colleagues	  are	  working	  on	  multiple	  projects	  at	  once.	  	  
Other	  social	  and/or	  economic	  problems	  were	  reported	  by	  67%	  of	  the	  respondents	  
in	  Antakya	  as	  major	  or	  minor	  barriers	  to	  DRR	  action.	  In	  2011,	  with	  Antakya’s	  close	  
proximity	  to	  the	  large	  Kurdish	  population	  of	  Turkey	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  news	  
often	  hits	  closer	  to	  home.	  Their	  climate	  and	  limited	  access	  to	  proper	  medical	  care	  also	  
poses	  health	  threats	  to	  the	  small	  population	  as	  it	  is	  dry,	  arid,	  and	  not	  as	  close	  to	  the	  
Mediterranean	  Sea	  as	  Istanbul.	  Also,	  priorities	  of	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  change	  
often,	  despite	  their	  desire	  to	  create,	  implement,	  and	  maintain	  DRR	  practices	  within	  their	  
community.	  	  
The	  final	  barrier	  measured	  as	  moderate	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  hazards.	  
Earthquakes	  trigger	  many	  of	  the	  hazards	  in	  Turkey,	  but	  some	  hazards	  result	  from	  other	  
natural	  phenomena.	  Turkey	  is	  a	  vast	  nation,	  and	  crises	  are	  dealt	  with	  nationwide	  
regardless	  of	  the	  cause.	  Accordingly,	  64%	  of	  Antakya’s	  respondents	  identified	  other	  
hazards	  as	  being	  a	  barrier	  to	  DRR	  creation	  and	  implementation.	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Resources	  Needed	  to	  Implement	  DRR	  
Identifying	  the	  needs	  of	  DRR	  advocates,	  users,	  and	  leaders	  is	  critical	  to	  promoting	  
social	  change.	  Unfortunately,	  all	  too	  often	  resource	  needs	  are	  not	  matched	  with	  resource	  
supplies,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  elsewhere:	  	  “Disaster	  risk	  reduction	  communications	  have	  
often	  been	  supply	  driven	  (what	  experts	  think	  others	  should	  know)	  rather	  than	  demand	  
driven	  (what	  affected	  people	  want	  and	  think	  they	  need).	  The	  assumption	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
experts	  tends	  to	  be	  that	  ‘we’	  already	  know	  what	  ‘they’	  need”	  (Petal	  2007).	  Consequently,	  a	  
great	  gap	  has	  formed	  between	  what	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  end	  users	  say	  they	  want	  from	  
science	  and	  technology,	  and	  what	  science	  and	  technology	  are	  offering	  to	  decision-­‐makers.	  
Fortunately,	  this	  gap	  is	  can	  be	  sealed	  by	  engaging	  in	  dialogue	  and	  needs	  assessments	  across	  
the	  science-­‐users	  divide	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  to	  build	  bridges	  between	  DRR	  users	  and	  the	  
scientific	  community.	  The	  survey	  items	  on	  resource	  needs	  were	  meant	  to	  help	  assess	  what	  
end	  users	  say	  they	  need	  in	  order	  to	  most	  effectively	  implement	  DRR.	  The	  survey	  included	  
the	  following	  21	  items,	  which	  respondents	  said	  whether	  they	  ‘don’t	  need’,	  ‘have’,	  or	  ‘would	  
like	  to	  have’.	  	  
• Projected	  ground	  shaking	  intensity	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Maps	  of	  earthquake	  fault	  lines	  in	  the	  community;	  
• Maps	  of	  potential	  earthquake-­‐induced	  landslides	  or	  tsunamis	  in	  the	  community;	  
• Projected	  number	  of	  deaths	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  number	  of	  injuries	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  impacts	  on	  different	  population	  groups	  (such	  as	  elderly,	  homeless,	  etc.)	  in	  
an	  earthquake;	  	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  housing	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  schools	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  businesses	  in	  an	  earthquake;	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• Projected	  damage	  to	  hospitals	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  roads,	  bridges,	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  electricity,	  gas,	  and	  water	  delivery	  systems	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  mobile	  phone	  networks	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  damage	  to	  Internet	  networks	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Projected	  economic	  losses	  in	  an	  earthquake;	  
• Information	  about	  how	  individuals	  and	  facilities	  can	  prepare	  for	  earthquakes;	  
• Information	  about	  how	  organizations	  can	  prepare	  for	  earthquakes;	  
• Information	  about	  how	  to	  fasten	  contents	  of	  buildings	  so	  that	  they	  will	  not	  fall	  
during	  earthquakes;	  
• Information	  about	  how	  to	  strengthen	  buildings	  so	  that	  they	  will	  not	  collapse	  during	  
earthquakes;	  
• Access	  to	  technical	  experts	  who	  can	  identify	  and	  explain	  earthquake	  risk;	  
• Access	  to	  technical	  experts	  who	  can	  help	  individuals	  or	  organizations	  prepare	  for	  
earthquakes.	  
	  
The	  survey	  results	  for	  the	  resource	  needs	  items	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  6.2,	  which	  is	  
organized	  as	  follows.	  First,	  the	  21	  survey	  resource	  items	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  left	  column	  in	  
descending	  order,	  such	  that	  the	  item	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  table	  (projected	  damage	  to	  Internet	  
networks)	  represents	  the	  most	  commonly	  cited	  resource	  that	  respondents	  would	  like	  to	  
have	  access	  to,	  and	  the	  last	  item	  (family	  preparedness)	  represents	  the	  least	  commonly	  
cited	  resource	  that	  respondents	  would	  like	  to	  have.	  Second,	  the	  two	  target	  cities	  are	  listed	  
across	  the	  top	  row	  of	  the	  table.	  
To	  read	  Table	  6.2,	  start	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  far-­‐left	  column.	  This	  column	  includes	  a	  
cell	  for	  each	  of	  the	  21	  survey	  resource	  items.	  When	  read	  horizontally,	  the	  numerical	  data	  in	  
the	  table	  shows	  how	  many	  respondents,	  in	  each	  city,	  ranked	  an	  item	  as	  ‘have’	  or	  ‘would	  like	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to	  have’.	  When	  read	  vertically,	  the	  data	  displays	  how	  respondents	  in	  each	  city	  categorized	  
each	  of	  the	  21	  survey	  resource	  items.	  
One	  additional	  point	  of	  clarification	  regarding	  the	  data	  is	  presented	  below:	  the	  fact	  
that	  a	  respondent	  did	  not	  mark	  an	  item	  as	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  item	  
is	  unimportant	  to	  the	  person	  in	  his	  or	  her	  professional	  work.	  The	  questions	  that	  the	  team	  
asked	  of	  respondents	  following	  their	  completion	  of	  the	  survey	  revealed	  that	  in	  most	  cases,	  
when	  a	  respondent	  did	  not	  mark	  a	  resource	  as	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’,	  that	  person	  already	  had	  
access	  to	  the	  item.	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Table	  6.2:	  Resource	  Needs	  Response	  Counts	  and	  Percentages	  by	  City	  
Resource	  Item	   Istanbul	   Antakya	  
	   Have	   Would	  like	   Have	   Would	  like	  

















































































































































































White:	  Low	  resource	  
deficiency,	  where	  40%	  or	  
fewer	  of	  the	  respondents	  
indicated	  they	  would	  like	  




where	  41-­‐69%	  of	  
respondents	  indicated	  
they	  would	  like	  to	  have	  
access	  to	  state	  item.	  
Orange:	  High	  resource	  
deficiency,	  where	  70-­‐
89%	  of	  respondents	  
indicated	  they	  would	  like	  
to	  have	  access	  to	  stated	  
item.	  
Red:	  Extreme	  resource	  
deficiency,	  where	  90-­‐
100%	  of	  respondents	  
indicated	  they	  would	  like	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   I	  calculated	  an	  overall	  resource	  needs	  percent	  score	  for	  each	  city	  by	  adding	  together	  
the	  total	  number	  of	  ‘already	  have’	  responses	  and	  comparing	  the	  results	  to	  the	  total	  number	  
of	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  responses.	  Just	  over	  one-­‐third	  (34%)	  of	  the	  respondents	  from	  
Istanbul	  and	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  (60%)	  of	  respondents	  from	  Antakya,	  across	  all	  21	  survey	  
items,	  reported	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  listed	  in	  the	  survey.	  
Comparatively,	  respondents	  from	  Istanbul	  reported	  far	  fewer	  resource	  needs	  than	  those	  in	  
Antakya.	  	  
Istanbul	  
	   The	  main	  resource	  needed	  was	  information	  regarding	  what	  damage	  would	  be	  
caused	  to	  the	  Internet	  during	  a	  seismic	  event.	  A	  substantial	  number	  of	  respondents,	  70%,	  
reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  to	  how	  the	  Internet	  would	  be	  affected	  
following	  an	  earthquake.	  	  
	   The	  three	  resources	  that	  Istanbul	  respondents	  reported	  being	  moderately	  deficient	  
in	  (41-­‐69%	  of	  respondents	  said	  they	  would	  like	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  resource)	  are	  
information	  regarding	  damage	  to	  mobile/cell	  communications,	  differential	  impacts	  that	  a	  
seismic	  event	  could	  have	  on	  the	  city/between	  districts,	  and	  how	  the	  contents	  of	  buildings	  
would	  fair	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  This	  type	  of	  information	  is	  highly	  specific,	  and	  therefore	  could	  
be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  available	  personnel	  (60%	  reported	  this	  as	  a	  major	  barrier)	  or	  a	  
lack	  of	  technical	  expertise	  in	  Istanbul	  (30%	  reported	  this	  as	  a	  major	  barrier).	  
Antakya	  
Respondents	  in	  Antakya	  reported	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  resources	  needed	  including:	  
information	  on	  damage	  to	  the	  Internet	  (75%	  reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  
to	  this	  resource),	  information	  on	  damage	  to	  telephone	  lines/mobile	  lines	  (78%	  reported	  
	  
	   149	  
that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  to	  this	  resource),	  information	  on	  damage	  to	  businesses	  
(75%	  reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  to	  this	  resource),	  information	  on	  
damage	  to	  the	  road/transportation	  infrastructure	  (78%	  reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  
have’	  access	  to	  this	  resource),	  an	  estimation	  to	  the	  economic	  losses	  that	  would	  occur	  (75%	  
reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  to	  this	  resource),	  and	  maps	  on	  landslides	  and	  
tsunamis	  (75%	  reported	  that	  they	  ‘would	  like	  to	  have’	  access	  to	  this	  resource).	  These	  six	  
resources	  are	  the	  primary	  resources	  that	  respondents	  wanted	  to	  have	  access	  to	  either	  
because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  this	  type	  of	  information	  at	  present	  or	  because	  the	  types	  
of	  data	  they	  receive	  and	  use	  now	  are	  not	  sufficient.	  	  
Respondents	  in	  Antakya	  reported	  14	  additional	  resources	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  
have	  access	  to:	  differential	  impacts	  (62%),	  utility	  damage	  (62%),	  projected	  deaths	  (67%),	  
projected	  injuries	  (68%),	  damage	  to	  hospitals/healthcare	  facilities	  (62%),	  damage	  to	  
schools	  (67%),	  damage	  to	  housing	  (56%),	  access	  to	  risk	  experts	  (56%),	  earthquake	  effects	  
on	  building	  contents	  (44%),	  access	  to	  preparedness	  experts	  (44%),	  information	  about	  how	  
to	  strengthen	  buildings	  against	  seismic	  activity	  (56%),	  modes	  of	  organizational	  
preparedness	  (67%),	  range	  of	  ground	  shaking	  (44%),	  and	  family	  preparedness	  information	  
(44%).	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  in	  the	  same	  nation,	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya	  have	  
different	  capacities	  to	  cope	  with	  their	  risk.	  The	  community	  institutions	  in	  each	  city	  also	  
engage	  and	  interact	  with	  DRR	  in	  different	  ways	  because	  their	  access	  to	  DRR	  resources	  
differs.	  This	  also	  influences	  the	  ability	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  each	  community	  fosters	  
a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  and	  integrates	  DRR	  rhetoric	  within	  the	  community.	  This	  
understanding	  augments	  the	  notion	  that	  disasters	  and	  DRR	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  be	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considered	  in	  a	  fully	  national	  capacity.	  It	  is	  imperative	  to	  look	  at	  risk	  as	  a	  local,	  regional,	  
national,	  and	  international	  component	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  different	  types	  of	  
communities	  interact	  and	  engage	  in	  DRR	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  cultivate	  a	  culture	  of	  
resilience.	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CHAPTER	  7:	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
	   Turkey	  has	  the	  unfortunate	  distinction	  of	  being	  both	  one	  of	  the	  most	  seismically	  
prone,	  and	  most	  populous,	  nations	  in	  the	  world.	  With	  Turkey’s	  rapid	  population	  growth	  
and	  the	  settlement	  of	  more	  people	  in	  more	  hazardous	  regions,	  its’	  cities,	  and	  especially	  
Istanbul,	  has	  been	  ranked	  to	  have	  the	  6th	  highest	  seismic	  risk	  in	  the	  world	  according	  to	  the	  
Earthquake	  Disaster	  Risk	  Index	  (Davidson	  et	  al.	  1997).	  
In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  nation’s	  risk	  of	  disaster	  and	  increase	  their	  capacity	  to	  cope	  
with	  an	  event,	  different	  community	  institutions	  throughout	  Turkey	  exercise	  disaster	  risk	  
reduction	  (DRR)	  mechanisms	  and	  methods.	  The	  social,	  economic,	  cultural,	  and	  geological	  
differences	  throughout	  the	  nation	  led	  me	  to	  want	  to	  explore	  how	  two	  different	  cities—
Istanbul	  and	  Antakya—are	  working	  to	  reduce	  their	  risk.	  Using	  qualitative	  interviews,	  a	  
survey	  questionnaire,	  and	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  to	  the	  questionnaire,	  I	  explored	  how	  five	  
key	  community	  institutions—government,	  business,	  education,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  
organizations—structure,	  organize,	  and	  encourage	  DRR	  practices	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya.	  
The	  result	  of	  this	  exploration	  is	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  these	  community	  
institutions	  in	  Turkey	  attempt	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience	  in	  a	  region	  marked	  by	  
extreme	  seismic	  risk.	  
	   In	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  clarify	  how	  each	  individual	  community	  
institution	  –	  government,	  business,	  education,	  healthcare,	  grassroots	  –	  (using	  the	  
qualitative	  interviews,	  survey	  questionnaire,	  and	  the	  survey’s	  follow-­‐up	  questions)	  engages	  
in	  DRR.	  This	  involves	  understanding	  the	  primary	  themes	  found	  throughout	  the	  interviews	  
as	  well	  as	  identifying	  the	  barriers	  and	  resource	  needs	  specified	  in	  the	  survey	  questionnaire	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and	  the	  survey’s	  follow-­‐up	  questions.	  I	  combine	  the	  findings	  from	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya	  in	  
order	  to	  provide	  a	  broader,	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  DRR	  in	  Turkey.	  Though	  
different	  themes	  were	  found	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  there	  were	  also	  many	  similarities	  in	  
the	  data.	  As	  such,	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  give	  a	  broader	  portrait	  than	  was	  
previously	  available	  of	  the	  DRR	  barriers	  and	  opportunities	  in	  Turkey.	  	  
	  
Government	  
	   Through	  the	  interviews	  with	  local	  government	  officials	  and	  researching	  secondary	  
resources	  to	  understand	  regional	  and	  national	  government	  and	  legislative	  context,	  this	  
thesis	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  five	  primary	  ways	  government	  engages	  in	  DRR	  in	  Turkey.	  
(How	  Turkish	  governments	  engage	  in	  DRR	  will	  first	  be	  explored	  as	  a	  summation	  of	  the	  
types	  of	  responsibilities	  of	  local,	  regional,	  and	  national	  government.)	  First,	  one	  of	  the	  
government’s	  responsibilities	  is	  to	  enhance	  the	  general	  level	  of	  preparedness	  in	  local	  
communities	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  cope	  with	  extreme	  events.	  Second,	  government	  acts	  as	  
the	  legal	  authority	  as	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  creating,	  implementing,	  and	  enforcing	  zoning	  
and	  building	  code	  legislation.	  Third,	  the	  government	  supports	  other	  community	  
institutions,	  including	  the	  private	  sector,	  education	  sector,	  healthcare,	  and	  grassroots	  
organizations,	  and	  brings	  them	  together	  to	  enhance	  community-­‐level	  DRR	  activities.	  This	  
bolsters	  DRR	  networks	  across	  community	  institutions,	  nationally	  and	  internationally.	  
Fourth,	  government	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  urban	  transformation	  projects	  in	  Turkey.	  Fifth,	  
the	  government	  is	  responsible	  for	  increasing	  the	  public’s	  awareness	  of	  earthquake	  risk	  and	  
implementing	  activities	  and	  tools	  that	  will	  help	  make	  DRR	  a	  normative	  part	  of	  the	  local	  
culture	  otherwise	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  resilience’.	  Osman	  Kilic,	  Deputy	  Director	  of	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Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  Municipality’s	  Earthquake	  and	  Soil	  Research,	  proclaims	  that	  it	  is	  
“government’s	  responsibility	  to	  determine	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  risks.”	  
	   There	  are	  three	  specific	  roles	  the	  Turkish	  national	  government	  plays	  in	  DRR.	  First,	  
they	  financially	  support	  the	  nation	  with	  the	  fiscal	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  DRR.	  Second,	  the	  
national	  government	  strengthens	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  service	  by	  supporting	  and	  fostering	  multi-­‐
level	  decision-­‐making	  networks.	  Third,	  they	  use	  modern	  technology	  to	  inform	  the	  types	  of	  
DRR	  data	  and	  information	  they	  disseminate	  to	  other	  governments	  and	  community	  
institutions.	  
	   There	  are	  two	  primary	  roles	  the	  regional	  governments	  in	  Turkey	  play	  in	  DRR.	  First,	  
they	  act	  as	  a	  liaison	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  governments.	  Second…	  
	   The	  local	  government	  engages	  in	  DRR	  in	  five	  key	  ways.	  One,	  they	  use	  national	  
regulations	  and	  laws	  to	  direct	  DRR	  action.	  Two,	  they	  create	  and	  maintain	  a	  multi-­‐
level/stakeholder	  platform	  to	  promote	  community	  DRR.	  This	  platform	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  
information	  sharing,	  transparency,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  ideas.	  Three,	  the	  local	  
government	  engages	  the	  local	  population	  in	  DRR	  knowledge	  and	  action.	  Four,	  they	  
strengthen	  the	  local	  institutional	  capacity	  and	  implement	  practice	  DRR	  mechanisms.	  Five,	  
they	  development	  and	  experiment	  with	  new	  tools	  and	  techniques.	  Essentially,	  local	  
government	  is	  responsible	  for	  steering	  long-­‐term	  processes	  to	  solve	  problems	  that	  
threaten	  the	  local	  economy,	  community,	  and	  environment.	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Business	  
	   There	  are	  three	  ways	  businesses	  engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  Turkey.	  First,	  businesses	  interact	  
within	  the	  economy,	  informing	  what	  a	  good	  or	  bad	  DRR	  product	  looks	  like	  or	  the	  services	  
most	  needed	  for	  communities	  at	  risk.	  They	  act	  as	  seismic	  risk	  awareness	  advocates	  by	  
being	  in	  business	  and	  being	  active	  within	  the	  marketplace.	  Since	  the	  products	  of	  many	  
businesses	  directly	  reduce	  the	  risk	  that	  earthquakes	  pose	  to	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya,	  the	  
success	  of	  a	  business	  that	  uses,	  promotes,	  and	  demands	  DRR	  correlates	  with	  the	  success	  of	  
DRR.	  They	  also	  act	  as	  an	  effective	  educator	  and	  enforcer	  of	  DRR.	  Second,	  businesses	  have	  
the	  power	  to	  guide,	  improve,	  and	  change	  building	  materials,	  designs,	  and	  construction	  
plans.	  While	  the	  government	  creates	  and	  sometimes	  enforces	  building	  regulations	  and	  
codes,	  they	  have	  placed	  the	  responsibility	  of	  quality	  control	  and	  oversight	  of	  building	  
materials	  and	  construction	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  private	  enterprises.	  Third,	  another	  important	  
way	  that	  businesses	  in	  Turkey	  engage	  in	  DRR	  is	  through	  the	  significant	  expansion	  of	  the	  
Turkish	  DRR	  network.	  As	  multiple	  industries	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  and	  the	  function	  and	  
economic	  prosperity	  of	  the	  city,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  that	  multiple	  industries	  are	  considered	  
and	  work	  together	  in	  DRR.	  All	  businesses	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  DRR,	  as	  their	  potential	  continuity	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  disaster	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  success	  of	  DRR.	  	  
	  
Education	  
The	  method	  of	  DRR	  engagement	  within	  the	  education	  sector	  is	  two	  fold;	  one,	  to	  
educate	  young	  people	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  public	  about	  their	  potential	  risks	  and	  how	  they	  
can	  prepare	  and	  protect	  themselves	  against	  a	  seismic	  event	  and;	  two,	  educational	  
institutions	  also	  work	  towards	  strengthening	  and	  retrofitting	  school	  buildings,	  while	  also	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engaging	  in	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  actions	  such	  as	  securing	  bookshelves	  and	  cabinets	  in	  
schools.	  	  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  in	  Turkey	  is	  important	  to	  the	  DRR	  process	  because	  of	  the	  
paternalistic	  structure	  of	  the	  education	  system	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  Ministry	  determines	  the	  
types	  of	  messages	  that	  are	  delivered	  to	  the	  nation’s	  youth.	  The	  Ministry	  also	  maintains	  
primary	  authority	  because	  they	  provide	  the	  funding	  for	  structural	  and	  non-­‐structural	  
mitigation	  actions	  for	  schools	  as	  well	  as	  educational	  resources	  and	  materials.	  However,	  at	  
the	  national	  level,	  the	  DRR	  standards	  are	  broad.	  They	  allow	  the	  provincial	  governments	  
enough	  flexibility	  to	  develop	  DRR	  curriculum	  tailored	  to	  the	  regional	  risks	  they	  face.	  
Individual	  school	  DRR	  curriculum	  is	  primarily	  dependent	  upon	  the	  provincial	  government	  
for	  provisions	  including	  funds	  for	  school	  retrofits,	  training	  materials	  for	  students	  and	  
teachers,	  civil	  defense	  experts,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  types	  of	  DRR	  information	  given	  to	  the	  
teachers	  and	  students.	  	  
The	  flow	  of	  information	  and	  types	  of	  data	  available	  comes	  full	  circle	  as	  the	  national	  
government	  is	  highly	  dependent	  upon	  the	  Kandilli	  Observatory	  in	  Istanbul	  for	  their	  
knowledge,	  educational	  methods,	  seismic	  data,	  and	  resources.	  KOERI	  at	  Boğaziçi	  University	  
in	  Istanbul	  is	  the	  central	  source	  for	  DRR	  educational	  material	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  is	  considered	  
a	  well-­‐known	  and	  trusted	  organization	  that	  works	  daily	  to	  reduce	  seismic	  risk.	  KOERI	  acts	  
not	  only	  as	  an	  educator	  of	  students	  and	  the	  public,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  epicenter	  of	  earthquake	  
information	  within	  the	  community.	  It	  is	  the	  organization	  that	  others	  go	  to	  when	  
information	  about	  seismic	  risk	  and	  EQRR	  is	  needed.	  Kandilli’s	  CIP,	  supported	  by	  USAID,	  
significantly	  increases	  the	  educational	  capacity	  of	  the	  Istanbul.	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The	  CIP	  primarily	  targets	  students	  and	  schools,	  but	  has	  materials	  and	  strategies	  for	  
other	  institutions	  as	  well.	  The	  four	  modules	  that	  educational	  institutions	  focus	  their	  DRR	  
education,	  through	  the	  CIP	  are	  1)	  basic	  disaster	  awareness,	  2)	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  
techniques,	  3)	  structural	  awareness,	  and	  4)	  the	  importance	  of	  community	  volunteering.	  In	  
order	  to	  educate	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  way	  with	  the	  most	  accurate	  data,	  educational	  
institutions	  in	  Istanbul	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  reinforcing	  the	  DRR	  networks	  within	  the	  
city.	  Not	  only	  are	  universities	  the	  primary	  producers	  of	  information	  and	  data	  in	  regards	  to	  
seismic	  risk,	  vulnerability,	  and	  DRR,	  but	  they	  also	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  provide	  education	  to	  
a	  variety	  of	  different	  organizations.	  Educational	  institutions	  work	  together	  to	  obtain	  and	  
prepare	  the	  most	  accurate	  and	  helpful	  data	  possible.	  
	  
Grassroots	  
There	  are	  two	  primary	  ways	  that	  grassroots	  organizations	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya	  
engage	  in	  DRR.	  First,	  grassroots	  organizations	  involved	  in	  DRR	  are	  responsible	  for	  
community	  outreach	  and	  education.	  They	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  disaster	  volunteer	  
structure	  and	  provide	  funds	  and	  assistance	  for	  volunteers	  working	  towards	  enhancing	  DRR	  
in	  their	  communities.	  As	  strong	  community	  outreach	  advocates,	  grassroots	  groups	  aim	  to	  
work	  with	  neighborhoods	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible.	  Neighborhood	  
heads	  and	  other	  elected	  officials	  are	  often	  the	  first	  point	  of	  contact	  for	  grassroots	  
organizations.	  From	  the	  neighborhood	  head,	  a	  core	  group	  of	  neighborhood	  leaders	  interact	  
with	  grassroots	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  DRR	  efforts	  locally	  and	  increase	  risk	  
awareness	  throughout	  the	  community.	  They	  strive	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  all	  corners	  of	  a	  
community,	  and	  expand	  risk	  awareness	  and	  possible	  DRR	  strategies.	  Grassroots	  groups	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then	  translate	  DRR	  knowledge	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  so	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  people	  are	  able	  to	  
understand	  and	  use	  DRR	  information.	  This	  establishes	  a	  network	  of	  neighborhoods	  in	  
Istanbul	  that	  can	  share	  and	  exercise	  DRR	  information,	  knowledge,	  and	  resources.	  These	  
organizations	  work	  with	  communities	  to	  provide	  strategies,	  activities,	  and	  mechanisms	  the	  
community	  can	  employ	  to	  reduce	  their	  risk	  to	  disasters.	  To	  do	  this,	  they	  often	  provide	  free	  
earthquake	  awareness	  training	  sessions,	  seminars,	  and	  materials.	  Second,	  although	  their	  
primary	  objective	  is	  to	  actively	  engage	  the	  community	  in	  DRR	  and	  to	  promote	  a	  culture	  of	  
resilience	  throughout,	  many	  grassroots	  organizations	  have	  focused	  their	  efforts	  on	  projects	  
whose	  aim	  is	  to	  strengthen	  the	  building	  stock	  of	  the	  community.	  
	  
Healthcare	  
	   The	  healthcare	  sectors	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Antakya	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  
emergency	  response,	  and	  as	  such,	  their	  involvement	  in	  directly	  reducing	  risk	  is	  limited.	  
However,	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  healthcare	  institutions	  engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  Turkey.	  First,	  there	  
is	  a	  multitude	  of	  disaster	  contingency	  plans	  that	  each	  healthcare	  institution	  must	  have,	  
review	  annually,	  and	  file	  with	  the	  Health	  Ministry.	  Also,	  healthcare	  institutions	  execute	  
practices	  and	  mock	  scenarios	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  prepared.	  Second,	  under	  Health	  Ministry	  
regulations,	  every	  hospital	  should	  have	  trained	  disaster	  managers	  as	  well	  as	  at	  least	  10	  
people	  who	  are	  trained	  in	  search	  and	  rescue	  and	  disaster	  management.	  There	  are	  
mandatory	  annual	  training	  programs	  with	  the	  national	  government	  via	  the	  Health	  Ministry	  
designed	  to	  educate	  employees	  about	  how	  to	  create	  and	  implement	  this	  disaster	  plan.	  This	  
training	  is	  offered	  through	  hospitals	  for	  health	  sector	  officials	  such	  as	  doctors,	  nurses,	  
paramedics,	  technicians,	  and	  police	  services.	  In	  addition	  to	  training	  and	  contingency	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planning,	  national	  healthcare	  institutions	  provide	  regional	  and	  city	  hospitals	  with	  
emergency	  response	  and	  recovery	  materials	  that	  will	  be	  needed	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  disaster.	  
Healthcare	  institutions	  are	  more	  distanced	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  DRR	  networks	  in	  terms	  
of	  sharing	  information	  across	  the	  sectors.	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  information	  sharing	  
between	  healthcare	  institutions,	  their	  networks	  and	  DRR	  dialogue	  is	  equally	  robust.	  
Healthcare	  institutions	  regularly	  share	  information	  with	  one	  another	  and	  have	  a	  tight	  knit	  
network	  of	  information	  sharing	  and	  DRR	  dialogue	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  healthcare	  
professionals	  constantly	  reevaluating	  best	  possible	  strategies.	  Though	  disjointed	  from	  
other	  key	  institutions,	  the	  healthcare	  institutions	  work	  closely	  with	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  
maximize	  their	  effectiveness	  during	  a	  disaster.	  They	  will	  share	  information	  with	  one	  
another	  and	  work	  to	  coordinate	  their	  contingency	  plans.	  Because	  of	  this	  internalized	  
structure	  of	  DRR	  dialogues,	  healthcare	  professionals	  see	  their	  DRR	  efforts	  as	  more	  tailored	  
to	  the	  ways	  that	  healthcare	  works,	  and	  therefore	  more	  effective.	  	  
	  
Barriers:	  
	   There	  are	  five	  primary	  variables	  respondents	  answered	  as	  extremely	  (86-­‐100%	  of	  
respondents	  reported)	  or	  highly	  (70-­‐85%	  of	  respondents	  reported)	  preventative	  of	  DRR	  
strategies	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  Turkey.	  The	  barriers	  found	  are	  1)	  other	  social	  and	  economic	  
problems,	  2)	  lack	  of	  available	  personnel,	  3)	  lack	  of	  technical	  experience,	  4)	  lack	  of	  public	  
interest,	  and	  5)	  money.	  According	  to	  respondents,	  it	  is	  these	  five	  key	  variables	  that	  impede	  
Turkey’s	  ability	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	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In	  conclusion,	  this	  broad	  scope	  of	  understanding	  how	  community	  institutions	  
engage	  in	  DRR	  in	  Turkey	  lays	  a	  strong	  foundation	  upon	  which	  to	  learn	  from	  as	  well	  as	  
expand	  and	  improve	  upon	  Turkish	  DRR.	  Though	  Turkey	  is	  considered	  a	  world-­‐wide	  leader	  
in	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms,	  barriers	  and	  challenges	  still	  exist.	  
This	  thesis	  can	  inform	  a	  variety	  of	  community	  institutions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  other	  
institutions	  in	  DRR.	  As	  well,	  this	  work	  can	  supplement	  the	  knowledge	  of	  governance	  
structures	  and	  community	  institutional	  networks.	  It	  can	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  create	  or	  
improve	  upon	  existing	  DRR	  networks,	  strategies,	  and	  mechanisms.	  This	  study	  moreover	  
provides	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  successful	  (though	  not	  perfect)	  DRR	  efforts,	  and	  allows	  
for	  other	  communities	  to	  tailor	  progressive,	  active,	  and	  effective	  DRR	  into	  their	  particular	  
traditions	  and	  culture.	   	  
	  
























The	  mission	  of	  disaster	  risk	  reduction…	  is	  to	  convey	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
environmental	  and	  social	  conditions	  and	  the	  human	  actions	  and	  inactions	  that	  
lead	  to	  disaster,	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  advocacy	  and	  to	  raise	  expectations	  of	  
social	  policy	  to	  reduce	  these	  threats	  and	  to	  stimulate	  changes	  in	  individual	  and	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Appendix	  A:	  City	  Selection	  Criteria	  
	  
There	  are	  8	  criteria,	  which	  it	  used	  to	  select	  the	  two	  primary	  target	  cities.	  	  
	  	  
1. National	  Income:	  I	  selected	  cities	  to	  represent	  a	  range	  of	  national	  incomes.	  
According	  to	  world	  development	  indicator	  rankings	  of	  215	  World	  Bank	  Atlas	  
economies,	  the	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  ranged	  from	  18th	  (USA)	  to	  160th	  (India)	  in	  
national	  incomes.	  
2. Population	  Size:	  I	  selected	  both	  large	  and	  less	  heavily	  populated	  cities.	  	  
3. Recent	  and	  Distant	  Exposure	  to	  a	  Large	  Earthquake:	  I	  selected	  cities	  with	  both	  
“recent”	  and	  “distant”	  exposure	  to	  large	  earthquakes,	  because	  exposure	  to	  damaging	  
earthquakes	  is	  important	  to	  understanding	  public	  perceptions	  of	  risk.	  The	  exposure	  
times	  for	  the	  selected	  cities	  ranged	  from	  one	  year.	  
4. High	  Seismic	  Risk:	  In	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  goal	  of	  reaching	  the	  most	  earthquake-­‐
prone	  cities,	  areas	  were	  selected	  that	  have	  high	  to	  very-­‐high	  earthquake	  hazard	  risk.	  
5. Earthquake	  Mitigation	  Experience:	  The	  countries	  in	  the	  sample	  were	  classified	  either	  
as	  “mitigation	  leaders”,	  as	  “active”	  or	  as	  “passive”	  with	  regard	  to	  mitigation	  
activities.	  Although	  no	  actual	  mitigation	  scale	  exists,	  I	  used	  rankings	  from	  the	  
Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  risk	  reduction	  activity,	  and	  
therefore	  experience.	  Turkey	  ranks	  92nd	  on	  the	  HDI	  with	  measurement	  of	  0.699	  out	  
of	  1	  (1	  being	  an	  unattainable	  level	  of	  advanced	  development)	  (Klugman	  2011).	  
6. Working	  Environment:	  The	  selected	  cities	  had	  to	  have	  a	  secure	  working	  
environment	  and	  a	  stable	  and	  semi-­‐	  or	  fully-­‐democratic	  government.	  Although	  this	  
involved	  an	  admittedly	  subjective	  assessment	  of	  risk	  within	  the	  working	  
environment,	  this	  criterion	  was	  important	  to	  help	  ensure	  a	  safe	  work	  environment.	  	  
7. International	  Development	  Organization	  Offices:	  At	  least	  some	  cities	  had	  to	  have	  
regional	  or	  country-­‐level	  representation	  of	  major	  international	  development	  
organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  GHI-­‐CSU	  team	  to	  conduct	  
supplemental	  interviews	  with	  development	  professionals	  in	  these	  organizations	  
focused	  on	  risk	  reduction.	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Bhutan,	  Peru,	  and	  
Turkey.	  
8. Local	  Partner:	  Contact	  with	  local	  partners	  was	  required	  since	  English	  was	  not	  the	  
lingua	  franca	  of	  Turkey.	  Thus,	  another	  criterion	  for	  city	  selection	  was	  that	  local	  
partners	  who	  would	  assist	  with	  scheduling	  and	  conducting	  interviews,	  and,	  in	  some	  
cases,	  provide	  translation	  assistance	  as	  well	  would	  need	  to	  be	  identified.	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Appendix	  B:	  Interviewee	  Selection	  Criteria	  
	  
	   Local	  Government	  
Officials	  








General	  Description:	   Mix	  of	  local	  
government	  officials,	  
city	  engineers,	  
planners,	  and/or	  local	  
emergency	  
management	  officials.	  	  
Business	  people	  with	  
strong	  ties	  to	  the	  local	  
community	  and	  
working	  in	  industries	  
that	  are	  especially	  
important	  to	  the	  local	  




should	  be	  local,	  not	  a	  
part	  of	  multinational	  
corporations	  unless	  
their	  headquarters	  are	  
in	  the	  city.	  	  
District	  level	  school	  
administrators,	  
principals,	  and/or	  
teachers.	  May	  also	  
include	  officials	  within	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  




other	  leaders	  within	  
hospitals,	  nursing	  
homes,	  or	  other	  
healthcare	  facilities.	  
May	  also	  include	  chief	  
medical	  officers	  
and/or	  officials	  within	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  





groups,	  NGO’s,	  or	  faith-­‐
based	  groups,	  etc.	  who	  
are	  working	  with	  
vulnerable	  populations	  
including	  women,	  





mitigation,	  or	  disaster	  
risk	  reduction.	  May	  
include	  persons	  with	  
past	  experience,	  who	  
are	  not	  presently	  
active—but	  ideally	  
they	  are	  currently	  
involved	  in	  earthquake	  
activities.	  	  
*Ideally,	  this	  person	  
will	  also	  have	  some	  
leadership	  capacity	  
and	  ability	  to	  affect	  
change.	  However,	  we	  
Select	  individuals	  who	  




advocated	  for	  stricter	  
building	  codes,	  
championed	  hazards	  
mitigation	  activities,	  or	  
have	  otherwise	  
worked	  to	  reduce	  
earthquake	  risk	  within	  
the	  community.	  	  
Select	  individuals	  who	  
are	  involved	  in	  
business	  continuity	  
planning	  and	  other	  
earthquake	  mitigation	  
efforts	  for	  local	  
businesses.	  It	  may	  be	  
worthwhile	  to	  look	  for	  
local	  chapters	  of	  
international	  (e.g.,	  DRI:	  







Select	  individuals	  who	  
have	  designed	  hazards	  
education	  materials,	  
implemented	  
education	  programs	  in	  
a	  school	  or	  district,	  
and/or	  actively	  
supported	  teachers	  or	  
children	  who	  asked	  for	  
more	  disaster	  risk	  
reduction	  education	  
within	  schools.	  
Educators	  who	  have	  
designed	  innovative	  
after-­‐school	  programs	  
should	  also	  be	  
considered	  for	  
inclusion.	  	  	  
Select	  individuals	  who	  




mitigation	  plans	  for	  
the	  healthcare	  sector.	  	  




disaster	  risk	  reduction	  
at	  the	  local	  level.	  
Groups	  that	  involve	  
and	  empower	  
marginalized	  
populations	  to	  work	  
toward	  making	  their	  
lives	  safer	  and	  their	  
communities	  more	  
resilient	  to	  
earthquakes	  should	  be	  
especially	  targeted.	  	  	  
	  










city,	  or	  region.	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Language:	  Must	  either	  
speak	  English	  or	  have	  
a	  local	  partner/GHI	  
team	  member	  who	  can	  
translate	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Availability:	  Must	  be	  
available	  for	  a	  one	  
hour	  interview	  (or	  1.5	  
hours	  if	  translation	  is	  
required).	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Diversity:	  The	  project	  
team	  will	  strive	  for	  
gender	  diversity	  
among	  interviewees	  in	  
each	  city.	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Appendix	  C:	  Fieldwork	  Guide	  
	  
What	  to	  take	  to	  each	  interview	  
• Multiple	  copies	  of	  the	  
o interview	  guide,	  	  
o questionnaire	  (preferably	  printed	  double-­‐sided),	  	  
o demographic	  form,	  and	  	  
o GEM	  handout	  to	  be	  left	  with	  interviewee	  (preferably	  printed	  in	  color).	  	  
• Audio	  recorder	  and	  extra	  batteries	  
• Notebook	  
• Camera	  	  
• Business	  cards	  
• Directions	  to	  interview	  site	  
• Wallet	  and	  ID	  	  	  
	  
Key	  activities	  during	  fieldwork	  
• Conduct	  and	  record	  interviews	  with	  10	  community	  leaders	  per	  city.	  	  
o Familiarize	  yourself	  with	  your	  recorder!	  Make	  sure	  you	  know	  how	  to	  turn	  it	  
off	  and	  on.	  And,	  stop	  and	  start	  the	  recorder	  so	  you	  can	  see	  how	  it	  assigns	  new	  
numbers	  to	  new	  files.	  	  
o Try	  to	  basically	  memorize	  the	  interview	  guide	  before	  arriving	  in	  the	  field	  so	  
you	  can	  avoid	  reading	  questions	  verbatim	  or	  stumbling	  with	  questioning.	  
o Leave	  sufficient	  time	  (1.5-­‐2	  hours)	  between	  interviews.	  Some	  interviews	  may	  
run	  long,	  and	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  have	  to	  rush	  off	  from	  one	  interview	  or	  be	  late	  
to	  the	  next.	  	  
o Make	  sure	  the	  interviews	  are	  recorded	  in	  a	  quiet	  space	  (offices	  or	  conference	  
rooms	  with	  closed	  doors	  are	  ideal).	  Have	  the	  local	  partner	  request	  this	  space	  
when	  setting	  up	  the	  interview.	  	  
o When	  you	  ask	  the	  interviewee	  to	  fill	  out	  the	  questionnaire	  (about	  40	  minutes	  
into	  the	  interview),	  keep	  the	  recorder	  running	  unless	  the	  interviewee	  is	  
taking	  an	  unusually	  long	  time	  and	  isn’t	  speaking.	  If	  you	  do	  turn	  off	  the	  
recorder,	  restart	  it	  before	  you	  begin	  asking	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questions.	  Turn	  it	  
off	  once	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  have	  been	  answered.	  See	  below	  for	  
information	  on	  naming	  the	  audio	  files.	  
o If	  multiple	  individuals	  show	  up	  for	  the	  interview,	  have	  all	  those	  who	  actively	  
participated	  fill	  out	  the	  questionnaire	  and	  the	  demographic	  form.	  	  
o Ask	  the	  local	  partner	  to	  take	  photos	  of	  you	  and/or	  the	  interviewee	  during	  the	  
sessions.	  Also,	  make	  sure	  and	  get	  some	  photos	  of	  the	  local	  partner	  “in	  action.”	  
See	  the	  San	  Francisco	  photo	  slideshow	  on	  Shutterfly	  for	  the	  types	  of	  
interview	  photos	  we	  are	  looking	  for.	  	  
o Debrief	  with	  your	  local	  partner	  following	  interviews	  to	  clarify	  any	  vague	  
points	  or	  to	  identify	  issues	  with	  the	  interview	  process.	  
o Takes	  notes	  about	  observations	  or	  other	  insights	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  
following	  the	  interviews	  and	  at	  least	  within	  48	  hours	  of	  them	  occurring.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  these	  notes	  is	  to	  1)	  help	  the	  project	  team	  discover	  what,	  if	  
anything,	  needs	  to	  be	  changed	  in	  the	  research	  method	  for	  the	  remaining	  
	  
	   173	  
cities	  and	  2)	  help	  you	  prepare	  for	  the	  debriefing	  with	  the	  project	  team	  after	  
the	  fieldwork.	  	  
o Be	  open	  to	  interviewing	  more	  than	  10	  people	  in	  each	  city	  if	  you	  meet	  or	  hear	  
about	  someone	  who	  you	  think	  might	  provide	  valuable	  insight	  for	  the	  project.	  
It	  is	  okay	  if	  an	  additional	  interviewee	  does	  not	  fit	  neatly	  into	  one	  of	  the	  
beneficiary	  classes.	  	  	  	  
• At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  day,	  download	  the	  interview	  recordings	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  
send	  the	  recordings	  to	  Lori	  via	  YouSendIt.com.	  Follow	  the	  file	  naming	  scheme	  
below.	  	  
o Use	  Lori’s	  upgraded	  version	  of	  YouSendIt,	  which	  allows	  you	  to	  send	  multiple	  
files	  at	  once	  and	  files	  larger	  than	  50MB.	  	  
• Conduct	  an	  informal	  interview	  (no	  recordings,	  take	  notes	  as	  needed	  on	  key	  points)	  
with	  each	  local	  partner	  during	  the	  last	  two	  days	  of	  fieldwork.	  See	  local	  partner	  
interview	  questions	  document	  for	  suggested	  questions.	  Have	  the	  local	  partner	  fill	  
out	  a	  demographic	  form.	  
o Write	  a	  brief	  memo	  (2-­‐5	  pages)	  summarizing	  the	  local	  partner	  interview	  
feedback	  and	  email	  to	  the	  project	  team.	  	  
• Conduct	  at	  least	  one	  informal	  interview	  (no	  recordings,	  take	  notes	  as	  needed	  on	  key	  
points)	  with	  one	  official	  of	  an	  international	  development	  agency	  in	  Lima	  (Veronica),	  
Istanbul	  (Justin),	  and	  Guwahati	  or	  Thimpu	  (Hari).	  See	  international	  development	  
interview	  questions	  document	  for	  suggested	  questions.	  Have	  the	  official	  fill	  out	  a	  
demographic	  form.	  	  	  
o Write	  a	  brief	  memo	  (2-­‐5	  pages)	  summarizing	  the	  interviews	  and	  email	  to	  the	  
project	  team.	  	  	  
• If	  time	  allows,	  do	  brief	  street-­‐side	  surveys	  of	  three	  buildings	  under	  construction	  in	  
each	  city.	  
o Take	  photos	  of	  the	  buildings.	  	  
o Write	  a	  brief	  memo	  summarizing	  what	  you	  observed:	  size	  of	  buildings,	  
structural	  systems,	  configurations,	  general	  quality	  of	  design/construction.	  
• Take	  photos.	  
o Images	  of	  typical	  architecture,	  the	  concentration	  of	  buildings	  or	  cityscapes	  
could	  be	  useful	  for	  our	  report	  to	  GEM.	  	  
o Images	  of	  interviewees	  taking	  the	  survey,	  showing	  preparedness	  materials,	  
or	  engaging	  in	  the	  interview	  with	  you	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  jog	  your	  memory	  
later	  and	  could	  be	  used	  in	  our	  final	  report	  to	  GEM.	  	  
o Upload	  the	  photos	  to	  the	  project	  Shutterfly	  site:	  Categorize	  the	  images,	  add	  
captions,	  create	  a	  separate	  word	  file	  or	  do	  something	  else	  as	  a	  way	  to	  record	  
simple	  descriptions	  of	  the	  photos.	  Again,	  see	  the	  San	  Francisco	  slideshow	  for	  
an	  example	  of	  the	  types	  of	  captions	  we	  are	  looking	  for.	  Note	  that	  Jen	  has	  
offered	  to	  upload	  the	  photos	  and	  captions	  for	  you—you	  can	  send	  the	  photos	  
to	  her	  using	  the	  YouSendIt	  account	  and	  send	  the	  captions	  as	  a	  word	  
document.	  	  
	  
“What	  to	  do	  if”	  during	  the	  interviews	  
• Multiple	  people	  want	  to	  be	  interviewed:	  Warn	  them	  that	  the	  interview	  will	  take	  
longer.	  If	  they	  are	  still	  willing	  to	  complete	  the	  interview,	  then	  conduct	  it	  with	  up	  to	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three	  people	  at	  a	  time.	  Consider	  splitting	  up	  into	  separate	  groups	  if	  you	  have	  
multiple	  recorders	  and	  interviewers	  (e.g.,	  GHI	  staff	  and	  graduate	  student).	  	  	  
• The	  interviewee	  says	  s/he	  has	  less	  than	  an	  hour:	  focus	  on	  the	  priority	  questions,	  
which	  have	  asterisks	  by	  them	  on	  the	  interview	  guide.	  Try	  to	  have	  the	  questionnaire	  
and	  demographic	  page	  completed	  but	  you	  could	  email	  them	  as	  a	  back	  up.	  	  
• Someone	  cancels:	  If	  an	  interviewee	  cancels,	  try	  to	  reschedule	  (this	  is	  another	  reason	  
that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  “front	  load”	  interviews	  so	  you	  have	  some	  flexibility	  during	  the	  
final	  days	  of	  your	  trip	  if	  you	  need	  to	  schedule	  make	  up	  interviews).	  If	  the	  person	  
cancels	  and	  cannot	  reschedule,	  begin	  searching	  immediately	  for	  a	  “replacement”	  
interviewee	  from	  that	  particular	  beneficiary	  class.	  
• Interviews	  go	  long	  or	  short:	  We	  have	  allotted	  1	  hour	  for	  interviews	  (1.5	  hours	  if	  
translation	  is	  involved).	  Do	  not	  worry	  too	  much	  if	  interviews	  run	  slightly	  longer	  or	  
slightly	  shorter	  than	  an	  hour,	  as	  the	  timing	  mostly	  evens	  out	  in	  the	  end.	  However,	  if	  
interviews	  are	  running	  really	  short,	  it	  might	  be	  worth	  a	  quick	  Skype	  call	  to	  try	  to	  
“troubleshoot”	  to	  find	  out	  if	  something	  is	  going	  on	  (culturally	  or	  otherwise)	  that	  is	  
making	  the	  guide	  not	  work	  as	  well	  in	  a	  particular	  context.	  	  	  
	  
Audio	  file	  downloading,	  naming,	  and	  sending	  process	  	  
• Download	  audio	  files	  to	  your	  computer	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  fieldwork	  day.	  
o Our	  protocol	  for	  stopping	  and	  starting	  the	  recorder	  during	  the	  interview	  
sessions	  (see	  above)	  means	  that	  you	  might	  have	  2-­‐3	  audio	  files	  for	  each	  
interview	  session.	  	  	  
• Once	  downloaded,	  check	  to	  ensure	  the	  audio	  files	  play	  properly	  on	  your	  computer.	  
Also	  check	  the	  length	  of	  the	  audio	  file,	  so	  you	  know	  exactly	  how	  long	  each	  interview	  
lasted.	  After	  the	  files	  are	  downloaded,	  right	  click	  on	  each	  file	  and	  select	  “Rename.”	  
o Once	  the	  box	  appears	  that	  allows	  you	  to	  type	  a	  new	  name,	  please	  begin	  
naming	  the	  files	  by	  the	  city	  and	  with	  a	  1a,	  1b,	  1c,	  2a,	  2b,	  3a,	  etc.	  following,	  
depending	  on	  the	  interview	  order.	  Do	  not	  use	  spaces,	  and	  leave	  everything	  
lower	  case.	  An	  example	  follows,	  file	  name	  is	  first,	  with	  descriptor	  in	  
(parentheses):	  	  
• Once	  the	  files	  are	  renamed,	  open	  an	  internet	  browser	  to:	  
https://www.yousendit.com/.	  Log	  in	  using	  Lori’s	  account	  Enter	  your	  email	  in	  the	  
“From:”	  box	  on	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  page	  and	  Lori’s	  email	  in	  the	  “To:”	  box.	  Select	  the	  
file	  and	  then	  send	  it	  to	  Lori.	  	  	  
• After	  Lori	  receives	  the	  file,	  checks	  it	  to	  ensure	  it	  is	  working	  properly,	  she	  will	  send	  it	  
to	  the	  transcriptionist	  and	  will	  also	  send	  a	  confirmation	  email	  that	  the	  file	  was	  
received.	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Appendix	  D:	  	  Interview	  Guide	  
	  
Thank	  you	  for	  meeting	  with	  us	  today.	  My	  name	  is	  [XX]	  and	  this	  is	  [XX].	  We	  are	  part	  of	  a	  
research	  team	  supported	  by	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model	  Foundation,	  an	  international,	  
collaborative	  initiative	  to	  help	  calculate	  and	  communicate	  earthquake	  risk	  worldwide.	  	  
	  
As	  part	  of	  this	  project,	  we	  are	  traveling	  to	  10	  cities	  in	  7	  countries	  to	  learn	  about	  programs	  
and	  activities	  that	  have	  helped	  people	  prepare	  for	  and	  reduce	  their	  earthquake	  risk.	  We	  
will	  use	  this	  information	  to	  advise	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model	  Foundation	  on	  how	  they	  
can	  make	  their	  earthquake	  risk	  information	  available,	  for	  free,	  to	  professionals	  like	  you.	  	  	  
	  
We	  have	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  that	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you.	  The	  interview	  should	  take	  
about	  1	  hour	  [1.5	  hours	  with	  translation]	  to	  complete.	  Is	  it	  okay	  if	  I	  record	  it,	  so	  I	  can	  focus	  
on	  you	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  take	  extensive	  notes?	  The	  recording	  will	  not	  be	  shared	  with	  
anyone	  outside	  of	  our	  research	  team.	  
	  
Do	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  the	  interview	  or	  the	  project	  before	  we	  begin?	  	  
	  
[Note:	  give	  interviewee	  your	  business	  card	  when	  you	  first	  meet]	  
	  
Interview	  Questions:	  	   	   	   	   	   Probes:	  	  
1.	  Work	  
	  
First,	  will	  you	  please	  say	  your	  name,	  title,	  
and	  the	  name	  of	  your	  organization?	  	  
	  
Will	  you	  tell	  me	  about	  your	  job	  here?	  	  	  
	  
	  
*2.	  Programs	  –	  Understanding,	  Preparing	  
for,	  and	  Mitigating	  Earthquake	  Risk	  	  
	  
What	  earthquake	  education,	  preparedness,	  
or	  mitigation	  activities	  is	  your	  organization	  
involved	  in?	  	  
	  
[Note:	  If	  the	  interviewee	  talks	  more	  
generally	  about	  “all	  hazards”	  programs,	  
probe	  to	  see	  if	  they	  are	  doing	  anything	  
earthquake	  specific.	  If	  they	  offer	  nothing	  
that	  is	  earthquake	  specific—which	  is	  a	  
finding	  in	  and	  of	  itself—ask	  the	  interviewee	  
to	  respond	  to	  these	  probes	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
other	  hazards	  program(s)	  they	  offer.]	  
	  
What	  sparked	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  
programs?	  	  
	  
What	  information	  and	  resources	  do	  you	  
draw	  on	  to	  implement	  these	  programs?	  
	  
What	  groups	  do	  you	  try	  to	  reach	  with	  your	  
programs?	  Why	  do	  you	  work	  with	  these	  
particular	  groups?	  	  
	  
What	  tools	  or	  strategies	  do	  you	  use	  to	  
communicate	  with	  the	  people	  you	  serve?	  
What	  strategy	  is	  most	  useful	  in	  terms	  of	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*3.	  Barriers	  	  
	  
What	  barriers	  have	  emerged	  with	  designing	  




Have	  you	  changed	  anything	  about	  your	  
program	  itself	  or	  your	  overall	  strategy	  to	  try	  
to	  address	  these	  barriers?	  	  
	  
4.	  Partnerships	  	  
	  
What	  lessons	  have	  you	  learned	  from	  other	  
leading	  individuals	  or	  organizations	  about	  
understanding	  or	  reducing	  earthquake	  risk?	  
	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model’s	  goals	  
is	  to	  reach	  as	  wide	  of	  an	  audience	  as	  
possible	  with	  their	  technical	  information.	  If	  
they	  were	  trying	  to	  share	  their	  information	  
in	  this	  city,	  who	  would	  you	  recommend	  they	  
contact?	  	  	  
*5.	  Earthquake	  Risk	  	  
	  
When	  you	  think	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  
major	  earthquake	  happening	  in	  your	  
community,	  what	  concerns	  you	  the	  most?	  
	  
Are	  the	  people	  you	  serve	  concerned	  about	  
earthquake	  risk?	  	  
	  
Are	  there	  other	  threats	  or	  hazards	  that	  the	  




During	  this	  last	  part	  of	  the	  interview,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  give	  you	  a	  short	  survey	  that	  
asks	  about	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  information.	  This	  should	  only	  take	  a	  few	  
minutes	  to	  complete,	  and	  then	  we	  will	  talk	  about	  your	  responses.	  	  
	  
Interviewee	  Completes	  Survey	  [keep	  recorder	  on	  unless	  the	  interviewee	  seems	  to	  
be	  taking	  an	  unusually	  long	  time	  and	  isn’t	  speaking]	  	  
	  
After	  the	  interviewee	  has	  completed	  the	  survey,	  and	  if	  time	  allows,	  review	  the	  
survey	  document	  with	  the	  individual.	  Ask	  these	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  as	  you	  look	  at	  
table	  1	  at	  the	  top	  of	  page	  1:	  
	  
1. Of	  those	  items	  that	  you	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to,	  which	  would	  be	  most	  
helpful/useful	  to	  you?	  	  
2. Of	  those	  items	  that	  you	  do	  have,	  how	  do	  you	  like	  the	  information	  delivered	  
(maps,	  charts,	  on-­‐line,	  etc.)?	  	  	  
a. What	  makes	  you	  trust	  the	  information	  that	  you	  use?	  
b. Do	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  information	  you	  have	  already	  is	  reliable?	  Is	  there	  
anything	  that	  you	  would	  change	  to	  make	  it	  more	  robust	  or	  useable?	  	  
3. If	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model	  Foundation	  wanted	  to	  connect	  with	  
professionals	  like	  you	  to	  share	  their	  information	  for	  free,	  how	  would	  you	  
recommend	  they	  do	  that?	  What	  channels	  should	  the	  Foundation	  use	  to	  reach	  
professionals	  like	  you?	  	  
4. The	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model	  Foundation	  wants	  to	  help	  people	  reduce	  
earthquake	  risk	  by	  developing	  online	  tools	  and	  resources.	  What	  online	  tools	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or	  resources	  would	  you	  like	  GEM	  to	  develop	  to	  make	  you	  more	  effective	  at	  
reducing	  earthquake	  risk?	  
	  
This	  has	  been	  exceptionally	  helpful,	  and	  we	  are	  grateful	  for	  your	  time.	  Are	  there	  any	  
final	  thoughts	  or	  comments	  that	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	  	  
	  
Ask	  interviewee	  to	  complete	  demographic	  form.	  	  
	  
Interviewee	  Completes	  Demographic	  Form	  [turn	  off	  recorder]	  	  
	  
Give	  interviewee	  the	  handout	  on	  GEM	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview.
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Appendix	  E:	  Survey	  Questionnaire	  
	  
Think	  about	  the	  organization	  where	  you	  work	  and	  the	  community	  
and	  people	  it	  serves.	  Which	  of	  the	  following	  do	  you	  already	  have	  or	  
would	  you	  like	  to	  have	  to	  help	  understand	  earthquake	  risk?	  (Note:	  If	  
you	  already	  have	  access	  to	  a	  resource	  listed	  below	  but	  would	  still	  
like	  the	  Global	  Earthquake	  Model	  to	  provide	  it,	  please	  check	  the	  









Do	  not	  need	  
Projected	  ground	  shaking	  intensity	  in	  an	  earthquake.	   	   	   	   	  
Maps	  of	  earthquake	  fault	  lines	  in	  your	  community.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Maps	  of	  potential	  earthquake-­‐induced	  landslides	  or	  tsunamis	  in	  your	  
community.	  
	   	   	   	  
Projected	  number	  of	  deaths	  in	  an	  earthquake.	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  number	  of	  injuries	  in	  an	  earthquake.	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  impacts	  on	  different	  population	  groups	  (such	  as	  elderly,	  
homeless,	  etc.).	  
	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  housing	  in	  an	  earthquake.	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  schools	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  businesses	  in	  an	  earthquake.	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  hospitals	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  roads,	  bridges,	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  in	  an	  
earthquake.	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  electricity,	  gas,	  and	  water	  delivery	  systems	  in	  an	  
earthquake.	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Projected	  damage	  to	  mobile	  phone	  networks	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  	  	   	   	   	   	  
Project	  damage	  to	  Internet	  networks	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  
Projected	  economic	  losses	  in	  an	  earthquake.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Information	  about	  how	  individuals	  and	  families	  can	  prepare	  for	  
earthquakes.	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Information	  about	  how	  organizations	  can	  prepare	  for	  earthquakes.	   	   	   	   	  
Information	  about	  how	  to	  fasten	  contents	  of	  buildings	  to	  not	  fall	  during	  
earthquakes.	  
	   	   	   	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Information	  about	  how	  to	  strengthen	  buildings	  to	  not	  collapse	  during	  
earthquakes.	  
	   	   	   	  
Access	  to	  technical	  experts	  who	  can	  identify	  and	  explain	  earthquake	  risk.	   	   	   	   	  
Access	  to	  technical	  experts	  who	  can	  help	  individuals	  or	  organizations	  
prepare	  for	  earthquakes.	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
Which	  of	  the	  following	  minor	  or	  major	  barriers	  to	  
implementing	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  activities	  does	  the	  
organization	  where	  you	  work	  experience?	  	  





Not	  a	  barrier	  
Lack	  of	  money.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Lack	  of	  time	  to	  dedicate	  to	  such	  activities.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Too	  few	  people	  available	  to	  work	  on	  such	  activities.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Lack	  of	  technical	  expertise.	   	   	   	   	  
Lack	  of	  earthquake	  information.	   	   	   	   	  
Other,	  more	  urgent,	  social	  or	  economic	  problems.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Other,	  more	  serious,	  hazards.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Lack	  of	  interest	  in	  earthquake	  hazards	  among	  your	  colleagues.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Lack	  of	  interest	  in	  earthquake	  hazards	  among	  the	  people	  you	  
serve.	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Think	  about	  how	  you	  receive	  and	  share	  information	  for	  professional	  purposes.	  How	  useful	  have	  the	  following	  
information	  sources	  been	  for	  you	  over	  the	  past	  year?	  	  	  
	  
	  
Low	   Medium	   High	   Not	  available	   Available,	  but	  not	  
useful	  
Newspapers	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Radio	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Television	  	   	   	   	   	   	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Social	  media	  (such	  as	  Facebook,	  
Twitter)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Scientific	  publications	  (such	  as	  books,	  
journal	  articles,	  trade	  magazines)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Email	   	   	   	   	   	  
Telephone	   	   	   	   	   	  
Talking	  in	  person	  with	  community	  
members	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Talking	  in	  person	  with	  scientific	  experts	   	   	   	   	   	  
General	  news	  web	  sites	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Government	  web	  sites	   	   	   	   	   	  
Earthquake-­‐	  or	  disaster-­‐focused	  web	  
sites	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Earthquake	  hazard	  maps	   	   	   	   	   	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Appendix	  F:	  Interviewee	  Demographic	  Form	  
	  
	  
Name:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Title:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Organization:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Telephone:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
	  
Email:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Gender:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Male	   	   	  	  Female	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Age:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
How	  many	  years	  have	  you	  lived	  in	  this	  community?	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
How	  many	  years	  have	  you	  worked	  for	  this	  organization?	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
	  
How	  many	  years	  have	  you	  been	  involved	  in	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  activities?	  	   	  
	  
	  
We	  will	  not	  share	  the	  audio	  recording	  of	  our	  interview	  with	  anyone	  outside	  our	  research	  
team.	  However,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  use	  your	  name,	  title,	  and	  organization	  in	  the	  final	  report.	  
Do	  you	  give	  us	  permission	  to	  use	  this	  information	  in	  the	  final	  report?	  	  	  Yes_______	  	  No_______	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SUMMARY of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (Hyogo Framework)
I S D R
International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
DRR= disaster risk reduction
1
Strategic Goals
The integration of disaster risk reduction into
sustainable development policies and planning
Development and strengthening of institutions,
mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to
hazards
The systematic incorporation of risk reduction
approaches into the implementation of emergency









Risk assessments and maps,
multi-risk: elaboration and
dissemination
Indicators on DRR and vulnerability
Data & statistical loss information
Early warning: people centered;
information systems; public policy
Scientific and technological
development; data sharing, space-
based earth observation, climate
modeling and forecasting; early
warning








Information sharing and cooperation;
Networks across disciplines and
regions; dialogue
Use of standard DRR terminology
Inclusion of DRR into school
curricula, formal and informal
education
Training and learning on DRR:
community level, local authorities,
targeted sectors; equal access
Research capacity: multi-risk; socio-
economic; application








policy, technical and institutional
capacities
Dialogue, coordination & information
exchange between disaster managers
and development sectors
Regional approaches to disaster
response, with risk reduction focus















Sustainable ecosystems and environmental
management
DRR strategies integrated with climate change
adaptation
Food security for resilience
DRR integrated into health sector and safe hospitals
Protection of critical public facilities
Recovery schemes and social safety- nets
Vulnerability reduction with diversified income options
Financial risk-sharing mechanisms
Public-private partnership
Land use planning and building codes










3. Use knowledge, innovation
and education to build a culture
of safety and resilience at
all levels
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness
for effective response at all levels











DRR part of development
policies and planning, sector
wise and multisector








The substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social,
economic and environmental assets of communities and countries
1. Ensure that disaster risk
reduction (DRR) is a national
and a local priority with a
strong institutional basis for
implementation
2. Identify, assess and monitor
disaster risks and enhance early
warning
































































Expected outcome, strategic goals and priorities for action 2005-2015
	  







Implementation by different stakeholders, multi-
sectoral approach; participation of civil society
(NGOs, CBOs, volunteers), scientific community &
private sector is vital
States primarily responsible; an
enabling international environment
is vital, incl. strengthened regional
capacities
States, regional and international
organizations to foster coordination among
themselves and a strengthened International





- Small island developing States: Mauritius Strategy;
- Least developed countries;
- Africa
Follow-up integrated with
other major conferences in
fields relevant to DRR;
reviews as appropriate
Actors






Promote regional programmes including for technical
cooperation, capacity development, the development
of methodologies and standards for hazard and
vulnerability monitoring and assessment, the sharing
of information and effective mobilization of resources;
Undertake and publish regional and sub-regional
baseline assessments;
Coordinate and publish reviews on progress and
support needs, and assists countries in preparation of
national summaries;
Establish specialized regional collaborative centers;
Support the development of regional mechanisms and




Develop a matrix of roles and initiatives in support of follow/up to the Hyogo Framework;
Facilitate the coordination of effective actions within the UN system and other international and regional entities to
support the implementation of the , identify gaps, facilitate processes to develop guidelines and
policy tools for each priority area;
In broad consultation, develop generic, realistic and measurable indicators. These indicators could assist States in




















Engage in the implementation of the ISDR by encouraging integration of DRR into humanitarian and sustainable
development fields;
Strengthen the capacity of the UN system to assist disaster-prone developing countries in DRR and implement
measures for assessment of progress;
Identify actions to assist disaster-prone developing countries in the implementation of the , ensure
their integration and that adequate funding is allocated; assist in setting up national strategies and programmes for DRR;
Integrate actions into relevant coordination mechanisms (UNDG, IASC, RCs and UN Country Teams);
Integrate DRR into development assistance frameworks such as CCA/UNDAF, PRSP;
In collaboration with networks and platform support: data collection and forecasting on natural hazards and risks; early
warning systems; full & open exchange of data;
Support States with coordinated international relief assistance, to reduce vulnerability & increase capacities;
Strengthen international mechanisms to support disaster stricken States in post-disaster recovery with DRR approach
Adapt & strengthen inter-agency disaster management training for DRR and capacity building.
Hyogo Framework
International Organizations (including UN System and IFIs)






National baseline assessments of the status of DRR;
Publish and update a summary of national programme for DRR
including international cooperation;
Develop procedure for reviewing national progress including
systems for cost benefit analysis and ongoing monitoring on risk;
Consider acceding to, approving or ratifying relevant international
legal instruments and to make sure they are implemented;
Promote the integration of DRR with climate variability and climate
change into DRR strategies and adaptation to climate change;
ensure management of risks to geological hazards.
Designate national coordination mechanisms for the






Mobilize resources and capabilities of relevant national, regional and international bodies, including the UN system;
Provide and support the implementation of the HFA in disaster prone developing countries, including through financial and
technical assistance, addressing debt sustainability, technology transfer, public-private partnership and North-South and South-
South cooperation;
Mainstream DRR measures into multilateral and bilateral development assistance programmes;
Source: Outcome of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo, Kobe Japan, 18-22 Jan 2005
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Continued
SUMMARY of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters ( )Hyogo Framework







Support national platforms & regional coordination;
Register relevant partnerships with Commission on Sustainable Development;
Stimulate the exchange, compilation, analysis and dissemination of best practices, lessons learnt;
Prepare periodic review on progress towards achieving the objectives of the and provide reports to the
UNGA & other UN bodies
Hyogo Framework
In order to achieve the goals and act upon the priorities identified in this Framework, the following tasks have been identified to ensure implementation and follow-up by States, regional and international organizations in collaboration
with civil society and other stakeholders. The ISDR partners, in particular the Inter-agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction and secretariat, are requested to assist in implementing this Framework for Action.
!
!
Provide adequate voluntary financial contribution to the UN Trust Fund for DR to support follow-up activities to
; review usage and feasibility for the expansion of this fund;
Develop partnership to implement schemes that spread out risks, reduce insurance premiums, expand insurance coverage and
increase financing for post-disaster reconstruction, including through public and private partnerships. Promote an environment
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Appendix	  H:	  List	  of	  Interviewees	  
Istanbul,	  Turkey	  






Branch	  Manager:	  Civil	  
Defense	  Expert	  









Istanbul	  Metropolitan	  Municipality,	  Earthquake	  and	  Soil	  
Research	  
Local	  Government	  
Selim	  KACMAZOGLU	   Civil	  Defense	  Expert	   Istanbul	  National	  Education	  Directorate	   Education	  
Ismet	  GUNGOR	   Coordinator	   TCIP:	  Turkish	  Compulsory	  Insurance	  Pool	   Business	  
Seyhun	  PUSKLUCLU	   Geophysical	  engineer,	  
seismologist	  
Kandilli	  Observatory	   Education	  
Dr.	  M.	  Turkay	  ESIN	   Responsible	  of	  Health	  
Services	  Unit	  for	  
Disasters	  
Istanbul	  Health	  Directorate	   Healthcare	  
Dr.	  Huseyin	  Nail	  
KAVLAKOGLU	  
Doctor	   Tuberculosis	  Prevention	  and	  Treatment	  Center	   Healthcare	  
M.	  Elvan	  CANTEKIN,	  
Ph.D.	  
General	  Director	   MAG	  (Neighborhood	  Disaster	  Volunteers)	  Foundation	   Non-­‐Profit	  
Ali	  Nasuh	  MAHRUKI	   President	   AKUT	  Search	  and	  Rescue	  Association	   Non-­‐Profit	  
Eren	  KALAFAT	   President	   ULUS	  YAPI	   Business	  
	   	   	   	  
Antakya,	  Turkey	  
Name	   Title	   Organization	   Beneficiary	  Class	  
1.	  Mehmet	  ALKAN	  	  
2.	  Mustafa	  KESEF	  
3.	  Ibrahim	  KAFADAR	  	  
4.	  Bestami	  MISIRLI	  
1.	  Chief	  
2.	  Assistant	  Director	  
3.	  Branch	  Manager	  
4.	  Civil	  Engineer	  
Antakya	  National	  Education	  Directorate	   Education	  
Joseph	  NASEH	   Archeologist	  and	  Former	  
Director	  
local	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  Antakya	   Additional	  
Dr.	  Alaattin	  OZTURK	   Doctor	   Ministry	  of	  Health	  (Antakya	  Hospital):	  in	  charge	  of	  
ambulance	  services	  
Healthcare	  
Engin	  Murat	  ALKAYA	   Geological	  Engineer	   Antakya’s	  Chamber	  of	  Geological	  Engineers	   Non-­‐Profit	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Antakya	  Municipality	   Local	  Government	  
Kadim	  DOGAN	   Deputy	  Governor/Vice	  to	  
the	  Governor	  
Governorship	  of	  Hatay	   Additional	  
Mustafa	  Halil	  
YUCULEN	  
Director	  	   Governorship	  of	  Antakya’s	  Province:	  Disaster	  and	  
Emergency	  Preparedness	  Department	  
Local	  Government	  
Selim	  HARBIYELI	   Co-­‐Director/Civil	  
Engineer	  
Turkish	  Engineers	  and	  Architect	  Association:	  Antakya’s	  
Chamber	  of	  Civil	  Engineers	  
Non-­‐Profit	  
Ali	  HOCA	   Owner/Civil	  Engineer	   Hoca	  Construction	  Company	   Business	  
Hakan	  USLU	   Owner/Civil	  Engineer	   Sigma	  Construction	  Test	  Laboratory	  and	  Engineering	  
Company:	  a	  materials	  testing	  company	  
Business	  
Zeki	  HUZMELI	   Branch	  Manager	   Samandag	  Town	  National	  Education	  Directorate	   Education	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Appendix	  I:	  Recording	  Matrix	  
Istanbul,	  Turkey	  
File	  Name	   Interviewee	  Name	   Beneficiary	  Class	   Interview	  Length	  
istanbul1a	   Necmi	  Ercin	   Local	  Government	   44	  minutes,	  24	  seconds	  
istanbul1b	   Necmi	  Ercin	   Local	  Government	   45	  seconds	  
istanbul1c	   Necmi	  Ercin	   Local	  Government	   17	  minutes,	  18	  seconds	  
istanbul2a	   	  Mahmut	  Bas	  and	  Osman	  Kilic	   Local	  Government	   1	  hour,	  5	  minutes,	  19	  seconds	  
istanbul2b	   Mahmut	  Bas	  and	  Osman	  Kilic	   Local	  Government	   18	  minutes,	  18	  seconds	  
istanbul3a	   Selim	  Kacmazoglu	   Education	   1	  hour,	  8	  minutes,	  53	  seconds	  
istanbul3b	   Selim	  Kacmazoglu	   Education	   16	  minutes,	  41	  seconds	  
istanbul4a	   Ismet	  Gungor	   Business	   55	  minutes,	  25	  seconds	  
istanbul4b	   Ismet	  Gungor	   Business	   6	  minutes,	  19	  seconds	  
istanbul5a	   Seyhun	  Puskulcu	   Education	   28	  minutes,	  58	  seconds	  
istanbul5b	   Seyhum	  Puskulcu	   Education	   23	  minutes,	  7	  seconds	  
istanbul6a	   Dr.	  M.	  Turkay	  Esin	   Healthcare	   47	  minutes,	  21	  seconds	  
istanbul6b	   Dr.	  M.	  Turkay	  Esin	   Healthcare	   9	  minutes,	  33	  seconds	  
istanbul7a	   Dr.	  Huseyin	  Nail	  Kavlakoglu	   Healthcare	   45	  minutes,	  5	  seconds	  
istanbul7b	   Dr.	  Huseyin	  Nail	  Kavlakoglu	   Healthcare	   18	  minutes,	  11	  seconds	  
istanbul7c	   Dr.	  Huseyin	  Nail	  Kavlakoglu	   Healthcare	   7	  minutes,	  37	  seconds	  
istanbul8a	   M.	  Elvan	  Cantekin	  Ph.D.	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   47	  minutes,	  27	  seconds	  
istanbul8b	   M.	  Elvan	  Cantekin	  Ph.D.	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   7	  minutes,	  53	  seconds	  
istanbul9a	   Ali	  Nasuh	  Mahruki	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   34	  minutes,	  5	  seconds	  
istanbul9b	   Ali	  Nasuh	  Mahruki	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   12	  minutes,	  48	  seconds	  
istanbul10a	   Eren	  Kalafat	   Business	   27	  minutes,	  23	  seconds	  
istanbul10b	   Eren	  Kalafat	   Business	   7	  minutes,	  16	  seconds	  
	   	   	   	  
Antakya,	  Turkey	  
File	  Name	   Interviewee	  Name	   Beneficiary	  Class	   Interview	  Length	  
antakya1a	   Mehmet	  Alkan,	  Mustafa	  Kesef,	  
Ibrahim	  Kafadar,	  and	  Bestami	  
Misirli	  
Education	   50	  minutes,	  36	  seconds	  
antakya1b	   Mehmet	  Alkan,	  Mustafa	  Kesef,	  
Ibrahim	  Kafadar	  and	  Bestami	  
Misirli	  
Education	   11	  minutes,	  28	  seconds	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antakya2a	   Joseph	  Naseh	   Additional	  interview:	  Former	  Director	  of	  the	  
local	  Orthodox	  Church,	  no	  questionnaire	  
available	  
19	  minutes,	  47	  seconds	  
antakya3a	   Dr.	  Alaattin	  Ozturk	   Healthcare	   34	  minutes,	  14	  seconds	  
antakya3b	   Dr.	  Alaattin	  Ozturk	   Healthcare	   8	  minutes,	  41	  seconds	  
antakya4a	   Engin/Murat	  Alkaya	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   29	  minutes,	  48	  seconds	  
antakya4b	   Engin/Murat	  Alkaya	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   14	  minutes,	  19	  seconds	  
antakya5a	   Isameddin	  Cecke	  and	  Engin	  Sozer	   Local	  Government	   1	  hour,	  3	  minutes,	  58	  seconds	  
antakya5b	   Isameddin	  Cecke	  and	  Engin	  Sozer	   Local	  Government	   21	  minutes,	  30	  seconds	  
antakya6a	   Kadim	  Dogan	   Additional	  Interview:	  Assistant/Deputy	  
Governor	  of	  Hatay,	  no	  questionnaire	  available	  
22	  minutes,	  52	  seconds	  
antakya6b	   Kadim	  Dogan	   Additional	  Interview:	  Assistant/Deputy	  
Governor	  of	  Hatay,	  no	  questionnaire	  available	  
5	  minutes,	  25	  seconds	  
antakya7a	   Mustafa	  Halil	  Yuculen	   Local	  Government	   48	  minutes,	  8	  seconds	  
antakya7b	   Mustafa	  Halil	  Yuculen	   Local	  Government	   20	  minutes,	  25	  seconds	  
antakya8a	   Selim	  Harbiyeli	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   40	  minutes,	  36	  seconds	  
antakya8b	   Selim	  Harbiyeli	   Non-­‐Profit	  Org	   7	  minutes,	  7	  seconds	  
antakya9a	   Ali	  Hoca	   Business	   33	  minutes,	  16	  seconds	  
antakya9b	   Ali	  Hoca	   Business	   4	  minutes,	  28	  seconds	  
antakya9c	   Ali	  Hoca	   Business	   30	  minutes,	  25	  seconds	  
antakya10a	   Hakan	  Uslu	   Business	   47	  minutes,	  5	  seconds	  
antakya10b	   Hakan	  Uslu	   Business	   13	  minutes,	  43	  seconds	  
antakya11a	   Zeki	  Huzmeli	   Education	   37	  minutes,	  1	  second	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Appendix	  J:	  Final	  Codebook	  
	  
Goal:	  Explain	  how	  different	  community	  institutions	  in	  Turkey	  engage	  in	  DRR.	  How	  
community	  institutions	  interact	  with	  DRR	  practices	  to	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  resilience.	  
	  
Interviewee	  -­‐	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  key	  insights	  regarding	  the	  interviewees’	  
actions	  and	  abilities.	  These	  coding	  categories	  may	  involve	  more	  personal	  stories,	  where	  
interviewees	  describe	  ideas	  or	  actions	  they	  have	  taken	  to	  encourage	  earthquake	  risk	  
reduction.	  The	  intent	  with	  this	  set	  of	  codes	  is	  to	  help	  describe	  how	  the	  interviewee	  views	  
their	  participation	  in	  DRR.	  	  
• interviewee	  innovator	  –	  when	  the	  interviewee	  came	  up	  with	  a	  new	  idea—a	  plan,	  
policy,	  program,	  or	  position—and	  then	  figured	  out	  a	  way	  to	  move	  the	  idea	  to	  action.	  	  
• interviewee	  implementer	  –	  when	  the	  interviewee	  actually	  describes	  the	  work	  that	  
he	  or	  she	  has	  done	  to	  spark	  the	  implementation	  of	  earthquake	  related	  programs	  or	  
policies.	  	  
• interviewee	  instigator	  –	  when	  the	  interviewee	  discusses	  going	  to	  “higher	  ups”	  
(higher	  ranking	  officials	  in	  his/her	  organization,	  political	  leaders,	  economic	  leaders,	  
etc.)	  to	  try	  to	  encourage	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  earthquake-­‐related	  programs	  or	  
policies;	  this	  code	  may	  include	  discussion	  of	  strategies	  or	  techniques	  the	  
interviewee	  has	  also	  developed	  him	  or	  herself.	  	  
• interviewee	  resource	  generator	  –	  when	  the	  interviewee	  describes	  places	  where	  
he	  or	  she	  went	  to	  obtain	  the	  necessary	  resources	  (financial,	  human,	  or	  material)	  to	  
make	  a	  program	  or	  policy	  work.	  	  
• interviewee	  receiver	  –	  when	  the	  interviewee	  describes	  a	  time	  that	  he	  or	  she	  was	  
receptive	  to	  a	  new	  idea,	  innovation,	  etc.	  This	  information	  may	  have	  come	  from	  a	  
colleague	  or	  someone	  “higher	  up”	  in	  the	  organization.	  Receivers	  are	  generally	  
receptive	  to	  new	  information	  and	  actively	  seek	  it	  out	  and	  try	  to	  learn	  more.	  	  
	  
	  
Programs	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  any	  already	  existing	  (or	  developing)	  
programs	  that	  the	  interviewee	  describes.	  These	  programs	  may	  be	  coordinated	  by	  the	  
interviewees’	  organization	  or	  by	  other	  organizations	  that	  the	  interviewee	  describes.	  This	  
theme	  will	  provide	  more	  detail	  about	  how	  each	  individual	  institution	  engages	  in	  DRR.	  
• programs	  earthquake	  mitigation	  –	  any	  programs	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  structural	  
or	  non-­‐structural	  hazards	  mitigation.	  	  
• programs	  earthquake	  preparedness	  –	  any	  programs	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  
preparedness	  among	  professional	  staff	  or	  the	  population(s)	  that	  the	  organization	  
serves.	  	  	  	  	  
• programs	  all-­hazards	  –	  programs	  with	  an	  all-­‐hazards	  focus.	  	  	  
• programs	  tsunami	  –	  programs	  that	  focus	  on	  tsunami	  risk.	  	  
• programs	  fire	  –	  programs	  that	  focus	  on	  fire	  risk.	  	  
• programs	  public	  health	  –	  programs	  that	  focus	  on	  public	  health;	  may	  include	  
chronic	  health	  threats	  (e.g.,	  HIV/AIDS)	  or	  more	  acute	  threats	  (e.g.,	  disaster).	  	  
• programs	  people	  involved	  –	  any	  individuals	  (paid	  staff,	  volunteers,	  etc.)	  who	  
assist	  with	  running	  a	  program.	  	  
• programs	  goals	  –	  a	  description	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  program.	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• programs	  discontinued	  –	  any	  program(s)	  that	  the	  organization	  used	  to	  sponsor	  
but	  no	  longer	  does;	  or,	  this	  may	  be	  a	  program	  that	  was	  proposed	  but	  it	  never	  got	  off	  
the	  ground.	  	  
• programs	  community	  network	  cohesion	  –	  programs	  that	  focus	  on	  creating	  a	  
cohesive	  community	  network	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  social	  capital.	  	  
• programs	  building	  retrofit	  –	  programs	  that	  focus	  on	  providing	  an	  understanding	  
and	  informing	  the	  interviewees	  organization	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  buildings	  in	  
particular	  areas	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  properly	  go	  about	  retrofitting	  these	  buildings.	  
• programs	  response	  –	  any	  programs	  that	  are	  implemented	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  response	  
phase	  of	  a	  disaster.	  
• programs	  desires	  –	  what	  the	  interviewee	  would	  like	  to	  see	  happen	  if	  they	  had	  
unlimited	  time	  and	  resources.	  
• programs	  risk	  measurement	  –	  programs	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  measure	  risk.	  
• programs	  incentive	  –	  programs	  that	  provide	  incentives	  to	  those	  who	  implement	  
earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  activities	  and	  programs	  suggested	  by	  the	  interviewee’s	  
organization.	  
• programs	  lifelines	  –	  program	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  improvement	  of	  lifelines	  and	  
public	  works.	  
• programs	  earthquake	  hazard	  –	  program	  that	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  earthquake	  
hazard	  rather	  than	  earthquake	  risk.	  
• programs	  information	  gathering	  –	  programs	  designed	  specifically	  to	  gather	  
information	  and	  data	  about	  earthquake	  hazard,	  risk,	  preparedness,	  etc.	  




Program	  Actions	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  actual	  actions	  that	  have	  been	  taken,	  
actions	  that	  will	  be	  taken,	  or	  actions	  that	  program	  leaders	  would	  like	  to	  take	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  lessons	  learned	  through	  the	  programs	  described.	  This	  information	  will	  
provide	  me	  with	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  how	  different	  community	  institutions	  practically	  
apply	  their	  DRR	  activities.	  
• action	  retrofit	  –	  any	  description	  of	  the	  retrofitting	  of	  buildings,	  either	  for	  the	  
organization	  or	  the	  larger	  community.	  
• action	  non-­structural	  mitigation	  –	  any	  description	  of	  activities	  aimed	  at	  
completing	  a	  non-­‐structural	  mitigation	  activity	  (e.g.,	  securing	  the	  contents	  of	  a	  
building,	  fastening	  equipment,	  etc.).	  	  	  
• action	  worker	  preparedness	  –	  actions	  aimed	  at	  preparing	  workers	  in	  the	  
organization	  for	  a	  disaster.	  	  	  
• action	  public	  preparedness	  –	  actions	  aimed	  at	  preparing	  the	  public	  that	  the	  
organization	  serves	  for	  a	  disaster.	  	  
• action	  business	  continuity	  –	  actions	  aimed	  at	  preparing	  businesses	  for	  a	  disaster.	  	  
• action	  lifeline	  assessment	  –	  actions	  aimed	  at	  assessing	  lifelines	  (e.g.,	  gas,	  electric,	  
water,	  etc.).	  	  
• action	  disability	  preparedness	  –	  actions	  aimed	  at	  preparing	  for	  persons	  with	  
disabilities.	  
• action	  structural	  mitigation	  –	  any	  description	  of	  activities	  aimed	  at	  completing	  a	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structural	  mitigation	  activity	  (e.g.,	  building	  new,	  EQ	  resistant	  structures,	  upgrading	  
seismic	  building	  codes,	  etc.).	  	  	  
• action	  update/improve	  program	  info	  –	  any	  updates	  that	  occur	  within	  a	  project,	  
whether	  that	  be	  update	  the	  information	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  project	  or	  obtaining	  new	  
resources	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  project	  better.	  
• action	  legal/government	  mandates	  –	  legal	  resources/government	  mandates	  used	  
to	  implement	  and	  enforce	  earthquake	  safety	  standards.	  
• action	  distribution	  of	  planning	  rights	  –	  project	  seeks	  to	  distribute	  the	  planning	  
rights	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  potential	  building	  locations	  to	  particular	  
organizations	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  earthquake	  resistant	  district.	  
• action	  increase	  consciousness	  –	  actions	  used	  to	  increase	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  
public	  about	  their	  earthquake	  risk.	  
• action	  financially	  supports	  other	  organizations	  –	  financially	  supports	  other	  
organizations,	  institutions,	  and/or	  departments	  whose	  primary	  goal	  is	  earthquake	  
risk	  reduction.	  
• action	  community	  empowerment	  –	  actions	  taken	  to	  empower	  and	  train	  
community	  members	  to	  advocate	  for	  their	  own	  risk	  management	  needs.	  	  
• action	  professional	  networks	  –	  communicate	  and	  coordinate	  risk	  reduction	  
activities	  and	  programs	  with	  other	  organizations	  and	  institutions.	  
• action	  response	  –	  actions	  taken	  to	  increase	  the	  communities	  response	  knowledge	  
and	  capacity.	  
• action	  participatory-­any	  training	  or	  planning	  that	  is	  done	  in	  a	  participatory	  
manner,	  (e.g.	  professionals	  and/or	  community	  members	  coming	  together	  to	  create	  a	  
plan	  that	  works	  for	  them).	  
• action	  land	  use	  planning	  –	  actions	  taken	  with	  regards	  to	  land	  use	  planning	  in	  
order	  to	  address	  earthquake	  risk.	  
• action	  post	  earthquake	  –	  actions	  that	  were	  taken	  after	  the	  earthquake.	  
• action	  risk	  communication	  –	  action	  taken	  to	  try	  and	  communicate	  earthquake	  
risk.	  
• action	  hope	  –	  actions	  taken	  to	  provide	  hope	  to	  community	  members	  suffering	  post-­‐
earthquakes.	  
• action	  standardize	  planning	  -­‐-­‐	  actions	  taken	  to	  standardize	  preparedness	  and	  
planning	  efforts	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible.	  
	  
	  
Program	  Creation	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  key	  things	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
earthquake	  or	  hazards	  programs	  that	  the	  interviewee	  describes.	  	  
• creation	  leader	  w/	  vision	  –	  an	  individual	  or	  team	  of	  individuals	  who	  pursued	  
hazard	  risk	  reduction	  activities	  and	  prompted	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
• creation	  funding	  –	  when	  funding	  became	  available,	  the	  program	  was	  created.	  	  
• creation	  incident	  city	  –	  a	  disaster	  or	  other	  emergency	  in	  the	  same	  city	  sparked	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  program.	  	  	  
• creation	  incident	  nation	  –	  a	  disaster	  or	  other	  emergency	  in	  a	  different	  city,	  but	  the	  
same	  nation,	  sparked	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
• creation	  incident	  other	  nation	  –	  a	  disaster	  or	  other	  emergency	  in	  a	  different	  
nation	  sparked	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  program.	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• creation	  community	  advocates	  –	  powerful	  voices	  within	  the	  community	  
advocated	  to	  have	  the	  program	  started.	  
• creation	  external	  organization	  –	  an	  organization	  external	  to	  the	  city	  (either	  at	  the	  
state	  or	  federal	  level,	  or	  an	  international	  organization	  outside	  the	  nation)	  created	  
the	  program.	  	  	  
• creation	  concern	  about	  community	  –	  concern	  about	  vulnerable	  members	  of	  the	  
community,	  vulnerable	  structures,	  etc.	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
• creation	  legislation	  –	  new	  legislation	  prompted	  change.	  
• creation	  leadership	  support	  –	  increased	  support	  from	  leaders	  or	  government	  
officials	  sparked	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  program.	  
	  
	  
Information	  Sources	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  where	  the	  
organizations/individuals	  represented	  in	  the	  sample	  are	  currently	  getting	  their	  
information.	  This	  theme	  will	  help	  me	  understand	  the	  network	  of	  professionals	  and	  their	  
relationships.	  
• sources	  websites	  –	  may	  include	  local,	  state,	  or	  federal	  government	  sites;	  private	  
preparedness	  sites.	  	  
• sources	  news	  media	  –	  when	  interviewees	  obtain	  information	  from	  general	  news	  
media,	  either	  print	  or	  on-­‐line.	  	  
• sources	  technical	  publications	  –	  may	  include	  scholarly	  journals,	  books,	  and	  other	  
professional	  publications.	  	  
• sources	  technical	  databases	  –	  may	  include	  CDC	  data,	  HAZUS,	  USGS	  ShakeMap,	  etc.	  	  
• sources	  field	  reconnaissance	  –	  any	  reference	  to	  learning	  about	  earthquakes	  from	  
actual	  field	  reconnaissance	  trips	  to	  other	  earthquake	  affected	  regions.	  	  
• sources	  past	  earthquakes	  –	  drawing	  on	  information	  from	  past	  earthquakes	  within	  
the	  interviewees’	  home	  city.	  	  
• sources	  internal	  experts	  –	  experts	  who	  are	  within	  an	  organization	  who	  provide	  
information.	  	  
• sources	  external	  experts	  –	  academics,	  scientists,	  emergency	  managers,	  and	  others	  
who	  advise	  agencies	  and	  provide	  information	  or	  data.	  This	  code	  also	  may	  capture	  
going	  to	  professional	  conferences	  to	  listen	  to	  external	  experts.	  	  
• sources	  partnerships	  –	  may	  include	  partner	  organizations	  or	  umbrella	  
organizations	  that	  offer	  information	  and	  resources	  to	  encourage	  earthquake	  risk	  
reduction	  activities.	  	  	  
• sources	  credible	  –	  any	  description	  of	  what	  makes	  the	  interviewee	  trust	  or	  believe	  
in	  the	  accuracy	  of	  an	  information	  source;	  also	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  
access	  to	  credible	  or	  reliable	  data.	  
• sources	  past	  all-­hazards	  –	  drawing	  on	  information,	  resources,	  and/or	  lessons	  
learned	  from	  past	  hazards.	  
• sources	  community	  networks	  –	  community	  networks	  that	  share	  information	  and	  
resources	  that	  inform	  and	  promote	  earthquake	  safety.	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Program	  Implementation	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  what	  makes	  their	  programs	  
work	  well	  and/or	  are	  used	  to	  actually	  implement	  and	  run	  the	  programs.	  This	  information	  
will	  directly	  guide	  me	  to	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  DRR	  by	  each	  institution.	  
• effective	  leader	  –	  one	  person,	  or	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people,	  who	  provide	  consistent,	  
long-­‐term,	  unwavering	  support	  for	  risk	  reduction	  activities.	  
• effective	  general	  support	  –	  the	  program	  receives	  positive	  feedback	  and/or	  
support	  from	  the	  “public”	  it	  serves	  (whether	  it	  be	  parents	  involved	  with	  a	  school,	  
members	  of	  the	  community,	  etc.).	  	  	  
• effective	  funding	  –	  adequate	  funding	  is	  available.	  	  
• effective	  information	  –	  appropriate	  and	  accessible	  information	  is	  available	  and	  
usable	  to	  professionals.	  	  
• effective	  goal	  –	  a	  clear,	  central	  goal	  and/or	  mission	  statement	  that	  drives	  the	  
program.	  	  	  
• effective	  networks	  –	  program	  coordinators	  work	  with	  persons	  from	  other	  agencies	  
and	  organizations	  to	  understand	  and	  stay	  on	  top	  of	  “best	  practices.”	  	  
• effective	  resources	  –	  appropriate	  resources	  are	  available	  for	  use	  by	  professionals.	  
• effective	  communication	  –	  information	  is	  being	  communicated	  effectively.	  
• effective	  training	  –	  appropriate	  effort	  is	  put	  into	  training	  staff	  and/or	  public	  about	  
disaster	  preparedness/response.	  	  
• effective	  culture	  –	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  culture	  supports	  earthquake	  
preparedness	  and	  recovery.	  
• effective	  buildings	  –	  building	  codes	  were	  adequate	  and	  contributed	  to	  many	  
buildings	  withstanding	  ground	  shaking	  from	  the	  earthquake.	  
• effective	  business	  continuity	  –	  businesses	  were	  up	  and	  running	  quickly	  after	  the	  
earthquake.	  
• effective	  success	  –	  anytime	  someone	  mentions	  their	  success	  of	  being	  able	  to	  
withstand	  and	  respond	  an	  earthquake	  in	  some	  capacity.	  
• effective	  trust	  –	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  among	  community	  members	  made	  response	  and	  
recovery	  go	  more	  smoothly.	  
• effective	  community	  –	  strong	  sense	  of	  community	  made	  the	  earthquake	  response	  
and	  recovery	  go	  more	  smoothly.	  
	  
	  
Lessons	  Learned	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  refers	  to	  lessons	  learned	  and	  whom	  those	  lessons	  
were	  learned	  from.	  This	  theme	  will	  help	  me	  understand	  the	  network	  of	  professionals	  and	  
their	  relationships.	  
• lessons	  leaders	  –	  any	  description	  of	  the	  leaders	  within	  the	  field.	  	  
• lessons	  learned	  –	  lessons	  learned	  from	  others	  about	  earthquake	  preparedness,	  
response,	  or	  mitigation.	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Program	  Targets	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  the	  individuals	  or	  groups	  that	  are	  
targeted	  by	  the	  programs	  that	  were	  described	  in	  the	  interviews.	  This	  theme	  will	  add	  to	  my	  
holistic	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  institutions’	  participate	  in	  the	  community	  as	  well	  as	  with	  
one	  another.	  
• reach	  school	  children	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  school-­‐age	  children.	  	  
• reach	  parents	  of	  school	  children	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  parents	  of	  any	  
school	  age	  child.	  	  
• reach	  elderly	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  older	  residents.	  	  
• reach	  staff	  /	  workers	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  help	  the	  individuals	  within	  the	  
organization	  prepare	  themselves	  as	  well	  as	  their	  families	  and	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  
readily	  available	  should	  disaster	  strike.	  
• reach	  disabled	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  persons	  with	  disabilities.	  	  
• reach	  poor	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  low-­‐income	  populations,	  persons	  on	  fixed	  
incomes,	  etc.	  	  
• reach	  homeless	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  homeless	  populations.	  	  
• reach	  homeowners	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  homeowners.	  	  
• reach	  renters	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  renters.	  	  
• reach	  rental	  property	  owners	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  rental	  property	  
owners.	  	  
• reach	  faith-­based	  orgs	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  faith-­‐based	  organizations	  
(FBOs).	  	  
• reach	  non-­profit	  orgs	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  non-­‐profit	  or	  community-­‐
based	  organizations	  (CBOs).	  	  
• reach	  businesses	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  businesses.	  	  
• reach	  policy	  makers	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  policy	  makers.	  
• reach	  neighborhoods	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  community	  neighborhoods.	  
• reach	  building	  owners	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  building	  owners.	  
• reach	  other	  organizations/institutions/departments	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  
reach	  other	  organizations,	  institutions,	  or	  departments	  that	  are	  working	  in	  
earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  activities,	  or	  who	  should	  be	  working	  in	  earthquake	  risk	  
reduction	  activities.	  
• reach	  community	  –	  efforts	  and/or	  goals	  of	  the	  program	  are	  to	  reach	  the	  
community	  in	  general.	  
• reach	  leaders	  –	  actions	  taken	  to	  reach	  community	  and	  village	  leaders	  or	  
government	  officials.	  
• reach	  healthcare	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  healthcare	  professionals.	  
• reach	  drug	  –	  programs	  designed	  to	  reach	  drug	  users/addicts.	  
• reach	  volunteers	  –	  programs	  and/or	  information	  designed	  to	  reach	  volunteers,	  or	  
whoever	  wants	  and	  desires	  to	  find	  and	  use	  this	  information.	  
• reach	  prisoners	  –	  programs	  or	  actions	  taken	  designed	  to	  target	  the	  prison	  
population.	  
• reach	  education	  sector	  –	  reach	  people	  in	  the	  education	  sector	  to	  increase	  safety	  of	  
school	  buildings.	  
• reach	  women	  –	  program	  is	  designed	  to	  reach	  women.	  
• reach	  media	  –	  actions	  taken	  to	  reach	  journalists	  or	  the	  media.	  
• reach	  industry-­-­	  programs	  designed	  specifically	  to	  reach	  industry.	  
	  
	   194	  
	  
	  
Communication	  Channels	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  refers	  to	  the	  ways	  the	  interviewees	  and	  
their	  organizations	  communicate	  with	  the	  people	  they	  serve.	  This	  may	  capture	  community	  
channels	  and	  strategies	  already	  in	  place,	  or	  those	  that	  the	  interviewees	  hope	  to	  have	  
established.	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  also	  may	  capture	  communication	  channels	  that	  interviewees	  
do	  not	  use.	  “Communication	  channels”	  will	  help	  my	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  
organizations	  work	  with	  one	  another,	  clarifying	  the	  network	  of	  professionals	  and	  their	  
relationships.	  
• communication	  social	  media	  –	  social	  media	  used	  to	  communicate	  (e.g.,	  Facebook,	  
Twitter,	  etc.).	  	  
• communication	  direct	  contact	  –	  person-­‐to-­‐person	  contact,	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  contact,	  
contact	  through	  church	  or	  other	  speaking	  engagements,	  etc.	  	  
• communication	  Internet	  –	  communication	  through	  websites,	  email,	  web-­‐based	  
newsletters.	  	  
• communication	  paper	  –	  communication	  through	  pamphlets,	  reports,	  paper	  
newsletters,	  etc.	  Note,	  these	  documents	  may	  also	  be	  posted	  on	  websites	  somewhere,	  
but	  if	  they	  are	  also	  in	  paper	  format,	  make	  sure	  and	  “double	  code”	  so	  that	  the	  
document	  is	  captured	  under	  both	  the	  “communication	  internet”	  and	  
“communication	  paper”	  code.	  	  	  
• communication	  community	  networks	  –	  communication	  through	  networks	  
already	  established	  or	  desired	  to	  be	  established	  within	  the	  neighborhood	  or	  
community.	  
• communication	  news	  media	  –	  television	  or	  radio	  news	  media	  is	  used	  to	  
communicate.	  
• communication	  telephone	  –	  communication	  through	  telephone.	  
• communication	  radios	  –	  anytime	  a	  person	  or	  organization	  plans	  to	  use	  
professional	  radios	  for	  risk	  communication.	  
• communication	  photos	  –	  when	  a	  person	  or	  organizations	  uses	  photos	  to	  
communicate	  a	  point.	  
• communication	  presentations	  –	  when	  a	  person	  or	  organization	  uses	  
presentations/slides/PowerPoint’s/seminars	  in	  order	  to	  communicate	  earthquake	  
risk	  reduction	  information.	  
• communication	  TV	  movies	  –	  TV,	  movies,	  YouTube	  videos,	  or	  other	  digital	  visual	  
media	  strategies	  are	  used	  to	  communicate	  risk	  information.	  
• communication	  games	  –	  games	  as	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  communicating	  
earthquake	  risk	  and	  response	  strategies	  
	  
	  
Barriers	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  any	  expressed	  barrier	  to	  implementing	  
earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  or	  hazard	  risk	  reduction	  activities.	  The	  “barriers”	  theme	  
provides	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  DRR	  activities	  that	  community	  institutions	  might	  want	  to	  
participate	  in,	  but	  do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so.	  
• barrier	  time	  –	  not	  enough	  time.	  
• barrier	  money	  –	  not	  enough	  funding	  available.	  	  
• barrier	  available	  personnel	  –	  not	  enough	  available	  personnel.	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• barrier	  expertise	  –	  not	  enough	  available	  expertise	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  
• barrier	  long-­range	  perspective	  –	  difficult	  to	  get	  other	  key	  decision	  makers	  to	  take	  
a	  longer-­‐range	  perspective	  and	  to	  make	  an	  investment.	  	  
• barrier	  other	  issues	  –	  other	  social	  issues,	  which	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  more	  pressing,	  
receive	  more	  attention.	  	  
• barrier	  other	  hazards	  –	  other	  hazards,	  which	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  more	  pressing,	  
receive	  more	  attention.	  	  
• barrier	  emergency	  response	  –	  response	  activities	  receive	  more	  priority	  and/or	  
funding	  than	  preparedness	  or	  mitigation	  related	  activities.	  	  
• barrier	  community	  networks	  –	  community	  networks	  or	  lack	  thereof	  present	  a	  
barrier	  to	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  effective	  community	  risk	  reduction	  
strategies.	  
• barrier	  voices	  –	  too	  many	  voices	  and	  opinions	  make	  the	  creation	  and	  
understanding	  of	  a	  clear	  framework	  difficult.	  
• barrier	  consistent	  message	  –	  the	  message	  the	  organization	  is	  trying	  to	  articulate	  is	  
not	  consistent	  across	  multiple	  platforms.	  
• barrier	  culture	  –	  culture	  presents	  barrier	  to	  seismic	  risk	  reduction	  and	  
preparedness	  information	  dissemination.	  
• barrier	  policy	  –	  past	  or	  current	  public	  policy	  restricts	  mitigation	  and	  preparedness	  
activities.	  	  
• barrier	  resources–	  not	  enough	  non-­‐monetary	  resources	  available.	  
• barrier	  organizational	  networks–	  organizational	  networks	  or	  lack	  thereof	  present	  
a	  barrier	  to	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  effective	  risk	  reduction	  strategies.	  
• barrier	  leadership	  –	  breakdown	  or	  changes	  in	  leadership	  inhibit	  adequate	  disaster	  
preparedness/recovery	  efforts.	  
• barrier	  trust	  –	  distrust	  of	  the	  source	  or	  credibility	  of	  the	  disaster	  risk	  reduction	  
information	  being	  provided.	  	  
• barrier	  planning	  –	  the	  organization	  either	  does	  not	  have	  any	  risk	  reduction	  plans	  
in	  place	  or	  the	  plans	  are	  insufficient	  
• barrier	  government	  law	  –	  the	  organizations	  are	  subjects	  of	  the	  government	  and	  
are	  required	  to	  follow	  the	  job	  title	  dictated	  to	  them	  by	  the	  government.	  
• barrier	  private	  sector/buildings	  –	  organizations	  struggle	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  control	  
that	  they	  have	  over	  private	  sector	  buildings;	  how	  safe	  they	  are	  as	  well	  as	  what	  types	  
(if	  any)	  of	  structural	  retrofitting	  or	  mitigation	  techniques	  taken	  to	  make	  the	  building	  
safer.	  
• barrier	  political	  climate	  –	  the	  political	  atmosphere	  impedes	  earthquake	  mitigation	  
and	  preparedness	  activities	  from	  occurring.	  
• barrier	  forget	  –	  the	  communities	  tendency	  to	  forget	  about	  their	  risk	  to	  earthquakes	  
presents	  a	  barrier	  impeding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  certain	  programs.	  
• barrier	  no	  transportation	  –	  there	  is	  no	  transportation	  available	  to	  help	  staff	  
members	  respond	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  
• barrier	  crime	  –	  high	  crime	  in	  certain	  areas	  prevents	  organization	  from	  reaching	  
vulnerable	  populations.	  
• barrier	  persuade	  –	  an	  inability	  to	  persuade	  the	  public	  to	  learn	  and/or	  participate	  
in	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  programs,	  activities,	  and	  actions.	  
• barrier	  accessible	  information	  –	  information	  on	  earthquake	  preparedness	  and	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risk	  is	  available,	  but	  not	  accessible.	  
• barrier	  Internet	  –	  there	  is	  very	  little	  Internet	  availability	  in	  the	  area,	  which	  limits	  
people’s	  ability	  to	  access	  information	  online	  or	  through	  social	  media.	  
• barrier	  enforcement	  –	  earthquake	  preparedness	  plans	  are	  not	  strictly	  enforced	  so	  
people	  do	  not	  follow	  through	  with	  them.	  
• barrier	  parent	  involvement	  –	  a	  lack	  of	  parent	  involvement	  and	  financial	  support	  
creates	  a	  barrier	  to	  earthquake	  preparedness.	  
• barrier	  access	  to	  data	  –	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  available	  data	  i.e.	  housing	  stock,	  
infrastructure,	  etc.	  to	  accurately	  measure	  risk.	  
• barrier	  unexpected	  event	  –	  the	  earthquake	  that	  occurred	  was	  not	  what	  was	  
expected	  or	  mapped	  prior	  to	  the	  event.	  
• barrier	  laggard	  upgrades	  –	  not	  adhering	  to	  new	  building	  code	  standards	  or	  being	  
laggard	  in	  building	  retrofits	  and	  upgrades	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  barrier	  when	  the	  
earthquake	  hit.	  
• barrier	  unsafe	  development	  –	  processes	  that	  allow	  developers	  to	  build	  in	  unsafe	  
areas	  to	  maximize	  profits	  creates	  a	  barrier	  to	  earthquake	  mitigation.	  
• barrier	  building	  code	  limitations	  –	  building	  codes	  are	  only	  meant	  to	  keep	  the	  
buildings	  from	  falling,	  not	  to	  be	  functional	  after	  an	  earthquake.	  
• barrier	  bureaucracy	  –	  bureaucratic	  processes	  limited	  the	  amount	  of	  agency	  
individuals	  had	  to	  begin	  recovery.	  
• barrier	  delays	  –	  delays	  in	  reconstruction	  following	  an	  earthquake	  can	  create	  
significant	  barriers	  to	  recovery.	  
• barrier	  communication	  –	  the	  loss	  of	  communication	  tools	  i.e.	  radio,	  TV.,	  Internet,	  
phones,	  etc.	  created	  a	  barrier	  following	  the	  earthquake.	  
• barrier	  insurance	  –	  lack	  of	  or	  no	  insurance	  coverage	  within	  the	  community	  
severely	  hindered	  their	  ability	  to	  respond	  and	  recover	  from	  an	  event.	  
• barrier	  unemployment	  –	  unemployment	  after	  an	  earthquake	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  
recovery.	  
• barrier	  preexisting	  social	  issues	  –	  social	  issues	  that	  existed	  before	  the	  EQ	  were	  
magnified	  afterwards.	  
• barrier	  unclear	  motivation-­‐-­‐	  too	  many	  differing	  motivations	  for	  participating	  
makes	  implementing	  programs	  difficult.	  
• barrier	  focus-­‐-­‐	  either	  too	  specific	  or	  too	  broad	  a	  focus	  hinders	  success.	  
• barrier	  assessment-­-­	  there	  is	  not	  a	  formal	  assessment	  or	  review	  of	  the	  program	  
which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  measure	  success.	  
• barrier	  building	  practices-­‐-­‐	  building	  practices	  are	  unsafe	  and/or	  there	  are	  not	  
formal	  licensing	  requirements	  to	  build	  safely.	  
	  
	  
Information	  Preferences	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  capture	  how	  professionals	  want	  to	  
have	  information	  delivered	  to	  them	  and	  explanations	  why.	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  may	  also	  be	  
used	  to	  describe	  which	  of	  these	  information	  channels	  have	  been	  effectively	  used	  to	  
communicate	  risk	  to	  others.	  	  
• preference	  maps	  –	  deliver	  information	  in	  map	  format.	  	  
• preference	  charts	  –	  deliver	  data	  in	  charts,	  statistical	  tables,	  etc.	  	  
• preference	  online	  –	  deliver	  information	  online.	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• preference	  downloadable	  –	  deliver	  information	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  can	  be	  
downloaded	  and	  transferred	  to	  computers,	  smart	  phones,	  iPads,	  etc.;	  in	  the	  event	  of	  
an	  Internet	  outage,	  this	  will	  still	  allow	  data	  to	  be	  accessed.	  	  
• preference	  work	  –	  deliver	  information	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  professionals	  can	  use	  the	  
information	  in	  their	  workplace,	  to	  present	  information	  to	  their	  colleagues	  to	  educate	  
them	  regarding	  risk.	  	  
• preference	  public	  –	  deliver	  information	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  professionals	  can	  use	  
the	  information	  for	  public	  presentations,	  meant	  for	  a	  general	  audience,	  to	  educate	  
laypersons	  regarding	  risk.	  	  	  
• preference	  all-­hazards	  –	  deliver	  information	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  can	  be	  integrated	  with	  
an	  all-­‐hazards	  plan	  and	  perspective.	  	  
• preference	  tips	  –	  any	  general	  discussion	  of	  how	  risk	  communication	  “works”;	  
description	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  channels	  for	  relaying	  risk	  information.	  	  
• preference	  other	  reputable	  organizations/departments	  –	  prefer	  to	  have	  
information	  delivered	  to	  them	  through	  other	  departments	  in	  the	  government	  or	  
other	  organizations	  that	  they	  trust.	  
	  
	  
Earthquake	  Concerns	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  refers	  to	  concerns	  expressed	  regarding	  
earthquakes.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  theme	  is	  to	  help	  inform	  how	  different	  community	  institutions	  
want	  to	  engage	  in	  DRR,	  but	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  due	  to	  particular	  barriers.	  
• concern	  intensity	  –	  concern	  regarding	  the	  intensity,	  speed,	  depth,	  etc.	  of	  an	  
earthquake.	  	  
• concern	  soft	  story	  building	  –	  concern	  that	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  building	  will	  
collapse	  and	  cause	  additional	  “ripple	  effects”	  (e.g.,	  gas	  line	  explosions).	  	  
• concern	  unreinforced	  masonry	  buildings	  –	  concern	  that	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  
building	  will	  collapse.	  
• concern	  non-­ductile	  concrete	  –	  concern	  that	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  building	  will	  
collapse.	  	  
• concern	  historic	  structures	  –	  concern	  that	  historic	  structures	  will	  be	  damaged,	  
destroyed,	  and/or	  demolished	  after	  an	  earthquake.	  	  
• concern	  buildings	  general	  –	  general	  concern	  that	  “buildings”	  (any	  type)	  will	  fall	  
down	  or	  are	  at	  risk	  in	  some	  way.	  
• concern	  bridges	  roads	  –	  concern	  that	  bridges	  or	  roads	  will	  be	  impassable,	  will	  
collapse,	  etc.	  
• concern	  lifelines	  –	  concern	  that	  gas,	  electric,	  water,	  sewage	  or	  other	  critical	  
lifelines	  will	  be	  damaged.	  	  
• concern	  nuclear	  –	  concern	  that	  a	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  is	  in	  an	  earthquake	  fault	  
zone.	  	  
• concern	  emergency	  access	  –	  concern	  that	  due	  to	  destruction	  of	  lifelines,	  
emergency	  personnel	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  the	  city.	  	  
• concern	  communication	  –	  concern	  that	  communication	  technologies	  such	  as	  
phones,	  Internet,	  text	  messaging	  will	  not	  work.	  	  
• concern	  vulnerable	  populations	  –	  concern	  that	  vulnerable	  groups	  (homeless,	  
disabled,	  etc.)	  will	  be	  harmed	  or	  killed.	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• concern	  liquefaction	  –	  concern	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  city	  will	  experience	  liquefaction	  or	  
that	  liquefaction	  has	  not	  been	  dealt	  with	  appropriately.	  	  
• concern	  landslides	  –	  concern	  that	  landslides	  will	  occur.	  	  	  
• concern	  fire	  –	  concern	  that	  fires	  will	  occur	  due	  to	  broken	  gas	  lines	  or	  other	  issues	  
associated	  with	  the	  earthquake.	  	  
• concern	  tsunami	  –	  concern	  that	  a	  tsunami	  will	  result	  from	  an	  earthquake,	  causing	  
more	  damage	  and	  	  loss.	  	  
• concern	  population	  displacement	  –	  concern	  that	  people	  will	  leave	  after	  the	  
earthquake	  and	  will	  not	  return.	  	  	  
• concern	  other	  hazards	  –	  concern	  that	  other	  hazards	  will	  occur	  (outside	  of	  an	  
earthquake)	  that	  may	  affect	  operations	  (e.g.,	  global	  warming,	  environmental	  
contamination,	  etc.)	  	  
• concern	  overall	  survival	  –	  concern	  that	  members	  of	  the	  community	  will	  not	  
survive	  an	  earthquake.	  	  
• concern	  home	  –	  concern	  that	  people’s	  homes	  will	  not	  survive	  a	  seismic	  event.	  
• concern	  business	  continuity	  –	  concern	  that	  loss	  of	  a	  community	  business	  will	  
result	  in	  a	  decrease	  of	  or	  complete	  loss	  of	  morale.	  
• concern	  overall	  public	  health	  and	  safety	  –	  concern	  for	  the	  overall	  public	  health	  
and	  safety	  of	  a	  community	  or	  neighborhood.	  
• concern	  general	  community	  –	  concern	  for	  the	  community	  in	  general.	  
• concern	  affordable	  housing	  –	  concern	  that	  earthquake	  damage	  would	  decrease	  
the	  amount	  of	  affordable	  housing	  available.	  
• concern	  evacuation	  –	  concern	  that	  individuals	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  evacuate	  
buildings	  and/or	  homes	  safely.	  
• concern	  sheltering	  –	  concern	  that	  the	  city	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  adequately	  
shelter	  evacuated	  populations	  or	  that	  citizens	  will	  not	  be	  prepared	  to	  shelter	  in	  
place.	  
• concern	  crime	  –	  concern	  that	  crime	  rates	  will	  increase	  after	  a	  disaster.	  
• concern	  chaos	  –	  concern	  that	  there	  will	  be	  generalized	  chaos,	  disorder,	  or	  social	  
breakdown	  after	  a	  disaster.	  	  
• concern	  dense	  population	  –	  concern	  that	  high	  risk	  areas	  are	  densely	  populated.	  
• concern	  informal	  living	  –	  concern	  about	  people	  living	  in	  informal	  settings,	  e.g.	  
squatters,	  invaders,	  shanty	  towns,	  etc.	  
• concern	  for	  private	  sector	  buildings	  –	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  oversight	  from	  
appropriate	  professionals,	  private	  sector	  buildings	  are	  not	  as	  safe	  as	  public	  
buildings.	  
• concern	  interference	  private	  sector	  buildings	  –	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  within	  the	  
organization	  that	  in	  order	  to	  plan	  with	  private	  building	  owners,	  you	  must	  interfere.	  
• concern	  consciousness	  of	  the	  public	  about	  their	  risk	  –	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  about	  
the	  public’s	  lack	  of	  consciousness	  about	  their	  true	  earthquake	  risk.	  
• concern	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  –	  despite	  well-­‐intentioned	  codes,	  regulations,	  and	  
legislation,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  enforcement,	  making	  these	  laws	  
useless/void.	  
• concern	  non-­structural	  mitigation	  –	  concerned	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  non-­‐structural	  
mitigation	  (community	  awareness	  as	  well	  as	  implementation).	  
• concern	  small	  businesses-­‐	  concern	  that	  small	  businesses	  will	  not	  survive	  an	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earthquake.	  
• concern	  not	  enough	  –	  concern	  that,	  despite	  their	  efforts,	  what	  is	  being	  done	  is	  still	  
not	  enough	  to	  sufficiently	  prepare	  
• concern	  earthquake	  philosophy	  –	  any	  time	  the	  interviewee	  shows	  concern	  
through	  a	  philosophical	  discussion	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  earthquakes.	  
• concern	  lifestyle	  disruption	  –	  community	  members	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  
disruption	  that	  earthquake	  risk	  reduction	  programs	  and	  activities	  will	  cause	  in	  their	  
life.	  This	  worry	  leads	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  community	  support,	  hindering	  earthquake	  risk	  
reduction	  programs	  and	  activities.	  
• concern	  unstable	  land	  –	  concern	  that	  the	  land	  or	  soil	  is	  unstable	  and	  settlements	  in	  
these	  areas	  will	  be	  damaged.	  
• concern	  floating	  population	  –	  concern	  that	  many	  people	  in	  the	  city	  do	  not	  live	  
there	  permanently.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  incoming	  and	  outgoing	  population.	  
• concern	  proper	  burial	  –	  concern	  that	  there	  will	  be	  (was)	  so	  many	  dead	  bodies	  
without	  caskets	  that	  people	  will	  have	  to	  be	  buried	  in	  mass	  graves.	  
• concern	  response	  capacity	  –	  interviewee	  displays	  concern	  for	  the	  response	  
capacity	  of	  the	  community/organization	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  
• concern	  temporary	  work	  locations	  –	  concern	  about	  working	  from	  home	  or	  in	  
temporary	  office	  spaces	  post-­‐earthquake.	  
• concern	  critical	  buildings	  –	  concern	  that	  critical	  buildings	  such	  as	  hospitals,	  public	  
works,	  schools,	  etc.	  will	  remain	  functional	  following	  an	  earthquake.	  
• concern	  insurance	  –	  any	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  insurance	  companies	  have	  played	  
post-­‐disaster	  or	  the	  role	  that	  they	  will	  play	  in	  the	  future.	  
• concern	  psychological	  impacts	  –	  concern	  that	  earthquake	  events	  have	  a	  negative	  
psychological	  impact	  on	  community	  members.	  
• concern	  rebuild	  –	  concerns	  about	  the	  plans	  for	  rebuilding	  the	  city	  post-­‐earthquake.	  
• concern	  media	  –	  concern	  that	  information	  presented	  in	  media	  reporting	  is	  often	  
inaccurate	  and	  can	  have	  serious	  implications	  for	  recovery.	  	  
• concern	  fatigue	  –	  concern	  that	  people	  who	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  earthquakes	  are	  
experiencing	  fatigue,	  which	  is	  hindering	  their	  ability	  to	  prepare	  for	  future	  events.	  
• concern	  displacement	  –	  concern	  about	  members	  of	  the	  community	  that	  have	  been	  
or	  will	  be	  displaced	  from	  the	  homes	  due	  to	  an	  earthquake.	  
• concern	  disaster	  relief	  funds	  –	  concern	  that	  disaster	  relief	  funds	  are	  not	  being	  
used	  appropriately.	  	  
• concern	  type	  of	  earthquake	  –	  concern	  that	  earthquakes	  can	  come	  from	  all	  
different	  directions	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  shaking	  which	  makes	  risk	  hard	  to	  
estimate.	  
• concern	  preparedness	  –	  interviewee	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  preparedness	  
capacity	  of	  their	  community.	  
• concern	  temporary	  housing	  –	  concerns	  about	  people	  in	  temporary	  housing	  
following	  an	  earthquake.	  
• concern	  post-­‐earthquake	  research	  ethics	  –	  ethical	  concerns	  about	  post	  disaster	  
research.	  
• concern	  schools	  –	  concern	  that	  school	  are	  not	  or	  will	  not	  be	  up	  and	  running	  quickly	  
after	  an	  earthquake.	  
• concern	  students	  –	  concern	  that	  students	  education	  is/will	  suffer	  following	  an	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earthquake.	  
• concern	  time	  of	  day	  –	  concern	  that	  an	  earthquake	  would	  be	  more	  harmful	  at	  night	  
than	  during	  the	  day.	  
• concern	  dependency	  on	  relief	  aid	  –	  concern	  that	  community	  members	  become	  
dependant	  on	  disaster	  relief	  aid,	  which	  affects	  their	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  trajectory.	  
• concern	  NGO’s	  –	  concern	  that	  NGO's	  are	  either	  not	  doing	  an	  adequate	  job	  or	  that	  
there	  are	  too	  many	  overlapping/conflicting	  services	  after	  an	  earthquake.	  
• concern	  flood	  –	  concern	  that	  flooding	  will	  occur.	  
	  
	  
Risk	  Perception	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  concerns	  levels	  of	  risk	  perception	  (high,	  low,	  non-­‐
existent)	  among	  different	  actors.	  This	  theme	  gives	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  the	  
participant’s	  perspective	  as	  they	  consider	  their	  community	  and	  institutional	  involvement	  
in	  DRR.	  	  
• risk	  perception	  public	  –	  descriptions	  of	  how	  concerned	  “people”	  or	  “the	  public”	  
are	  about	  earthquake	  threats.	  	  
• risk	  perception	  children	  –	  descriptions	  of	  how	  children	  think	  about	  earthquake	  
risk.	  	  
• risk	  perception	  powerful	  –	  descriptions	  of	  how	  those	  in	  powerful	  positions—
either	  within	  the	  interviewees’	  own	  organization	  or	  other	  powerful	  actors	  outside	  
the	  organization—think	  about	  earthquake	  risk.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Survey	  Questions	  –	  This	  set	  of	  codes	  should	  be	  used	  to	  capture	  the	  responses	  to	  the	  
probes	  asked	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview,	  after	  the	  interviewee	  has	  taken	  the	  survey.	  If	  the	  
interviewee	  speaks	  to	  other	  relevant	  issues,	  codes,	  or	  themes,	  they	  should	  be	  captured.	  
This	  theme	  helps	  clarify	  why	  the	  interviewee	  answered	  the	  way	  they	  did	  on	  the	  survey.	  
• survey	  most	  important	  –	  response	  to	  the	  question	  “which	  of	  these	  items	  is	  most	  
critical,	  or	  important	  to	  you,	  and	  why?”	  	  
• survey	  format	  –	  survey	  response	  to	  the	  question	  “what	  format	  do	  you	  prefer	  to	  
received	  your	  information	  in?”	  
• survey	  needs	  –	  any	  discussion	  of	  explicitly	  stated	  needs,	  what	  the	  interviewee	  
would	  like	  to	  have	  access	  to,	  etc.	  	  
• survey	  trust	  –	  what	  makes	  you	  trust/distrust	  the	  sources	  where	  you	  currently	  
receive	  your	  information?	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Appendix	  K:	  Survey	  Questionnaire	  –	  Turkish	  
Küresel	  Deprem	  Modeli	  Vakfı	  Anketi	  
	  
	  
Kurumunuzu,	  buradaki	  topluluğu	  ve	  buraya	  hizmet	  eden	  insanları	  
düşünerek	  cevap	  veriniz.	  Aşağıdakilerden	  hangisine	  deprem	  riskini	  anlama	  
yönünden	  sahipsiniz	  yada	  sahip	  olmak	  isterdiniz?(Not:	  Eğer	  aşağıdaki	  
kaynaklara	  erişiminiz	  olduğu	  halde	  bu	  kaynağı	  Küresel	  Deprem	  Modeli’	  nin	  
















Bir	  depremdeki	  yer	  sarsıntı	  miktarı	  tahmini?	  	   	   	   	   	  
Bölgenizdeki	  fay	  hatları	  haritası.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Deprem	  tarafından	  tetiklenebilecek	  potansiyel	  toprak	  kayması	  yada	  tsunami	  
haritaları.	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  gerçekleşen	  ölüm	  sayısı	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  	  yaralanan	  sayısı	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Farklı	  nüfuslardaki	  etkilerinin	  tahmini.	  (Yaşlılar,	  evsizler	  …	  vs.)	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  hasar	  gören	  konut	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  hasar	  gören	  okul	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  hasar	  gören	  işyeri	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  hasar	  gören	  hastane	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  hasar	  gören	  yol,	  köprü	  ve	  altyapı	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  zarar	  gören	  elektrik,	  doğalgaz	  ve	  su	  taşıma	  sistemleri	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  cep	  telefonu	  şebekelerinde	  meydana	  gelecek	  hasar	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  internet	  ağında	  meydana	  gelecek	  hasar	  tahmini.	  	   	   	   	   	  
Depremde	  oluşacak	  ekonomik	  kayıp	  tahmini.	   	   	   	   	  
Bireylerin	  ve	  ailelerin	  depreme	  nasıl	  hazırlanacakları	  konusunda	  bilgi.	   	   	   	   	  
Kurumların	  deprem	  için	  nasıl	  hazırlanacakları	  konusunda	  bilgi.	   	   	   	   	  
Binaların	  içerisindekilerin	  deprem	  sırasında	  düşmeden	  durabileceği	  süre	  
miktarını	  artırma	  hakkında	  bilgi.	  
	   	   	   	  
Binaların	  deprem	  sırasında	  yıkılmamaları	  için	  nasıl	  güçlendirilebilecekleri	  
hakkında	  bilgi.	  
	   	   	   	  
Deprem	  riskini	  belirleyebilecek	  ve	  açıklayacak	  eksperlere	  erişim.	   	   	   	   	  
Depreme	  karşı	  hazırlık	  konusunda	  bireylere	  ve	  kurumlara	  yardımcı	  olacak	  teknik	  
uzmanlara	  erişim.	  	  
	   	   	   	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Çalıştığınız	  kurum	  deprem	  riskini	  azaltma	  konusunda	  yürüteceği	  
aktivitelerde	  hangi	  önemli	  yada	  daha	  önemsiz	  engelleri	  deneyimledi?	  













Maddi	  yetersizlik.	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Bu	  gibi	  çalışmalara	  ayıracak	  zaman	  yetersizliği.	   	   	   	   	   	  
Bu	  gibi	  çalışmalarda	  yer	  alacak	  çalışan	  yetersizliği.	   	   	   	   	   	  
Teknik	  yetersizlikler.	   	   	   	   	   	  
Yetersiz	  deprem	  bilgisi.	   	   	   	   	   	  
Diğer	  daha	  kritik,	  sosyal	  yada	  ekonomik	  problemler.	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Diğer	  daha	  ciddi	  tehlikeler.	   	   	   	   	   	  
Meslektaşların	  deprem	  tehlikesi	  konusuna	  karşı	  yeteri	  kadar	  ilgili	  
olmaması.	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Hizmet	  ettiğiniz	  kitlenin	  deprem	  tehlikesine	  karşı	  yeteri	  kadar	  ilgili	  
olmaması.	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Profesyonel	  	  	  amaçlar	  için	  bilgileri	  nasıl	  aldığınızı	  ve	  paylaştığınızı	  düşündüğünüzde	  aşağıdaki	  bilgi	  













Bu	  olanak	  var	  
ama	  kullanışlı	  
değil	  
Gazeteler	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Radyo	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Televizyon	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sosyal	  paylaşım	  siteleri	  (Facebook,	  
Twitter…vs.)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	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Bilimsel	  yayınlar	  (Kitaplar,	  makaleler,	  mesleki	  
dergiler…vs.)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
E-­‐posta	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Telefon	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Meslektaşlarla	  bilgi	  alışverişi	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Bilim	  uzmanları	  ile	  bilgi	  alışverişi	  
(Mühendisler,	  araştırmacılar,	  
akademisyenler…vs.)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Haber	  siteleri	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Hükümet	  siteleri	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Deprem	  veya	  doğal	  afet	  siteleri	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Deprem	  tehlike	  haritaları	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Çalıştığıınız	  binanın	  bir	  depremde	  hasar	  göreceğini	  öğrenmiş	  olsaydınız	  
aşağıdakilerden	  hangi	  bilgiye	  sahip	  olurdunuz	  yada	  olmak	  isterdiniz?	  
	  










Depremden	  sonra	  binadaki	  hasarı	  telafi	  etmek	  için	  tahmini	  masraf	  miktarı.	  
	  
	   	   	   	  
Depremden	  sonra	  binanın	  onarılana	  dek	  tahmini	  ne	  kadar	  sure	  (gün,	  hafta,	  
ay…)kullanıma	  kapalı	  kalacağı.	  
	   	   	   	  
Deprem	  sırasında	  binanın	  tamemen	  yıkılma	  olasılığı,	  içerisindeki	  tahmini	  
potansiyel	  yaralı	  ve	  ölü	  sayısı.	  
	   	   	   	  
Binanınızın	  deprem	  olmadan	  once	  daha	  az	  zarar	  görmesi	  yada	  yıkılmaması	  için	  
tahmini	  	  güçlendirme	  çalışması	  tutarı.	  
	   	   	   	  
ADINIZ:________________________________	  
	  
